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"It is of first importance to have a definition so clear cut that it
will not invite extensive threshold litigation over jurisdic-
tion."
-The American Law Institute'
The law governing federal-court jurisdiction is unnecessarily compli-
cated. It will become even more complicated if the American Law
Institute has its way.
Since 1959, gently prodded by Mr. Chief Justice Warren,2 the Insti-
tute has come up with proposals for comprehensive revisions of the
Judicial Code. It is refreshing to see the Institute turn its attention to
legislative drafting, for we have had a surfeit of Restatements and a
dearth of good statutes. It is also encouraging that such an influential
and intelligent body is concerned with federal jurisdiction; the subject
touches the most sensitive nerves of federalism and of the separation of
powers, as well as pervading even the humblest accident case, and the
confusion and frequent irrationality of the present law cry aloud for
correction.
Many of the ALI suggestions, especially among those not relating to
diversity jurisdiction, are desirable advances. But in seeking to make
the law of jurisdiction rational the Institute has too often ignored its
own excellent principle, quoted above, that the law should be easy to
apply. Jurisdiction should be as self-regulated as breathing; the prin-
cipal job of the courts is to decide whether the plaintiff gets his money,3
and litigation over whether the case is in the right court is essentially
a waste of time and resources.
I recognize that important policies such as the desirability of a federal
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This is the first installment of a two-
part article. The second part will appear in the Winter 1969 Issue, Volume 36, number 2.
1 STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, pt. I, at 72
(Official Draft 1965) [Hereinafter cited as OFFICAL DRAFT].
2 See OFFicIL DRAFT, pt. I, at vii.
8 Or his injunction, or his divorce, and so on; but let us not quibble.
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forum for the vindication of federal rights or respect for legitimate state
interests underlie the delineation of federal jurisdiction. When the
choice of forum seems likely to make a substantial difference in the out-
come of a case, as, for example, in prosecutions of civil-rights workers
for demonstrations in Mississippi,4 detailed attention to the particular
case may be warranted. But since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins5 the instances
in which a substantial difference is predictable have been relatively few;
in determining diversity jurisdiction, for example, it may be less impor-
tant to assure disposition of each case in strict accord with jurisdictional
policy than to avoid threshold litigation over the place of trial.
Maintaining our parallel state and federal court systems is an expen-
sive habit, for it makes some jurisdictional litigation inevitable. Neither
Australia nor Canada has so serious a problem; both federations seem to
get along well enough by leaving most of the business of trial and initial
appeal to state or provincial courts, with a federal court of last resort
open to correct errors and to maintain uniformity.6
The ALI, prudently, makes no attempt to emulate the Australian
or Canadian experience. Despite the views of Mr. Justice Story,7 it
seems to be generally accepted that Congress could eliminate the dual
system by abolishing all inferior federal courts; 8 but Congress is not
about to do it. Because of persistent state-federal hostilities, historically
more acute here than in Australia or in Canada, we do not seem to have
4 See Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights:
Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 793, 794-9 (1965).
5 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6 Some original federal jurisdiction, however, is vested in the Exchequer Court of
Canada, and in the Australian High Court, Commonwealth Industrial Court, Federal
Court of Bankruptcy, and courts of the Australian Capital Territory. See Commonwealth
of Australia Constitution Act of 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12, as amended, §§ 71-80; Judiciary
Act 1903-1959 (Austl.) §§ 30, 38, 38A, 39; British North America Act of 1867, 30-31 Vict.,
c. 3, §§ 96, 99, 101; Supreme Court Act, CAN. Rv. STAT. c. 259, §§ 35, 36, 55, 57, 62 (1952);
Exchequer Court Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 98, §§ 17-19, 21-22, 26, 29 (1952); Z. COWEN,
FEDERAL JURMI5IMfnON IN AUSTRALIA 21, 78, 92, 96-97 (1959), finding reason for dissatisfaction
with the original jurisdiction of the High Court.
7 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-31 (1816).
8 See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850), upholding the power of Congress to
deny diversity jurisdiction when the plaintiff's assignor could not have sued in federal
court; H. HART & H. WECHsLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEIM 17-18, 293
(1953), arguing that Story's position contradicts the "deliberate compromises of the Con-
stitutional Convention"; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1: "such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." General federal-question jurisdiction was
not conferred until 1875, see HART & WEcnsLER, supra, at 727-30. Arguably, however, Article
I requires that some federal trial court be open for habeas corpus. See Eisentrager v. For-
restal, 174 F.2d 961, 965-6 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
See generally D. CusR.E, FEDERAL CouRTs 87-105 (1968).
Federal Jurisdiction
reached the point where Supreme Court review of state courts is always
adequate to assure recognition of federal rights.9 Moreover, federal
procedures are relatively enlightened; and the life tenure, indepen-
dence, respectable salary, and prestige of the federal bench have at-
tracted, by and large, judges of relatively high caliber. Many of us
would hate to see federal courts go, for they are pretty good courts-
considering, as Theodore Green is reputed to have said when asked
how he felt on his ninety-third birthday, the alternative.
To achieve a unitary system by abolishing the state courts, however,
is at least as unthinkable today. A constitutional amendment very
likely would be required, although the result might be approximated
by expanding diversity jurisdiction to encompass cases in which any
two opposing parties are diverse; 10 conferring a protective federal-
question jurisdiction, if that is allowable,11 over the very nearly all-
embracing category of cases affecting interstate commerce; 12 and making
federal jurisdiction exclusive across the board.13 Even if the federal
courts under such a scheme purported to follow state law, however, the
effective destruction of the state courts would entail a significant shift
in the division of federal and state lawmaking powers, for it would de-
prive the states of the ability to construe their own statutes and to make
common law.' 4 With both states' rights and the plums of judicial
patronage at stake, the political obstacles would be overwhelming.
Some day, perhaps, we may hope that a single system of courts can be
established to assure both a high degree of competence and indepen-
dence and a local control of judicial lawmaking commensurate with
local legislative power. Appointment by the Governor, with federal
guarantees of tenure and irreducible salary, might do the trick. But the
time is not ripe.
This side of Utopia some accommodation must be made for the ef-
9 See Professor Amsterdam's vivid description, for example, of the performance of
Mississippi state courts in prosecutions arising out of civil-rights activities cited in note 4
supra at 794-9.
10 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 US. 523, 530-1 (1967), established that
this would be constitutional.
11 See HART F& WEcsL.R, supra note 8, at 371-2. This issue is discussed in text at notes
69-73 infra.
12 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
13 The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 429-31 (1867), sustains exclusive federal
jurisdiction.
14 See Williams, The Role of Federal Courts in Diversity Cases Involving Mineral
Resources, 13 U. KAN. L. R.v. 375, 387-8 (1965), saying that even with concurrent jurisdic-
tion the federal courts are "winning" the "contest" over adjudicating questions of state
law in mineral cases: "[P]erhaps the leading jurist in oil and gas matters is to be found
in a federal rather than a state court.,.."
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fective operation of two sets of courts. The cases ought to be divided
between the two systems in such a way that both are given the maximum
opportunity to serve the purposes for which they exist; and the division
ought to be as easy to administer as is consistent with those purposes.
A great many improvements along these lines can be made in the exist-
ing distribution of federal and state jurisdiction, and a great many can
be made in the ALI proposals.
I proceed to the bill of particulars.
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
1. Retention of the Jurisdiction
Of necessity the Law Institute has entered the Great Debate over
whether diversity jurisdiction should be abolished or retained. I must
say I find this controversy rather boring; I cannot agree with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter that diversity is a great curse15 or with Judge Parker that
it is a great blessing.16
Since Erie and Klaxon 7 the most respectable argument for diversity
jurisdiction has been that it protects outsiders from state-court dis-
crimination.'8 Only meager attempts have been made to test the
15 See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520-6 (1928); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S.
48, 53-60 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., 337 U.S. 582, 650-1 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For other negative responses
to diversity jurisdiction see R. JACKSON, THE SuPaxas COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYsrEar OF
GOVERNMENT 36-37 (1955); Doub, Time for Re-Evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity
Jurisdiction? 44 A.B.A.J. 243 (1958); Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction,
41 HARv. L. RPv. 483, 510 (1928); Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 132 (1923); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and
the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 234-40 (1948).
16 See Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A.J. 433,
437-9 (1932); Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 407,
408-11 (1956). Accord, Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in
Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A.J. 601, 604 (1922); Farage, Proposed Code Will Emasculate Diver-
sity Jurisdiction, TRIAL, April-May 1966, at 30; Marbury, Why Should We Limit Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction?, 46 A.B.A.J. 379, 380 (1960); Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdic-
tion: Past, Present, and Future, 43 Tx. L. REv. 1 (1964).
17 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941).
18 The Supreme Court has often said this is the purpose of the jurisdiction. E.g., Bank
of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945). See also Warren, supra note 15, at 83. For the
view that the basis of diversity was the fear of state legislative action against creditors,
not of court bias against nonresidents as such, see Friendly, supra note 15, at 492-8.
One might of course advocate overruling Klaxon and retaining diversity jurisdiction to
assure impartial administration of a new federal doctrine of choice among state laws;
this would involve the considerations respecting original federal-question jurisdiction,
[Vol. 36:1
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factual accuracy of this argument by the tools of social science,19 and it
is not obvious either that prejudice against nonresidents is a terrible
problem now20 or that federal jurisdiction is an effective antidote.21
My hunch is that it is too early to say that xenophobia has disappeared
from the American scene, but I can appreciate the argument that the
danger of bias is not great enough to justify the burden on federal
courts and the interference with state prerogative that diversity jurisdic-
tion entails.
Like an Orwellian broken record, John P. Frank has unabashedly
argued for diversity jurisdiction on a broader basis: State Courts Bad,
Federal Courts Good.22 I have come to modulate my original horrified
which will be discussed in Part II of this article. Despite Erie's well-grounded constitutional
arguments, Congress probably has power under the Commerce Clause and the federal-
question provision in Article III to repeal the Rules of Decision Act and reinstate an
enlarged federal common law in diversity cases, see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Such a sweeping shift in lawmaking powers, responsive to no
greater pressure than a general bias in favor of the federal government and a desire to
avoid choice-of-law problems, is not to be expected in a revision of the Judicial Code.
19 Two recent, modest studies involved questioning attorneys about why they chose to
take diversity cases to federal courts. See Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice
of Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 IA. L. REv. 933, 937-8 (1962), finding that only 4.3% of
responding Wisconsin lawyers even mentioned bias and that "geographical convenience,
availability of broader discovery procedures, and the notion that federal juries render
higher awards are the most frequently indicated reasons for preferring a federal court";
Note, The Choice Between State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in Virginia, 51
VA. L. REv. 178, 179-84 (1965), reporting that 60% of responding Virginia attorneys assigned
bias against out-of-state plaintiffs as a reason for choosing the federal court.
It is not altogether clear what questions the researcher should put in attempting to
assess the bias problem. To ask attorneys why they go to federal court is to obtain their
opinion as to the existence of bias; if bias in fact is minimal, perhaps we should reconsider
the desirability of burdening the system with diversity jurisdiction in order to allay
groundless apprehensions. To ask state-court judges and prospective jurors whether they
would be fair to out-of-state litigants seems to my lay eye to invite unreliable responses;
who wants to brand himself a bigot? Subtle questionnaires like those employed to test
anti-Semitism (see T. W. ADoRuo, ET AL., TIE AurTorrARIAN PEFsONALrrY 57-101 (1950))
might be devised, or an attempt made to determine by examining judgments whether
outsiders lose a disproportionate number of cases in state courts or fare better in federal.
But would the findings be worth the trouble?
20 Perhaps the situation most persuasive to Northern minds is that of a Yankee litigant
in a Southern court. But even in this context New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 278 Ala.
656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), rev'd, 876 U.S. 254 (1964), was an atypical case because of its
direct connection with the racial issue. A grant of jurisdiction in suits between citizens
of different states arising out of a controversy over Negro rights might take care of most
cases of probable bias.
21 It might be more effective if federal jurors were drawn from districts embracing parts
of two or more states and if federal judges were more often assigned duties away from
home. But there is some protection because the jurors are drawn from a fairly large
district, because the judges are relatively free from political pressures, and possibly even
because of the subconscious influence of being a part of the national government.
22 See Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YAx L.J. 7 (1963); Frank.
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reaction to Mr. Frank's position, for what he proposes is no more a
perversion of constitutional authority than is the common use of the
tax and commerce powers to combat such nuisances as machine guns,
prostitution, and child labor;23 I am left to confess that, like Chief
Justice Taft,24 I am not yet wholly reconciled to Champion v. Ames.25
In brief, I cannot view either the retention or the abolition of diver-
sity jurisdiction with appreciable choler. But after studying the In-
stitute's proposals and essaying to improve on them, I am tempted to
say that the impossibility of drafting sensible and workable limits for
diversity cases is reason enough to abandon the jurisdiction.
The slightly sadistic will find it entertaining to follow the Institute's
tortuous path to the conclusion that diversity ought to be retained.26
The commentary begins with a ringing denunciation of the jurisdic-
tion: "So long as federal courts continue to decide cases arising under
state law without the possibility of state review, the state's judicial
power is less extensive than its legislative power; this is an undesirable
interference with state autonomy." 27 Not only is diversity bad for the
states; it is bad for the federal courts too, for in diversity cases the
federal courts lack "the creative function which is essential to their
dignity and prestige." 2 Nor can diversity be justified today by its
original policies of encouraging free movement of capital among the
states or of enhancing the prestige of the federal government; the
latter goal was long ago achieved, and there is no longer any reason to
fear that an inability to take refuge in federal court will deter interstate
investment. "Proof that diversity jurisdiction fulfilled a useful purpose
at some time in the past is of course not proof that it continues to do
so."
29
Then, abruptly, the Reporters land a swift right to their own jaw,
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction-An Opposing View, 17 So. CAR. L. REv. 676 (1965). The
logic of Mr. Frank's position suggests not only that diversity jurisdiction be retained but
that federal courts be opened to their fullest constitutional extent; to limit the proposal
to preserving the existing jurisdiction is an exercise in Realpolitik.
23 See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), overruled in other respects in
Marchett! v. United States 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (gambling); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300
U.S. 506 (1937) (guns); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941), overruling
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (child labor); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S.
308 (1913) (Mann Act).
24 See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (child labor).
25 188 US. 321 (1903) (lottery). Indeed the diversity proposition is by far the easier to
accept, for there is no doubt that Congress has power to create jurisdiction of Article III
cases regardless of its reasons for doing so.
26 OFkFCAL DRAr, pt. I, at 47-56.
27 Id. at 47.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 49.
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shifting the burden of proof before suggesting any present need for
diversity jurisdiction:
Ever since 1789 the federal government has pledged to travelers
away from their home states the even-handed justice of its own
courts. This pledge is so woven into the fabric of our society
that it is taken for granted. It should not lightly be with-
drawn. General diversity jurisdiction should be retained
unless it can be asserted with confidence that the shortcomings
of the state court justice which originally gave rise to it no
longer exist to any significant degree.30
Turning to the question of bias, the commentary seems first to
demolish the case for diversity jurisdiction again by declaring that
"none of the significant prejudices which beset our society today begins
or ends when a state line is traversed."31 But do not despair, gentle
reader; although racial, religious, and economic bias may operate
equally against local people, "the bias which was formerly thought to op-
erate against out-of-staters as such seems still to exist to some degree with
respect to persons from a more distant part of the country."32 Besides,
prejudice is but one aspect of the overall problem met by diversity
jurisdiction, namely, "the possible shortcomings of state justice."33 For
example, when state venue provisions "localize the place of trial in
small constituencies ... justice is likely to be impeded by the provin-
cialism of the local judge and jury, the tendency to favor one of their
own against an outsider, and the machinations of the local 'court house
gang.' ',34 In addition, "there have been in some states such infirmities
in practice and procedure as to jeopardize the fairness of adjudica-
tion,"35 and some metropolitan state courts "are so congested that justice
to litigants, including out-of-staters, is unconscionably delayed." 86 Con-
cededly these difficulties may be equally present in suits between parties
from the same state; but the Institute hastens to avoid the inference that
it is embracing Mr. Frank's argument that diversity should be retained
just because federal courts are better courts:
[T]he fact that in-staters are not or cannot be similarly pro-
tected is not decisive. One obvious material difference is that
the citizen of a state, who may share in its political life, is
30 Id. at 51.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 52.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 53.
386 Id.
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properly held to responsibility for its institutions, and forced
to operate within them, in ways which are inappropriate as to
the out-of-stater who has no such general opportunity to play
a role in having the state's system changed.37
Finally, say the Reporters, diversity can be justified apart from the
actual competence or fairness of state courts, in order to prevent the
nonresident who loses a lawsuit from attributing his defeat to bias or
incompetence on the part of the state government, and thus to avoid
what "might otherwise be a source of friction and divisiveness among
the several states and their citizens."38 This consideration is especially
important when an alien is a party: "It is important in the relations of
this country with other nations that any possible appearance of injustice
or tenable ground for resentment be avoided." 39
If you think this is pretty complicated, you're right. I should prefer
to adhere to the straightforward notion that diversity jurisdiction exists
primarily to protect nonresidents from local prejudice. The inter-
pleader example furnishes an additional justification, which the In-
stitute also recognizes: Federal jurisdiction is appropriate when the
multi-state nature of the parties makes it impossible for any state court
to deal adequately with an entire controversy.40 In alien cases, too,
there is something to the argument that the federal government should
assert control over the potential causes of diplomatic embarrassment.
If diversity is to be retained, it should be tailored to meet these
purposes.
2. The Determination of Individual Citizenship
a. The Tests of Nationality and Domicile. The ALI's basic defini-
tion of diversity cases, apart from the red flag with which it begins, 41
is virtually identical to the present section 1332 of Title 28:
§ 1301....
(a) Except as provided in this section and section 1302 of
this title, the district courts shall have jurisdiction, originally
or on removal, of any civil action between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or
subjects thereof; or
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign
states or citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties;
37 Id. at 52-53.
88 Id. at 53.
39 Id. at 54.
40 See text at notes 121-50 infra.
41 See text at notes 207-23 infra.
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where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs....
(c) The word "State," as used in this chapter, includes the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and
any Territory or Possession of the United States.... 42
Except in regard to associations and personal representatives, 43 the
ALI draft, like the present statute, makes no attempt to define "citizen,"
and the traditional tests of nationality for foreign citizenship" and do-
micile for American, 45 while reasonably well understood, leave some-
thing to be desired. To exclude from foreign-citizen jurisdiction the
stateless person48 and the American living abroad,47 as the lower courts
have done, does accord with the purpose of avoiding offense to foreign
governments; 48 but if the danger of local prejudice justifies jurisdiction
over Americans living in other American states, it surely applies to the
stateless and to the expatriate, as well.49 Indeed diversity policy would
warrant jurisdiction on foreign-relations grounds whenever one or
more of the parties is claimed as a national by a foreign country, and on
grounds of bias whenever one party is an American citizen or resident
and the other is not-as well as in some cases wholly between non-
42 OFFiCAL DRArr, pt. I, at 8-9.
48 See text at notes 74-84, 158-76 infra.
44 E.g., Psinakis v. Psinakis, 221 F.2d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 1955); Shoemaker v. Malaxa, 241
F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1957); Pemberton v. Colonna, 290 F.2d 220 (3d Cir. 1961).
45 E.g., Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624-6, (1914).
46 E.g., Shoemaker v. Malaxa, supra note 44.
47 E.g., Van der Schelling v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 756, 761
(E.D. Pa. 1963), holding that "subjects" of a foreign state were aliens who "owed allegiance
to a sovereign monarch," as distinguished from aliens who were "citizens of a democracy."
48 So does the principle, see Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1954),
that the law of a foreign state determines whether a person is its citizen. Less satisfactory
in this light is the holding in Klausner v. Levy, 83 F. Supp. 599, 600 (E.D. Va. 1949), that
a citizen of mandated Palestine was outside the jurisdiction: He was not a British citizen,
though entitled to British diplomatic protection, because Palestine had power to confer
its own citizenship; but Palestine was not a "foreign state" because it had not been
"formally recognized by the executive branch." Executive non-recognition does not imply
an indifference to irritations caused by state courts. Better are the Murarka holding that
India became a "foreign state" substantially before its independence, 215 F.2d at 552, and
the granting of permission to a Cuban agency to sue in Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino, 376
US. 398, 408-12 (1964), despite a break in diplomatic relations.
49 And also, very likely, to a suit between resident and non-resident aliens. But see
Cuozzo v. Italian Line, 168 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), denying jurisdiction because an
alien resident was not a "citizen" of an American state. This decision follows rather
logically from such holdings as Psinakis v. Psinakis, supra note 44, which held a resident
alien diverse to a citizen of the state where he resided. But policy suggests jurisdiction
would be proper in both cases: The resident alien is likely to be favored in a contest with
a total outsider and disfavored when opposing a local citizen, so he arguably should be
held a citizen of both his state of residence (or domicile) and his country of nationality,
diverse (but cf. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, text at note 94 infra) to citizens of either.
1968]
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residents. In order to avoid complexity in drafting or interpretation,
one might therefore propose jurisdiction over all cases in which a non-
resident or noncitizen of the United States is a party.50
In light of the tenuous basis for diversity jurisdiction in any case,
however, the complications which would be engendered by such a
change counsel retention of the simple, established test of nationality.
While the American abroad could easily be held a foreign citizen or
subject, the man without a country, like the suit between two aliens,51
cannot be comfortably fitted into the language of either the existing
statute or the Judiciary Article of the Constitution. If jurisdiction of
such cases is to be sustained, it can only be the result of a statutory
change supported as a grant of protective federal-question jurisdiction
or of jurisdiction outside Article III; both these theories rely on Con-
gressional authority over foreign affairs, and neither has been approved
to date by the Supreme Court.52 Thus expansion of jurisdiction to en-
compass all international cases falling within diversity policy would
entail serious constitutional litigation at the outset. Moreover, it would
import into the foreign-citizen cases the difficult test of domicile or
residence that complicates the present scheme in interstate diversity
cases.
Domicile is an unsatisfactory test for American state citizenship both
because it is difficult to determine and because it too frequently bears
no relation to the probability of bias. John L. Lewis was held diverse
to a Virginian, although he had lived in Virginia for thirty years, be-
cause he still voted in Illinoi. 53 A Michigan woman who had married
an Illinois soldier in Wyoming and returned to Michigan after a few
weeks while he was sent overseas was held diverse to a citizen of Michi-
gan because a wife takes the domicile of her husband.5 4 The notions
that one may be a domiciliary of a place one has never been,5 5 and that
one retains an old domicile long after abandoning it until a new one is
acquired,56 are off base in terms of possible prejudice; and the tests for
G0 The probably rather rare case of dual American and foreign citizenship could most
simply be dealt with by treating the litigant as an American: In accord with Strawbridge
v. Curtiss, text at note 94 infra, his additional foreign citizenship seems unlikely to create
substantial danger of bias. To open the federal courts to Americans claimed by their
countries of origin, on the basis of a fear of foreign embarrassment, seems excessive.
51 See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809), limiting the alien-a-party
statute on constitutional grounds.
52 See text at notes 65-73 infra.
53 Lewis v. Splashdam By-Products Corp., 233 F. Supp. 47, 49 (W.D. Va. 1964).
54 Seegers v. Strzempek, 149 F. Supp. 35, 37 (E.D. Mich. 1957).
55 See R STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 14, illustration 1 (1934),
56 See id. § 15(2): "To acquire a domicile of choice, a person must establish a dwelling-
place with the intention of making it his home." The court justifiably rebelled in Pannill
v. Roanoke Times Co., 252 F, 910 (W.D. Va. 1918), refusing to hold a former Californian
[Vol. 36:1
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determining domicile of people who have concurrent connections with
two states-such as the commuter 57 and the modern Proserpina who
spends summers in New York and winters in Florida5s -are highly
arbitrary. On the other hand domicile provides rather well for the
serviceman or college student away from home,59 for he seems not
unlikely to be considered an outsider by some members of the com-
munity where he is stationed.
Here, as always, it is easier to criticize than to construct a satisfactory
alternative. Bias is a slippery enough concept at best, and an attempt to
isolate its sources becomes largely fantasy in dealing with people as-
sociated with more than one state. Because personal contacts seem more
relevant to possible bias than a probably unknown domiciliary inten-
tion, some concept of settled residence seems a better test than domicile;
it would take care of freakish cases in which a person is held a domicil-
iary of a place with which he has no present connection. But residence
remains quite arbitrary in cases like those of Proserpina or of the com-
muter; it might dictate the less desirable result in the case of the student
or soldier; and residence, like domicile, would be beastly to define.
Voting registration, if it were universal among adults, would be ac-
curate enough in light of its ease of application; automobile registration
would be no solution for those without vehicles or with registrations in
more than one state. Possibly the most universal hallmark would be the
address one places on one's annual income tax return. Unfortunately
there is no assurance that this address corresponds at all with the facts;
it could easily be jimmied to produce or to defeat diversity; and, most
significantly, not everybody files a return. A statutory test in terms of
alternative indices could be devised, taking as conclusive the first avail-
able item in a list such as the following: voting registration, automobile
registration, address on tax return, address filed with draft board,
address filed with welfare agency. Absent any of these, the relatively
rare remaining cases could be determined by the traditional tests of
who had been wandering about for years with no intention to return still a Californian.
The result was to refuse jurisdiction despite the danger of bias, for the other party was
a citizen of the forum state. A better reflection of diversity policy, but of questionable
constitutionality, would allow jurisdiction of suits between persons who are not citizens
of the same state.
57 Home, not business, is decisive under the REsrATEMENT, §§ 12, 13 & comment f.
58 Intention governs, according to the RESTATEMENT, § 15.
59 There is a tendency to treat such people as only visitors where they are stationed,
in contexts such as divorce. E.g., Klingler V. Klingler, 254 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953). This is due partly to the often coerced nature of a soldier's or jailbird's presence,
see RESrATEMENT § 21, and partly to an unwillingness to accept unsubstantiated statements
of intention when the litigant has much to gain by proving a local domicile.
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domicile or of residence or excluded from the jurisdiction for lack of an
easy determining factor.60
Such a test, while one hopes it would prove easy to administer, is
embarrassingly complicated. Moreover, the present domicile test yields
for most people a simple answer, and a change would invite litigation
where there is rather little today. Until an easy test suggests itself,
therefore, I cannot blame the ALI for leaving the statute uninformative
on the issue of citizenship; but I would hope that the courts in problem
cases would pay less heed to intention and more to physical facts than
is suggested by the traditional concept of domicile.61
b. The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Territories. The
Institute accepts the current extension of diversity jurisdiction to
citizens of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Territories
and proposes to include citizens of American Possessions as well. This
jurisdiction was upheld as to District of Columbia citizens in the
peculiar Tidewater 2 case, which seems unlikely to be overruled despite
the inability of the Supreme Court to agree upon a rationale. I fully
agree with Justices Rutledge and Murphy in that case that the word
"State" in Article III's diversity provisions is literally broad enough to
encompass any geographical entity such as the District of Columbia,63
and that the words should be construed to include the District in order
to effectuate their purpose of safeguarding outsiders against possible
prejudice. This reasoning, the ALI and I agree, is equally applicable
to Territories and Possessions and has additional force in the case of
Puerto Rico, whose current Commonwealth status gives it a measure
of self-government not unlike that of the states and has been held to
bring Puerto Rico within some statutory jurisdictional provisions apply-
ing in terms only to states.64 But this argument, as to the District of
00 Alternatively, persons connected with more than one state could be held diverse to
citizens of neither, by analogy to the ALI's proposal for corporations, see text at notes
177-99 infra. This would leave, however, a serious problem of deciding what constitutes
a sufficient connection.
61 The Restatement tests of domicile, long discredited even in the conflicts field
because of their erroneous premise that a single criterion will serve equally well a multitude
of different policies, see authorities cited in R. CRA7-TON & D. CURm, CONFror OF LAws
42-48 (1968), were not formulated with diversity jurisdiction in mind and should not be
taken as determinative.
02 National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
03 There is no rigid requirement that the word "state" be given the same meaning in
various sections of the Constitution. Compare Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177
(1869) (corporation not a "citizen" under Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV)
with Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 814, 328-9 (1854), treating a
corporation as if it were a citizen under Article III by invoking the patently unreasonable
conclusive presumption that all shareholders were citizens of the incorporating state.
64 Rosso v. Puerto Rico, 226 F. Supp. 688, 693 (D.P.R. 1964) (28 U.S.C. § 2283, which
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Columbia at least, proved unacceptable to seven of the nine Justices
deciding Tidewater.
Justices Jackson, Black, and Burton sustained the District of Colum-
bia provision in Tidewater without regard to Article III. Instead, they
upheld the provision as an exercise of Congress's Article I power to
govern the District. This position is somewhat more difficult to em-
brace; it is clear enough, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter objected, that
Article III was intended as a limitation on the powers of the federal
courts. But the reasons for this limitation were two: federalism and the
separation of powers. According to conventional theory, authority to
decide abstract or nonjudicial questions would compromise the in-
dependence of the judges and burden them with tasks they are poorly
equipped to perform; 65 while decision of nonfederal, nonmaritime
cases between citizens of the same state would infringe state rights.66
Significantly, neither of these points is relevant to Tidewater: The case
was certainly judicial, and it is difficult to argue that trying cases for
the District of Columbia is a function of peculiarly state concern. Un-
fortunately this may prove only that there ought to be jurisdiction over
District of Columbia citizen cases, not that there can be; for the premise
of the Constitution, confirmed by the much-maligned tenth amend-
ment, is that the federal government may exercise only powers con-
ferred upon it by the Constitution: Unless the case comes within the
judicial power defined in that document it cannot be entertained.
With this a majority of the Court in Tidewater agreed.
On balance, however, I think Mr. Justice Jackson was right and the
majority wrong: It is not necessary to read Article III to incapacitate
Congress from governing the District of Columbia in light of the broad
grant of power over the District in Article 1.67 Once accepted, the Jack-
limits injunctions against proceedings in "State" courts); see Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377,
386-8 (lst Cir. 1953) (suggesting without deciding that Puerto Rico may be a "State"
within the three-judge provision in 28 U.S.C. § 2281).
65 See the compilation of arguments against advisory opinions in D. CuRRE, FEDm AL
CoU'rs 9 (1968).
66 See The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 452 (1851).
67 Cf. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), and Dynes v. Hoover, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1858), declaring that territorial and military tribunals need not meet
the tenure and salary requirements of Article III because other Constitutional provisions
could be read to authorize the exercise of judicial power. I think these decisions were
unfortunate; they led to a situation in which it appeared that Congress could abolish the
tenure of all federal trial judges, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 US. 22 (1932); Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929). Fortunately the independence of the judges seems to
have been strongly reaffirmed by Williams v. United States, 289 US. 553, 580-1 (1933),
which is based on the plain holding that powers falling within Article III cannot be given
to judges without tenure, and by Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 533-4 (1962), which
declares that litigants in Article III courts are constitutionally entitled to Article III judges,
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son theory is equally applicable to Territories and Possessions since
Article IV gives Congress power to legislate for those areas comparable
to the Article I grant respecting the District of Columbia. Puerto Rico,
on the other hand, presents something of a problem; for Congress in
approving Commonwealth status appears to have given up its authority
over local Puerto Rico affairs6 8-if it has constitutional power to do so.
The protective-jurisdiction theory of Professors Hart and Wechsler
allows one to reach Mr. Justice Jackson's result without conceding that
federal courts may be given jurisdiction outside Article III. Congress
has power to enact substantive laws governing District residents, and
cases arising under such laws would be federal-question cases within
Article III; therefore, Hart and Wechsler argue, Congress has the power
to infringe state interests to a lesser degree by creating federal jurisdic-
tion without creating federal law 69 The Supreme Court once squarely
rejected this notion, but under rather outmoded views of the Commerce
Clause;70 and Mr. Justice Frankfurter's objection to protective jurisdic-
tion on the ground that the greater does not always include the lesser 71
fails to persuade since it suggests no reason for not including the lesser
in this case. One possible reason is that the necessity to create sub-
stantive law acts as a brake on congressional expansion of jurisdiction,
but this sounds hollow in light of the ease with which state laws could
be adopted as the model for federal.72 A more serious problem with the
even at trial. It is surely not to be expected after Glidden that the Supreme Court would
permit this substantial safeguard of impartial justice to be subverted by giving jurisdiction
to a separate court composed of judges dependent upon the will of the Congress or of the
President.
The cases permitting non-tenure judges of territorial and military courts are dis-
tinguishable from Tidewater because in the latter the creation of judicial power outside
Article III does not conflict with any policy embodied in the limitations of that Article.
They are cited here to show that Article III has not always been read to exhaust the
judicial powers of the United States.
68 See Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309, 313-9 (D.P.R. 1953). But the Third Circuit,
upholding the jurisdictional provision, holds that Puerto Rico is still a "Territory."
Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 968 F.2d 431, 435-6 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 943 (1967).
69 See H. HART & H. WEcuSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SqsTEf 371-2
(1953). Indeed, although they do not say why, they suggest (as in controversies involving
bankruptcy trustees) that protective jurisdiction may even include cases that Congress
could not subject to federal law.
70 The Genesee Chief, b3 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 451 (1851): "[imt would be inconsistent
with the plain and ordinary meaning of words, to call a law defining the jurisdiction of
certain courts of the United States a regulation of commerce."
71 Textile Workers Union V. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 474 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
'2 See the Assimilative Grimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1964); the long-lived Conformity Act
respecting procedure, discussed in HART & WCHISLER, supra note 69, at 584-9; Clark Distill-
ihg Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (liquor importation). Old-fashioned fears
of improper delegation to the tates of congressional powers, see Washington v. W.C.
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protective-jurisdiction theory is the difficulty of discovering the federal
law under which, as required by Article III, the case would arise. The
bootstrap aspect of holding that the case arises under the jurisdictional
statute could be contained by holding the jurisdiction must be related
to some substantive congressional power, but this is a step beyond the
usual notion that a case arises under federal law only if the cause of
action or an ingredient of it is created by federal law, or if federal law
must be construed in the case.?3
However shaky the constitutional basis of Tidewater, a majority
there sustained the equation of District citizens with those of the states;
the same arguments apply to the Territories and Possessions and, with
slight reservations, to Puerto Rico; the jurisdiction makes sense and is
unlikely to be very offensive to anybody; and Tidewater is therefore not
likely to be overruled. The ALI is quite right in preserving and extend-
ing this bar-sinister variant of diversity jurisdiction, if diversity is to be
preserved at all.
c. Representative Parties and Frauds on the Jurisdiction. The ALI
wants to overturn a long-standing rule regarding the citizenship of
executors and administrators74 and to darify the present confusion
respecting guardians75 by providing that all personal representatives
shall be deemed citizens of the same state as the person whose estate or
interests they represent.7 6 The present rule has proved a ready vehicle
for permitting litigants to manufacture or to destroy diversity at will 7
-a practice that impairs whatever state and federal interests there are
in the proper allocation of these cases, imposes the burden of adjudica-
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924) (maritime workmen's compensation), have gone by the
board. See DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-1 (1956); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 321 n.29 (1955).
73 See Part II of this article, text at notes 275-90.
74 E.g., Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 306, 308 (1808); Rice v. Houston,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 66, 67 (1871), holding the representative a citizen of his state of domicile.
75 Compare Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325, 326 (3d Cir. 1955), looking to the guardian's
citizenship because he had the right to sue, with Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777,
780 (8th Cir. 1949), looking to the ward's because the action should have been brought in
his name and because, even if the foreign guardian were a proper party, the controversy
was essentially local. The closest Supreme Court authority is an ancient venue case,
Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429, 434 (1903), which relied on state law respecting
the right to sue and which, according to Fallat, may have been superseded by Civil Rule
17(c). In any case the guardian's home may be more relevant to litigation convenience
(venue) than to bias (diversity).
76 OFFIIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 9, § 1301(b)(4).
77 See Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 190 (1931), in which an
administratrix had filed suit three times in state court and had each action dismissed
voluntarily after removal. Finally she resigned anti secured the appointment of an
administrator from another state, in order, the Supreme Court found, to defeat diversity.
See also Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., note 80 infra.
1968]
The University of Chicago Law Review
tion on federal courts without regard to jurisdictional policy, and re-
flects poorly on the public image of the legal system. The Congress is on
record as opposing this sort of thing solidly since 1789. The famous
assignee clause 78 and the present ban on collusive or improper creation
of jurisdiction,79 which the Third Circuit at least has held inapplicable
to the most flagrant personal-representative cases,"" are well comple-
mented by the ALI's proposal.
Some have complained, as did Hart and Wechsler of the assignee
clause,"' that the ALI's proposal throws out tyke as well as tub, since
not all appointments or assignments altering diversity are for an im-
proper purpose.3 2 But to investigate motive in every case invites litiga-
tion, and especially in the case of the representative the reward is not
worth the effort; I see no reason to believe that there is a substantial
likelihood that the outcome of a case will be affected because of preju-
dice for or against an individual who has nothing to gain or lose in the
litigation.83 In the case of the guardian, it seems clear that any bias will
turn upon the citizenship of the ward. In the case of the decedent, it
is fair to ask whether his citizenship is relevant, since he "is the only one
in the whole wide world who literally has no interest in the proceed-
ings";8 4 but to investigate the domicile of all beneficiaries and creditors
of the estate would unjustifiably turn the jurisdictional question into
a full-dress probate proceeding, and there is a great likelihood that
neither judge nor jury would have been aware of or influenced by the
facts so laboriously ascertained. Thus, I approve the ALI's formulation
because it is exactly as simple to administer as the existing rule, avoids
the unseemly possibility of appointments made to affect jurisdiction,
and accords far better than the present rule with the probable focus of
bias.
78 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79.
79 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).
80 Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 785, 788 (3d Cir. 1959). An administratrix
had asked and received permission to resign "in order that Letters of Administration
may be granted to a non-resident" so that suit could be brought in federal court. The new
appointment was held neither "collusive" nor "improper." And the appointment of a
representative was earlier held not to be an "assignment" under the old assignee clause,
Childress v. Emory, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 642, 669 (1823).
81 H. HART& H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEERAL SYsTEm 918 (1953).
82 See Farage, Proposed Code Will Emasculate Federal Jurisdiction, TRIAL, April-May
1966, at 30, 31-32.
83 Cf. McNutt v. Bland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 8, 13-15 (1844), upholding jurisdiction of a
suit on behalf of New York creditors against Mississippi defendants on a sheriff's bond,
although the action had to be brought in the name of Mississippi's Governor. Nominal
parties, the Court said, could be ignored; executors and administrators were unconvinc-
ingly distinguished on the ground that they held title to estate property and controlled
the litigation.
84 Farage, supra note 82, at 32.
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The ALl proposes to retain in substance the section 1359 prohibition
against joining or creating parties "improperly" or "collusively,"85
and to reinstate the assignee clause without its erstwhile virtue of ad-
ministrability: The new section 1307(b) would disregard any transfer
made "to enable or to prevent the invoking of federal jurisdiction."8 16
On the other hand the Institute apparently accepts, in general,8 7 the
hornbook rules that citizenship is determined at the time of suit, and
that a motive to create or to defeat jurisdiction by changing domicile
is immaterial.88
Simplicity of application certainly justifies the last two rules8 9 and
raises some question as to the desirability of outlawing fraudulent
joinder or transfer. But the Institute's distinction can be defended, for
no acceptable self-administering rule suggests itself for the joinder and
transfer cases. To ignore all assignments, as before 1948, might create
hardship in cases of honest transfer and real prejudice; to accept all
parties at face value would encourage imposition at no greater cost than
the writing of a mock contract. A change of domicile, by contrast, is
ordinarily a rather extreme measure to undertake simply in order to
avoid the state courts; the notorious Nevada divorce problem is not
analogous, because since the overruling of Swift v. Tyson 0 the only
effect of diversity jurisdiction is, as was said in a related context, a
85 OFFICIAL DL-r, pt. I, at 21, § 1807(a).
86 Id. at 21-22.
s8 But see proposed § 1302(d), OFrcuA. DRAir, pt. I, at 12, which forbids invocation of
diversity jurisdiction (see text at notes 207-23 infra) by persons who, because of an estab-
lished business or commuter relationship with the forum state, could not have invoked
the jurisdiction at the time the claim arose. The effect of this proposal would be to
prevent a litigant from obtaining access to the federal court by abandoning an established
business, a possibility that seems something less than an overwhelming opportunity for
fraud on the jurisdiction. The Reporters give no reason for this odd and complicating
provision, offering only that it "complements the two preceding subsections, which
measure the two-year period backward from the time of invocation of diversity jurisdic-
tion," id. at 77. It is perfectly possible to require two years' connection without ignoring
the fact that the connection has been terminated.
88 Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624-5 (1914); Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824). The requirement in removal cases of diversity when the state
suit was begun as well as at the date of removal, Mansfield, Coldwater & L.M. Ry. v.
Swan, Ill U.S. 879, 381-2 (1884), may very slightly reduce the danger of contrived diversity;
but it is not a necessary result of the statutory requirement that the action be one in
which the federal court has "original jurisdiction." It complicates the inquiry upon re-
moval without adequate justification, and it risks possible bias when the change of home is
legitimate. Its probable explanation lies in the desirability of setting jurisdiction for
good when the complaint is filed. Cf. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, discussed in Part II
of this article, text at notes 232-44.
89 In addition, citizenship at the time of suit seems more relevant to bias than citizen-
ship at the time of the transaction.
90 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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change of courtrooms and not a change of law- 1 We have got along with
the collusive-joinder provision for a long while; I suspect the result of
the ALI's new assignee clause will be not a glut of litigation but a
seldom-satisfied burden of proof.9 2 But if litigating the fraud issue does
become a burden,93 the clause should be either abandoned or made
absolute.
3. Complete Diversity
a. The Strawbridge Rule. The ALl makes no attempt to deal with the
problem of Strawbridge v, Curtiss,94 and the statute has never done so.
The Institute doubtless assumes that by adopting the language of the
prior statute it will perpetuate the rule that diversity must be "com-
plete"-that all plaintiffs must be diverse to all defendants. I don't see
why, if this is their intention, they do not make this rule explicit in
the statute, While it is true that everyone who calls himself a lawyer
ought to know or be able to discover the Strawbridge rule, the language
of the statute is a trap for the uneducated, and there is no virtue in
refusing to make it clear.9 5
The assumption apparently underlying Strawbridge is that the pres-
ence of Massachusetts people on both sides of a case will neutralize any
possibility of bias affecting litigants from other states. On the facts of
Strawbridge itself, this was probably a fair assumption: The suit was
brought in Massachusetts, there were Massachusetts people on both
sides, and the interests of the parties on either side were joint. It was
thus impossible for a Massachusetts court to injure a nonresident with-
out also injuring one of its own people, and the chance of injury from
bias was probably slim. But the rule of Strawbridge has been uncriti-
cally extended beyond this type of case,96 and there are three situations
in which its rationale seems somewhat less compelling.
First, even if the interests are joint, the case may be different if suit
91 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 876 U.S. 612, 689 (1964) (transfer to more convenient forum).
92 See C. WRIGHT, FEERAL CouRTs 86 (1963), observing that § 1359 "has been largely
ineffective." And see the narrow interpretation of "improper" and "collusive" in Corabi
y. Au.to Racing, Inc., supra note 80, at 788.
93 A recent example of litigation over parties improperly joined to invoke jurisdiction
is Caribbean Mills, Inc. v. Kramer, 392 F.2d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 1968), holding improper
an assignment for collection. A motive to create diversity is not enough; the transfer, said
the court of appeals, must be a sham, not divesting the interest of the assignor.
94 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
95 E.g., "The district courts shall have jurisdiction of any civil action in which one
party is a citizen of a state and all parties properly joined as plaintiffs are citizens of
different states or foreign states from all parties properly joined as defendants."
96 E.g., Knoll v. Knoll, 350 F.2d 407 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 909 (1966)
(suit in state where no plaintiff was citizen); Friend v. Middle At. Transp. Co., 153 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1946) (interests not joint).
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is brought in a state whose citizens are on only one side of the case.
For example, if Strawbridge had been brought in Vermont, the home of
one of the defendants, a Vermont court might conceivably have gone
out of its way to benefit the lone Vermonter in the case, even though in
doing so it would have aided a stranger as well. Second, the Strawbridge
justification fails even in the state of common citizenship if the interests
are not joint. When a Massachusetts plaintiff sues the drivers of two
colliding automobiles, a Massachusetts court can satisfy its prejudices
by finding the Vermont driver negligent and exonerating the driver
from Massachusetts. 97 Finally, joinder of a judgment-proof local defen-
dant will not always protect a foreigner even when the interests are
inseparable and the forum is the state of common citizenship; the jury
and judge know who will pay the joint judgment. Thus, Strawbridge
is often abused by the joinder of local employees in personal-injury
actions against out-of-state railroads,98 or of local advertisers in an
Alabama libel suit against the New York Times. 9 If one is really con-
cerned with providing a federal forum to protect a foreign litigant from
possible bias, a re-examination of Strawbridge is in order along the lines
suggested.
The principal objection to this suggestion is that it is rather compli-
cated; the present rule is at least somewhat easier to administer, and
that is no small matter in dealing with questions of jurisdiction. Thus
it would be better to retain Strawbridge as an absolute rule than to
modify it. Better still, however, would be to replace Strawbridge with a
rule of minimum diversity: jurisdiction whenever one properly joined
plaintiff is diverse to any proper defendant. The premise of Strawbridge
is flimsy enough at best; it applies, as I have tried to show, to only a
small percentage of the cases covered by the rule; it causes plaintiffs to
split what ought to be a single law suit into two in order to obtain
federal jurisdiction; and, as will appear below, the rule is subject to a
number of exceptions that dissipate much of its force, increase the
burden of jurisdictional litigation, give an unjustified advantage to
defendants, and induce filing of actions in forms or in forums in which
they will not ultimately be tried.1°°
97 The ALI recognizes this and provides for removal by the defendant. See text at notes
118-9 infra; OFFicLL DaPrT, pt. I, at 87.
98 Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184 (1918).
99 Parks v. New York Times Co., 308 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1962).
100 The Supreme Court has recently held the Strawbridge rule not constitutionally
required, State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-1 (1967). A nondiverse
claim wholly unrelated to the diverse controversy, however, should not be held a part of
the "action" or "controversy" within either the statute or the Constitution.
Somewhat related to Strawbridge because of their assumptions that one defendant can
be counted on to protect the others are the judicial requirement that all defendants must
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The Institute proposes to preserve the obscure provision now in
section 1332(a) for jurisdiction of suits "between citizens of different
States and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are
additional parties." This section was inserted in 1948 to overturn lower-
court decisions refusing jurisdiction when a New Yorker sued a Cali-
fornian and a Frenchman; literally such an action is neither between
citizens of different states nor between citizens of a state and of a foreign
state.10 1 The present and proposed formulation, however, can be inter-
preted to grant jurisdiction in a suit between a New Yorker and a
Californian though there are Frenchmen on both sides. Such an excep-
tion to Strawbridge would be appropriate enough, since a New York or
California court's favor for the local litigant seems unlikely to be
affected by the contending French; but this would be equally true if
the cocitizen opponents hailed from Kansas, and I prefer a blanket rule
for simplicity. In any case the statute should specify whether the excep-
tion is intended; the initial purpose of the "additional parties" provision
could be less mysteriously conveyed, if Strawbridge is to be preserved,
by granting jurisdiction when one party is a citizen of a state and all
plaintiffs are citizens of different states or foreign states from all defen-
dants.1 02
The ALI does propose one new exception to the complete-diversity
rule, although it is rather difficult to recognize:
join in a removal petition under § 1441, Fletcher v. Hamlet, 116 U.S. 408 (1886), and the
statutory prohibition of removal in cases of complete diversity when any defendant is a
resident of the forum state. It makes sense, as Professor Wright says, FEDERAL COURTS 114
(1963), to deny access to a federal court to the resident defendant himself, who has nothing
to fear from his own state court; it makes less sense, for reasons discussed above, to deny
access to his foreign codefendants. Nor is it clear why the willingness of one foreign
defendant to waive removal should deprive others of this protection. Cf. Bradford V.
Harding, 284 F.2d 307, 310 (2d Cir. 1960), rejecting both these limitations when removal
was based on the federal-officer provision in § 1442. Because of the strong policy of protect-
ing the operation of the federal government, a single officer may remove even if other
officers do not join the petition and even if non-officers are also defendants. This should
also be the rule under § 1441.
101 See J. MooRa, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 154 (1949) and cases cited.
102 See note 95 supra. A related problem, though of minor practical impact, is whether
Strawbridge forbids jurisdiction of an otherwise diverse action in which parties on one or
both sides are not citizens of either American or foreign states. If the rule is that common
citizenship on both sides defeats diversity, the case of a noncitizen on one side clearly is
cognizable and the bilateral case debatable. The Strawbridge opinion itself requires that
each person must be "entitled to sue" or be sued in federal court, suggesting that even the
unilateral noncitizen case cannot be heard. Because the presence of noncitizens is not
likely to eliminate bias in either case, the former interpretation accords better with
diversity policy; but the latter has the advantage of having been clearly stated in easily
applicable, across-the-board form in a prominent Supreme Court opinion. If Strawbridge
is codified, it ought to be stated to exclude these cases from jurisdiction for the sake of
simplicity, as in note 95.
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Notwithstanding any other provision of this tide, whenever
an action brought by or on behalf of any person is within the
jurisdiction of the district courts under subsection (a) of this
section, jurisdiction in that action shall also extend to any
claim against the same defendant if such claim (1) is brought
by such person on his own behalf or by or on behalf of any
member of his family living in the same household as such
person and (2) arises out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the action.10 3
What the Institute is getting at is pendent jurisdiction over related
claims within a single family. Its principal concern seems to be with
restrictive decisions respecting the jurisdictional amount, and in that
context the proposal raises serious problems of administrability.104 But
the ALI's citation of Borror v. Sharon Steel Co.10 5 suggests the addi-
tional possibility of pendent jurisdiction over controversies between
parties not of diverse citizenship. 10 6 In Borror the Third Circuit held
that when a West Virginia administrator sued a Pennsylvania defendant
for wrongful death, a survival claim was properly joined even if it
belonged to the victim's Pennsylvania relatives.
If Strawbridge is to be repudiated, let it be done not this way but
directly and after facing the relevant issues. The Borror case is not
analogous to one in which jurisdiction is based on a federal question,
or in which the pendent claim is diverse but lacks the jurisdictional
amount. Joinder of the pendent claim in the latter situations by no
means impairs the need for a federal court to adjudicate the claims on
which jurisdiction is based; if there is to be a single proceeding to
decide both claims there is good reason to have it in federal court. But
when a dispute between two Pennsylvanians is joined to a dispute over
which there is jurisdiction only because of diversity, the assumption
underlying Strawbridge tells us there is no need for federal jurisdiction
even of the diverse claim. Judicial economy can be served, without sub-
stantial risk of bias, by a single suit on both claims in a state court. I
cannot agree that family cases are so special that Strawbridge should be
relaxed for them alone, especially when such ambiguous criteria define
the exception.
103 OFFiCAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 9-10, § 1301(e).
104 See Part II of this article, text at notes 395-8.
105 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964), cited in OFFCIAL DRAFr, pt. I, at 65 n.10.
106 It may be that the limitation to persons "living in the same household" eliminates
this possibility. But is it clear that this limitation refers to domicile in the sense that
determines citizenship for diversity purposes? Grandma may still vote in Tennessee though
she has been staying with the folks in Illinois for forty years; and Junior in Leavenworth
may still be a citizen of Illinois although he hasn't spent a night in the house since his
conviction.
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b. Separate-Claim Removal. Section 1441(c), which authorizes re.
moval of state-court actions containing "separate and independent"
claims, is one of the most unfortunate provisions in the entire Judicial
Code, Even its most general contours are not widely understood, and
nobody knows exactly what it means. Its effect is odd on its face: The
section creates an exception to the complete-diversity rule that can be
invoked only by defendants, and it allows an entire case to be removed
because its parts are independent. Its purposes are obscure; amendments
of the original provision have left it a patchwork that poorly serves any
discernible policy. The ALI wants to keep it-to amend it again, but
to keep it.
There would be no need for separate-claim removal if there were no
Strawbridge v. Curtiss; any lawsuit with minimal diversity would be
removable under section 1441(a) since the whole suit would be origi-
nally cognizable in federal court. 07 Strawbridge, destroying original
federal jurisdiction, closed this avenue of removal; but the philosophy
of that decision tells us that there is no danger of bias, and thus no need
for removal, because diversity is incomplete. The statute thus makes
little sense if Strawbridge is right or if Strawbridge is wrong.
The development of the statute suggests that its present form is a
m~salliance of three distinct principles: a mistrust of the complete-
diversity rule in certain cases; a desire to eliminate the plaintiff's forum-
shopping advantage; and a policy against multiple trials involving a
single transaction. We begin with Moore's insight that the section was
designed to "protect a nonresident defendant, who had been joined
with one or more local defendants under the relaxed and expanding
state joinder provisions."'08 Why, if Strawbridge was right (and Con-
gress did not overrule the decision), did such a defendant need protec-
tion? Perhaps because, as the ALI commentary recognizes, the presence
of a local defendant is no safeguard when interests are not joint.0 9 The
Supreme Court's interpretation of the original provision conforms
rather well with this thesis: Claims against concurrent tort-feasors (one
of whom could be found solely at fault) were held "separable" and thus
removable, while claims against an employer for acts of his employees
(where liability depended on employee fault) were not."20
107 A possible problem with this position is discussed in note 120 infra.
108 J. MooRE, COMMVENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 239 (1949).
109 OFFICIAL DRAT, pt, I, at 87.
11o Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1939), constrming Act of July 27, 1866, ch.
28, 14 Stat. 306. To be sure, a foreign employee would not be protected by the joinder
of his local employer, for the state court might find his act outside the scope of employ-
ment. Moreover, the common suspicion that the employer will pay doubtless makes joinder
of a local employee little real protection for the foreign master.
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But an out-of-state plaintiff is no more protected by the presence of
a local co-party without a joint interest than is a defendant; if Straw-
bridge was too broad, why did Congress limit the exception to defen-
dants? The answer may be that the foreign plaintiff has the option of
protecting himself by suing alone, in the federal court; the 1866 removal
provision merely canceled out his advantage by allowing the foreign
defendant the same opportunity to take the diverse part of the case into
federal court. Indeed this policy of equal treatment might support such
a removal provision even if Congress did not think Strawbridge too
broad: Both parties should have the same power to determine the
forum. But this would mean the Supreme Court's interpretation was
too restrictive: To equalize the plaintiff's choice, removal should have
been allowed whenever the nondiverse parties were not indispensable.
As construed, then, the original "separable controversy" removal
statute seems best explained as based upon the desire to give defendants
the same escape from an overbroad complete-diversity requirement that
plaintiffs already enjoyed because of their ability to leave nondiverse
parties out of the lawsuit. But an 1875 amendment,'11 preserved in the
1948 revision and by the ALI proposal, injected a third policy consider-
ation that threw the whole statute out of equilibrium.
The amendment, as interpreted, provided simply that upon removal
of the separable diverse controversy the nondiverse components of the
state-court suit were to be removed as well. The Supreme Court made
clear why: Its construction of the statute, in accord with apparent con-
gressional distrust of Strawbridge, allowed removal in many cases (e.g.,
concurrent tort-feasors) in which the diverse and nondiverse controver-
sies arose out of the same transaction. Removal of the entire case was
necessary in such cases to avoid two trials and consequent duplication
of proof.112 But with this amendment the statute ceased to make sense,
for it gave the defendant alone, unjustifiably, the opportunity to litigate
in federal court without splitting one lawsuit into two. If local parties
with several interests did not destroy the need for a federal forum, and
if judicial economy demanded a consolidated proceeding, Strawbridge
should have been relaxed for plaintiffs as well as for defendants.
Thus, after 1875, a statute designed to eliminate an unfair advantage
of plaintiffs gave an equally unfair advantage to defendants. But the
1948 revision made matters ever so much worse. The Revisers found too
much removal and too much litigation over separability; to reduce
both ' 3 they substituted the present term "separate and independent
111 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470.
112 Barney v. Lathant, 103 U.S. 205, 212-3 (1881).
113 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964), Reviser's Note.
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claim or cause of action," perpetuating the confusion while losing sight
altogether of the relevant policies. In accord with the Revisers' ex-
pressed intention, section 1441(c) has been authoritatively construed to
forbid removal when two defendants are charged with alternative or
joint and several liability for a single loss;"14 the out-of-state concurrent
tort-feasor for whose protection the statute was enacted has been removed
from its scope.115 Moreover, the broad discretion to take jurisdiction of
nondiverse claims upon removal sits very poorly with the new test of
removability. For claims now are seldom removable as "separate" unless
they are completely unrelated; in such a situation the judicial-economy
justification for removing the nondiverse parts of the case does not
apply." 6 It is a contradiction in policy as well as in language, on the
present interpretation of section 1441(c), to hold a claim "independent"
and "pendent" at the same time.117 Thus the present statute manages
to create difficult interpretive problems, fails to accomplish its policy
of protecting against abuses of Strawbridge, invites the federal courts to
take pendent jurisdiction when judicial administration does not call
for it, and grants the defendant an unjustified advantage over the
plaintiff in bringing cases less than wholly diverse into federal court.
The ALI, unfortunately, intends to retain and to broaden the defen-
dant's advantage, by allowing him to remove whenever he "would have
been able to remove" under the general removal provision "if sued
114 American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 841 U.S. 6 (1951).
115 Some have surmised that the separate-claim statute is of no use whatever: Any claims
sufficiently related to be joined in a state court may be too closely related to permit
removal as "separate." See Note, Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the
Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 896 (1958); and see Holloway v. Gamble-Skogro,
Inc., 274 F. Supp. 321, 323 (N.D. Ill. 1967): "Several cases have directly held . . . that
removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) is limited to situations where joinder of claims or parties
has been by plaintiff only." Lower courts, however, have found cases that avoid Scylla as
well as Charybdis [e.g., Climax Chem. Co. v. C.F. Braun & Co. 370 F.2d 616 (10th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 981 (1967) (breach of several contracts for construction of
various components of a single factory); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239
F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (breach of contracts of Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor
relating to single movie)]; and Professor Moore stresses, without suggesting what con-
ceivable policy is served by the distinction, that a suit by two injured accident plaintiffs
against a single defendant contains two "claims" or "causes of action" even if the facts
are largely common. J. MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 238 (1949).
116 But see the Taylor case cited in note 115 supra, where the court allowed removal
of the whole case; the claims were "separate" but not factually unrelated.
117 The constitutional difficulty with the pendent-jurisdiction provision of § 1441(c)
seems more acute in federal-question than in diversity cases, for there is no constitutional
barrier to repealing the complete-diversity rule. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire,
386 U.S. 523, 530-1 (1967). Yet surely there is some limit to the definition of "controversies"
between citizens of different states in Article III, for otherwise the entire jurisdiction




alone by any party making claim against him in the State court
action."'118 This amendment, says the commentary, will eliminate the
difficulty of determining separateness or separability, and will, as the
existing law does not, protect the foreign tort-feasor from prejudice." 9
The broadened test of removability, in addition, will justify on con-
servation-of-resources grounds the retention of the provision allowing
removal, when appropriate, of the non-federal parts of the suit. But
there are two problems with this proposal. First, it will allow removal
even when there is little possibility of hurting the outsider alone, as in
Strawbridge itself. This would be acceptable if Strawbridge were simply
to be repealed; but, more seriously, no reason appears for relegating the
parties to a game of musical chairs in which only the defendant can
have the case litigated in federal court without splitting one lawsuit
into two.
If Strawbridge is not satisfactory when interests are several, the
modern policy against multiple lawsuits demands that the doctrine be
relaxed for plaintiffs as well as for defendants. If Strawbridge is satis-
factory, there is no need for separate-claim removal, because joinder
destroys the effect of bias. In neither case is there any excuse for perpet-
uating this confusing, complicated, and unequal provision, which with
every amendment has increasingly done more harm than good. 20
118 OFFicIAL DRArt, pt. I, at 15-16, § 1304(b).
119 Id. at 87.
120 I see no reason to retain § 1441(c) simply to equalize the plaintiff's ability to obtain
a federal forum by splitting his lawsuit. Splitting lawsuits is not to be encouraged; we
let plaintiffs do it only because of the administrative difficulty of ascertaining, if we made
all proper parties indispensable, whether they have all been joined. And at that, as
discussed in the next section of this paper, we often allow additional parties into the suit
afterwards without asking the plaintiff's consent. In such cases the conflict between
Strawbridge and the policy of judicial economy is striking.
More deserving is the notion that removal should be allowed when the plaintiff, instead
of splitting one lawsuit, combines two unrelated ones to defeat removal. If Strawbridge
is wrong, the general removal statute might still not cover the case because the whole suit
could not have been brought in federal court; the unrelated claim is not part of the
statutory "civil action," whose scope should be defined in terms of the transaction. But if
Strawbridge were overruled, the statute should be read to equate "civil action" in the
removal statute with "civil action" in the diversity section-though the state suit is
broader, whatever could have been brought in federal court is the "action" and therefore
removable. (Before 1948 some lower courts permitted removal under the general provision
despite joinder of an unrelated, unremovable claim, because the "suit" was originally
cognizable in federal court; see Lewin, The Federal Courts' Hospitable Back Door-Re-
moval of "Separate and Independent" Non-Federal Causes of Action, 66 HARv. L. REV.
423, 426 (1953), arguing implausibly that the 1948 substitution of "civil action" for "suit"
may have made this no longer possible.) If Strawbridge is retained, too, I would simply
repeal § 1441(c); the chance that state courts would allow joinder of wholly unrelated
claims involving different parties seems too remote, and the harm done to defendants,
if it occurred, too small on the Strawbridge assumption, to justify attempting once more
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c. Interpleader and Dispersed Parties. Confronted by two claimants
to a single insurance fund, the New York Life Insurance Company paid
the money into a Pennsylvania state coUrt and left the claimants to fight
over it, only to discover that it had to pay twice; for the Supreme Court
held in 1916 that state courts in interpleader could not cut off the claims
of absent persons who were beyond the reach of ordinary process.' 2 '
Congress responded with the Intdrpleader Act, which authorizes nation-
Wide federal-court service when a fund is sought by "two or more
adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship as defined in section 1332."122
In 1939 the Court held the stakeholder need not, under this statute, be
diverse to all the claimants; the statute required "diversity only between
claimants," and it was constitutional because "there is a real contro-
Versy between the adverse claimants."' 23 In 1967, in State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Tashire,'24 the Court approved a block of lower-court deci-
sions holding that in interpleader complete diversity among rival claim-
ants was required neither by the statute nor by the Constitution,
The Interpleader Act is a well-designed response to the inadequacy
of state tribunals, entirely within the purpose of the diversity jurisdic-
tion. The Tashire holding that minimal diversity suffices is necessary
to fill the gap left by limitations on state personal jurisdiction; and this
fact is enough, coupled with the flexible language of Article III, to
to make the necessary painful distinctions. If repeal of § 1441(c) is not possible, the
statute should allow removal only when the diverse claim arises out of a different transac-
tion than the rest of the suit, and it should specify that the nondiverse, unrelated claims
ate to be left behind.
121 New York Life In. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
122 28 U,S.C. §§ 1335, 2361 (1964).
123 Treihies V. Sunshine Min. Co., 308 U.S. 66, 71, 72 (1939). Lower courts have continued,
after Treinies, to entertain under the general diversity provision of § 1352 interpleaders
in which the stakeholder is a citizen Of one state and all claimants citizens of a second. E.g.,
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kraft, 200 F.2d 952, 953 (2d Cir. 1953). If the Court
in Trenies nieafit that the only controversy was between the claimants (even if Strawbridge
is constitutionally iequired, said the Court, the stakeholder's deposit and discharge
"dem6nstratds the applicant's disinterestedness as between the claimants and as to the
property in dispute," 308 U.S. at 72), there is no jurisdiction in these cases. Moreover, since
the stakeholder could usually sue the several claimants in the courts of the state where
thdy all reside, the jitstification for federal jurisdiction is less pressing than when the
elaiinatts are diverse from eah other. At the beginning of the lawsuit, however, when
jurisdiction is generally determined, the stakeholder plainly has a controversy with each
claimant, aS the Dunlevy case graphically illustrates. Also, the stakeholder's opportunity
to interpleafd in a state court counts for little if he is already being sued by one of the
claimants in a federal court; the risk of double liability then justifies either ancillary
jurisdiction over the other claimantS regardless of their citizenship, or dismissal for
inability to join indispensable parties, see Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 868 U.S.
71 (1961). Tseinies can and should be read to say Strawbridge is satisfied because the
Controvetsy among the claimants is divexse; there is ancillary jurisdiction over the stake-
holder's contr6versies.
124 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
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sustain the constitutionality of the jurisdiction. There remains the nag-
ging question why, since federal courts can issue nationwide process in
interpleader cases, state courts cannot; recent decisions suggest, rightly,
that the desirability of avoiding either multiple liability or a windfall
to the stakeholder today justifies extraterritorial state service according
to the Supreme Court's due-process calculus of fundamental fairness in
the light of state interests, contacts, and total convenience. 125 But fed-
eral jurisdiction remains justified until the Court has clearly upheld
state authority and the states have legislated to protect the stakeholder.
The ALI proposes to retain interpleader jurisdiction, making clear
in the statute that minimal diversity will suffice, that citizens of foreign
states, of the District of Columbia, and of other Tidewater jurisdictions
are included, and that the stakeholder is not barred by being indepen-
dently liable to one or more of the claimaints; allowing process, sensibly,
anywhere outside the country "that process of the United States may
reach" and providing for change of venue; 126 and, most importantly,
authorizing the district courts to ignore state laws respecting choice of
law. 127
The problem of choosing among the laws of several states in diversity
cases is one of the knottiest around. Its consideration involves the pur-
poses of the diversity jurisdiction and of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the policies underlying Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,128 and the
unsettled principles of the conflict of laws. At the outset, in support of
the ALI's proposal, it should be noted that the reasons given by the
Supreme Court for deferring to state choice-of-law doctrines have no
application to interpleader cases. The purpose and effect of the Klaxon
and Barrack decisions were to assure that diversity cases would be
decided as if they had been brought in state court; the "accident" of
diversity was intended to supply an unbiased forum but not a change
of law.129 Because federal districts closely respect state lines, it is fair
to assume actions brought in Texas federal court would have been
brought in Texas if there were no federal courts, But the very basis of
federal interpleader is that the case as a whole could not have been
brought in any state court; the forum-shopping, outcome-determinative
reasoning of Klaxon and Barrack, uncritically extended to interpleader
in Griffin v. McCoach,230 is inapplicable.
125 See especially Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
126 See Part II of this article, text at notes 407-66.
127 OFFicL DaArr, pt. I, at 44-46, 160-2, §§ 1335, 2361.
128 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
129 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 318 U.S. 487 (1941); Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612 (1964).
130 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
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It remains to inquire whether there are reasons other than those
given by the Court for following state choice-of-law doctrines in inter-
pleader. The general policies behind Erie suggest that state conflicts
rules should not be followed: Maximum respect for state interests131
would be achieved by an independent federal examination of com-
peting policies; and, because state courts are not open, it is only by
following local choice-of-law rules that there can be any disuniformity
of outcome or any forum-shopping in interpleader cases. 132 Any broad-
ening of the policies thought to underlie diversity jurisdiction or the
Full Faith Clause would similarly militate against following state
choice-of-law principles: If one purpose of either clause is to resolve
interstate conflicts as a federal matter, problems of forum-shopping,
uniformity, and respect for state interests disappear even in ordinary
diversity cases; even state courts would follow federal choice-of-law
doctrine.133
In ordinary diversity cases, until choice of law is recognized to be a
federal question, the undesirability of intrastate forum-shopping argues
for retention of Klaxon despite the evils of disuniformity among federal
courts and the contention that a federal choice would best effectuate
Erie's command of deference to state concerns. In interpleader, where
there is no intrastate forum-shopping, everything so far considered
points toward abolishing Klaxon. Modern choice-of-law analysis, how-
ever, suggests difficulties with this approach and a possible argument for
retaining at least some degree of deference to state conflicts doctrine
even in interpleader.
Current conflicts analysis teaches that choice-of-law "rules" miss the
whole point: The applicability of a state rule of absolute liability, for
example, to a case with foreign elements is a question of construction
of that state's law in light of its policy and of the contacts of the case
with each state. Thus, in interpleader cases and elsewhere too, the
diversity court's first task under Erie ought to be not reference to the
conflicts law of the possibly disinterested state where it sits, but deter-
mination, as a matter of each state's substantive law, of which laws
apply. Trouble begins if the laws of two or more states are found
applicable, but many problem cases can be resolved by ruling that one
131 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 856 U.S. 525 (1958); Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 474-5 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
132 The argument over the relative demerits of intrastate and interstate forum-
shopping, see D. Ckvpms, THE CHOIcE-oF-LAw PRocEss 222 (1965), is thus not relevant to
interpIeader.
133 See Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22-42 (1963);




state would not wish to push its policy so far in the face of the other's
interest or the parties' expectations. 134 If balancing the competing inter-
ests proves not feasible, Klaxon may be the most satisfactory residual
solution; the ALI's proposal allows for this dubious possibility 35 by
merely permitting rather than requiring departure from state rules. I
therefore endorse the ALI's proposals respecting interpleader, although
because of the present incompleteness of methods of resolving true con-
flicts, I would not generally overrule Klaxon but would leave the matter
to be developed by the Supreme Court.
Having corralled a good thing in interpleader, the ALI proceeds to
beat it to death by proposing an entirely new set of provisions for
jurisdiction of controversies, minimally diverse, that are beyond the
power of a single state court to determine fully and fairly. The policy is
unexceptionable: If the state courts cannot do full justice because inter-
ested people are beyond state reach, open the federal courts. But the
proposal takes eleven tedious pages to spell out as a statute; 136 not one
example is given of a case requiring this treatment; and the complicated
provisions promise reams of interpretive litigation.
The basic provision would confer jurisdiction of "any civil action in
which the several defendants who are necessary for a just adjudication
of the plaintiff's claim are not all amenable to process of any one terri-
torial jurisdiction, and one of any two adverse parties is a citizen of a
State and the other is a citizen or subject of another territorial jurisdic-
tion." 37 Two difficulties are immediately apparent: Who is a "neces-
sary" party, and how is the court to determine whether a party is
"amenable to process"?
One of the beauties of interpleader is that the statute ignores these
imponderables; if there are scattered claimants, there is a substantial
likelihood they cannot be gathered into any state court, and that is
enough for federal jurisdiction. The Institute, aware of the problem of
threshold litigation in dispersed-party cases, establishes a set of objective
tests to avoid "detailed inquiry as to physical presence of a party within
a given jurisdiction at a particular time": A person is "amenable to
process" in a state if and only if he is domiciled, resident, or incorpor-
ated there, if the state is his principal place of business or he has an
134 See B. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 757-8
(1963).
135 See D. Currie, The Choice Among State Laws in Maritime Death Cases, 21 VAND. L.
REv. 297 (1968), for detailed discussion of a related problem, concluding optimistically that
most conflicts can probably be rationally resolved by federal courts.
136 OFFicIAL DRArr, pt. I, at 33-43, §§ 2341-6. Brief explanatory notes are included. The
commentary consumes id., 120-59.
137 Id. at 33, § 2341.
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agent there to receive process, or if he is subject to long-arm service of
process. 38 This enumeration is better than nothing, but it will scarcely
be easy to administer. The principal place of business has caused great
difficulties under the multiple-citizenship provision now in section
1332(c); 1 9 in addition to domicile, which may have to be determined
for additional parties beyond the two necessary for diversity under the
proposal, the courts are directed to investigate a new concept of "estab-
lished residence"; and, not least, jurisdiction will often depend upon
construction of the long-arm statutes of more than one state.
The proposed test of a necessary party is no more encouraging: "A
defendant is necessary for a just adjudication of the plaintiff's claim
• . . if complete relief cannot be accorded the plaintiff in his absence,
or if it appears that, under federal law or relevant State law, an action
on the claim would have to be dismissed if he could not be joined as
a party."140 This double definition is designed to reach two kinds of
cases: those in which a truly necessary party cannot be reached by state
process, and those in which an erroneous state view of indispensability
renders the state court in fact unavailable. A case can be made for fed-
eral jurisdiction in both situations, but determining when they are
presented is no mean task. The second clause demands, again, an inves-
tigation of several bodies of law, this time probably very murky. And
the Institute concedes the obscurity of its first clause: Even the "indis-
pensable" party "has not been defined with any measure of clarity," and
the "necessary" party is still more poorly defined, because of the "inher-
ent 4ifficulties" of demarcating "a line on what is essentially a continu-
ous spectrum of urgency of joinder" and because "in its procedural
setting, the concept of 'necessary' parties is not one on which ultimate
holdings rest" and therefore is seldom litigated. Consequently, "a
judicial sharpening of the concept beyond what has previously been
achieved" will be required: yet "there seems no better formulation to
express the degree of urgency for assembling multiple parties. .... -141
No better formulation, that is, except to abandon the game because of
the cost of the candle.
The ALI proceeds to prescribe venue for dispersed-party actions
(where "a substantial part" of the events occurred or "a substantial
part" of the property is situated, or where "any party resides" if there
138 Id. at 33-34, 138, § 2341(c).
139 See text at nqtes 167-74 infra.
140 OFFICIAL Da r, pt. I, at 33, § 2141(b).
141 Id. at 135-6. The proposed statute makes clear that the ordinary concurrent tort-
feasor is not a necessary party. Id. at 33, 136-7. Additional definitions in § 2345, id. at 41-42,




is no such district, with the residence of corporations and associations
specially defined);14 2 to authorize injunctions against related actions in
state or federal courts, nationwide process (and service anywhere else
"that process of the United States may reach"), and transfer (to "any
other district," on anyone's motion, "for the convenience of parties and
witnesses or otherwise in the interest of justice"); and to allow the
district court to make its own choice among state laws.143 These provi-
sions are straightforward enough, except for the uncertainty of deter-
mining what "part" of events or property is "substantial" and for the
burdensome inquiry into "convenience" and "justice" in deciding upon
transfer.
Two additional provisions add complexity: If there are parties
beyond even the extended process authorized, the court is directed to
proceed without them "unless it is satisfied that greater injustice would
be caused by proceeding without them than by total failure of the
action." Finally, if no more than $5,000 is at stake for any party, and if
jurisdiction "would lead to undue burden on distant parties," the court
may dismiss them without prejudice and proceed without them or, if
convinced that "greater injustice would be caused by any continuation
of the proceedings than by total failure of the action," dismiss the
whole suit.144 No standards are provided; both provisions essentially ask
the court to do what is right. Extensive proof respecting relative injury
is to be expected, and the word "discretion" may not suffice, even in the
one section in which it is used, to ward off time-consuming and
expensive appeals.
If this were all, it would be grotesque enough. But there is more:
separate provisions for removal of actions brought in state courts and
for bringing in additional parties in federal actions commenced under
other jurisdictional provisions. 14 5 Both these sections focus upon parties
"necessary for a just adjudication as to a defendant"; if such a party
cannot be joined or served in state court the case may be removed, and
the requirements of personal jurisdiction and complete diversity are
relaxed in suits already in federal court. The definition of a "necessary"
party for these two sections differs from that discussed above: A person
is necessary "if he claims or may claim an interest relating to the prop-
erty or transactions which is the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may leave the defendant
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
142 Id. at 34-35, § 2342.
143 Id. at 38-39, § 2344.
144 Id. at 39-40, §§ 2344(d), (e).
145 Id. at 35-37, 42-43, §§ 2343, 2346.
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inconsistent obligations." But for the obscure and unexplained refer-
ence to an interest in the "transaction," this looks remarkably like an
interpleader situation; it seems covered by the ability of such a defen-
dant to file interpleader in the federal court and to enjoin the action
against him.146
Thus the entire proposal for dispersed-party jurisdiction to protect
defendants may be unnecessary. Moreover, in these cases the Institute
dispenses with its objective standards for ascertaining amenability to
state service without extended litigation: "Since there is only one juris-
diction involved, and one in which there would normally be an attempt
to reach absent necessary parties, it is appropriate that when federal
jurisdiction is based upon the unamenability of the absentee to state
process it should turn upon whether the necessary party could with
reasonable diligence have been subjected to the jurisdiction of the state
court."'147 Additional complexity is created by provision for stay of the
federal proceeding, after removal, if there is another state court in
which all parties could be joined; 48 and by the complicated treatment
of counterclaims. 49
I would not inflict this monster of threshold litigation upon the fed-
eral courts without the strongest showing of urgent need. The ALI has
not given one instance in which such jurisdiction is needed. The
dispersed-party proposals should be disapproved. 150
d. Parties Added After the Complaint. Except for the limited pro-
posal just discussed respecting "necessary" parties the ALI does not deal
with the issues, so often presented, of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction
over intervenors, third-party defendants, and others brought into the
case after suit is begun. These issues present in sharp detail the critical
collision, overlooked by the Institute, between the complete-diversity
policy of Strawbridge v. Curtiss and the liberal joinder philosophy of
the Civil Rules. Once suit is filed in federal court, judicial economy
suggests that all claims arising from the transaction in suit be cleared
146 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 2361 (1964).
147 Orricua DRAFT, pt. I, at 141.
148 Id. at 37, § 2343(e).
149 Id. at 36, 42, §§ 2343(c), 2346(b). If a counterclaim arises out of the same transaction
as the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff shall be considered a defendant, and the defendant a
plaintiff, for purposes of determining whether absent persons are necessary, and for all
other purposes both parties may be deemed defendants. If the counterclaim is unrelated,
the plaintiff may remove if as defendant he could have removed an independent action
on the counterclaim. In a federal action based on diversity the usual venue, process, and
complete-diversity requirements are relaxed for necessary additional parties when the
counterclaim is compulsory.
150 To abolish Strawbridge, of course, would eliminate the problem, except as to venue
and personal jurisdiction, considered in Part II of this article, text at notes 407-46.
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up at the same time; but Strawbridge forbids the plaintiff to name all
the parties concerned unless they are completely diverse.
The lower courts, rather uniformly, have tended to resolve this
problem in favor of judicial economy at the expense of Strawbridge.
Defendants may implead third parties liable to themselves whether they
be cocitizens of the plaintiff or of the defendant,1 51 and persons entitled
to intervene as of right may do so without regard to diversity.152 Where
Strawbridge has been most flagrantly threatened with subversion, the
courts have balked: Indispensable parties cannot intervene unless
diverse to their adversaries, since there is no legitimate action to which
they can be appended; 153 a defendant under a since-repealed provision
could not implead a party liable only to a nondiverse plaintiff; 54 and
some courts say a plaintiff cannot make a claim against a nondiverse
third party brought in to answer to the defendant. 55
Except in the case of the indispensable party, permission to make
claims against nondiverse persons is necessary to keep Strawbridge from
destroying the ability of the federal courts to handle entire controversies.
Unfortunately, reliance on the Civil Rules to justify relaxing Straw-
bridge encounters difficulty with Rule 82's command that the Rules
not affect jurisdiction; in order to avoid this probem, as well as to over-
turn the unjustifiable exceptions discussed above, the statute ought to
make dear that additional, not indispensable, parties may be added, or
cross-claims made among existing parties, without regard to diversity
of citizenship or to amount. 5 6
The present law, permitting impleader and intervention to create
a federal action that could not have been brought originally in federal
court, has a musical-chairs aspect that is hard to defend. The best
justification is that the plaintiff is always free to combine all related
claims in a state court; once he has filed a limited, wholly diverse claim
in federal court, however, dismissal of the entire controversy may be a
harsh and wasteful act when nondiverse claims are appended, so that
151 See, e.g., Huggins v. Graves, 337 F.2d 486, 488-9 (6th Cir. 1964).
152 See Note, Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts,
71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 905-6 (1958), and cases cited. Decisions allowing compulsory counter-
claims to be made without regard to amount are analogous but easier, since the Straw-
bridge argument that the entire controversy belongs in state court cannot be made. See
note 391 in Part II of this article.
153 See Note, Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts,
71 HaRv. L. REv. 874, 905 (1958).
154 Friend v. Middle Ad. Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1946).
155 E.g., Huggins v. Graves, 337 F.2d 486, 488-9 (6th Cir. 1964) (dictum).
156 The serious question whether venue and process should also be relaxed in the
interest of enabling related claims to be combined is considered in Part II of this article,
text at notes 444-6.
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consolidation can reasonably be obtained only in a federal court. But
this inducement of the plaintiff tb split one lawsuit into two in order to
obtain a federal trial; coupled with a relaxation of Strawbridge when
additional parties are sought to be brought in, furnishes still another
argument against the complete-diversity rule itself.
I conclude that Strawbridge is simply wrong and should be overruled
by statute. It is Strawbridge that gives rise to pleas for such academic
horrors as the dispersed-party jurisdiction; that induces a plaintiff to
leave off parties Who ought to be joined, only to see them added after
the complaint; that causes trouble with Rule 82 on grounds that the
Rules illegally expand jurisdiction; that unnecessarily splits up claims
arising from a single transaction; that makes necessary the cumbersome
and litigation-provoking separate-claim removal. These costs, I think,
are too high to pay for the dubious principle, so clearly subject to ex-
ceptions and yet so difficult to limit effectively, that the presence of
adverse cocitizens is assurance against prejudice. If diversity is retained,
Strawbridge ought not to be.15T
4. Corporations and Other Associations
a. Determining Citizenship. After first indignantly protesting that
"that invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity,
a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen,"' 58 the Supreme Court
in the middle of the nineteenth century decided that a corporation
could be "deemed" a citizen of its state of incorporation, 59 or, as it
said in a later case, its shareholders could be conclusively "presumed"
citizens of that state, for diversity purposes.160 Why? Because, in the
first place, a corporation has the same power as breathing citizens to
contract, to commit torts, to sue, and to be sued; and because, in the
second place, a corporation can be the victim or the beneficiary of
prejudice against foreigners just as if it were a human being.161 Here,
apparently, the Strawbridge assumption was not thought to operate:
The presence of a shareholder from the same state as the opposing
157 To do away with Strawbridge would also eliminate the unseemly spectacle, in class
actions and in derivative suits, of seeking out a diverse plaintiff among large numbers of
interested parties. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Smith v.
Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957). In Hood v. James, 256 F.2d 895, 903 (5th Cir. 1958), this tactic
failed. The difficulty of inv~estigating the propriety 6f choosing the diverse representative
is another unsavory byproduct of Strawbridge.
158 Ba ik of the United States v. Deveatix, 9 U.S. (5 Crahch) 61, 86 (1809). This holding
did not mean corporate litigation was always outside the diversity jurisdiction, as it might
have; the Court treated the case as if the shareholders were parties and allowed suit
because they were all alleged to be diverse from the opposing party, id. at 62, 91-92.
159 Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844).
160 Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1854).
161 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 558; 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 329.
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party was not enough to remove the danger of bias. This is sensible
enough, whatever one may think of Strawbridge; for the court and the
jury are likely to be unaware of the residence of all the shareholders,
and it would be unfortunate and cumbersome to require proof of their
citizenship in order to determine jurisdiction.
But in the 1880's the Court developed a myopia about these matters.
Confronted with a suit between a New York joint stock association and
a citizen of another state, the Court refused jurisdiction because a joint
stock company "is not a corporation."162 Why that mattered the Court
did not say; the statute still did not mention corporations, and a much
later Second Circuit decision showed that the tests applied by the
Court in the early decisions deeming corporations citizens were equally
applicable to the association. 163 Joint-stock companies have the same
power as corporations to contract, to commit torts, to sue and to be
sued under New York law; the possibility of prejudice for or against
such a company seems identical; the only difference the Second Circuit
could see was a remote and contingent shareholder liability that it
found indistinguishable from the liability of shareholders in banking
corporations under many laws.
Yet when a similar problem concerning the status of a labor union
came to the Supreme Court not long ago in United Steelworkers v. R.
H. Bouligny, Inc.,164 the Court refused jurisdiction on the ground that
the problem was one for the legislature to resolve. The union is a harder
case to deal with than the corporation, because of its complicated struc-
ture of locals and internationals and because of the absence of a clear
state of registration; but the language of the opinion suggests that the
Court would adhere to the ruling against jurisdiction in the case of the
limited partnership or joint stock company, although these do not
present the problems of the union.
In view of the Court's initial willingness to find a niche for corpora-
tions in the diversity statute this deference to Congress is remarkable.
The application of statutes to situations not anticipated by the legisla-
ture is a pre-eminently judicial function, and the Court's refusal to
decide constituted a decision against jurisdiction without considering
the relevant arguments. Bouligny cannot be justified by the 1958 amend-
ment expressly recognizing corporate citizenship, for this was plainly
directed to the separate issue of eliminating abuses of the presumption
of shareholder citizenship; the amendment can easily be held to leave
162 Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889). Accord, Great Southern Fireproof
Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900) (limited partnership).
163 Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964).
164 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
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unimpaired the Court's power to construe "citizen" according to statu-
tory purpose, or even to express concurrence with the Court's original
view that associations having the characteristics of citizens should be
treated as such. Congressional design might be violated if an association
were given greater access to federal court than that allowed a corpora-
tion under the restrictive amendment, but I see no obstacle to con-
struing "corporation" in section 1332(c) to include the joint-stock
association and the limited partnership, which are identical with
corporations in terms of diversity policy.
The Institute proposes to make any unincorporated association a
citizen of its state of principal business, if it has capacity to sue or be
sued in the forum state.165 The reference to forum-state law may be
troublesome, 1 6 but the main difficulty I have with the ALI suggestion
relates to the criterion of principal place of business. This problem is
the central, still unresolved problem of diversity and associations of
all kinds; the inability of anyone to resolve it successfully is a powerful
point against the diversity jurisdiction itself.
When a corporation or association is wholly connected with a single
state, there is every reason to equate it with the ordinary citizen for
diversity purposes. Just as with individuals, however, and to a much
greater extent because far-flung corporations are so common, the quest
to isolate bias-producing factors becomes chimerical when the corpora-
tion is not localized. It is clear enough, for example, that a New York
corporation set up by New York shareholders to run a New York store
staffed by New Yorkers will be regarded as a foreigner if it litigates in
Georgia; it is less clear how the corporation would be regarded if a
single factor were altered-if the company had a Georgia charter, or
one shareholder lived in Georgia, or it had a Georgia store, or its
principal or sole office were in Georgia. Whether shareholders, man-
agers, or place of operations most affects prejudice is not known; and
the problem is quite insoluble when business is done in several states.
The most obvious hallmark of corporation citizenship, and the one
selected by the Supreme Court, is the state of incorporation. This, of
course, is almost wholly arbitrary in terms of diversity policy: New
Yorkers doing New York business are not likely to be viewed as out-
166 OricuAL DRAFrT, pt. I, at 8, § 1301(b)(2).
166 Capacity of an association to sue or be sued is determined by forum-state law under
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b), presumably because of Erie considerations. But the relevance of any
state's law to the probable bias that should underlie the definition of citizenship is unclear.
If the concern is with whether an organization has attributes of personality that may
deflect the attention of prejudiced people from the individuals comprising the association,
I should think a reference to the law creating the association would be more appropriate.
And the unexplained reference to ability to sue in the forum state suggests the possible
employment of renvoi, a complicated and uncertain process.
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siders by New York courts just because they have incorporated, as they
so commonly do, in Delaware. To avoid the imposition of purely local
cases on the federal courts, Congress enacted in 1958 that a corporation
should be deemed a citizen of the state of its principal business as well
as its state or states of incorporation. 167
For the pseudo-foreign corporation-the local business incorporated
in another state-this provision is fine, and the ALI is right to propose
extending it to alien corporations with their principal business in an
American state.168 It is also appropriate to hold the pseudo-foreign
corporation a citizen of its charter state, since a state like Delaware that
goes out of its way to attract foreign incorporation fees might well be
expected to treat its proteges favorably in order to keep them happily
registered. 69 Unhappily, neither the present statute nor the ALI pro-
posal is limited to pseudo-foreign corporations; the existing law, which
the Institute accepts in this respect, has uniformly been read to require
the courts to find a single principal place of business for every corpora-
tion. In the case of widespread giants like Sears, Roebuck or United
States Steel the task has proved worthy of Procrustes and unworthy of
the federal courts.
Some courts discuss the "nerve center" of the corporation, the place
where management is carried on;' 70 others find the operations of the
business, the manufacturing or selling, more significant. 17' If a test
emerges from the decisions, it seems to be that the place of manufacture
or comparable activity is determinative if it is substantially localized;
if operations are diffused through several states, the courts tend to pick
the place where the high offices are located. 7 2 I suppose this is about
the best that can be done with such a provision.' But I cannot approve
167 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964). See S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
168 OrricL. DRArr, pt. I, at 8, 57-58, § 1301(b)(1). The present provision has been read
not to make alien corporations citizens of their principal places of business, Eisenberg V.
Commercial Union Assr. Co., 189 F. Supp. 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), although the court
did not accept the implication of its holding by excluding the alien corporation from
citizenship altogether.
169 It is odd that the ALI does not make the unincorporated joint stock association or
limited partnership a citizen of its state of registration as well as of principal business.
Whatever considerations justify dual citizenship for corporations in like circumstances
apply equally to them.
170 E.g., Sabo v. Standard Oil Co., 295 F.2d 898, 895 (7th Cir. 1961); Scot Typewriter
Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
171 E.g., Anniston Soil Pipe Co. v. Central Foundry Co., 216 F. Supp. 473, 475-6 (N.D.
Ala. 1968), aff'd, 829 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1964); Inland Rubber Corp. v. Triple A Tire
Serv., Inc., 220 F. Supp. 490, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
172 See 1 J. MooRa, FEDERAL PRACTICE 717.77-.78 (2d ed. 1964); Bruner v. Marjec, Inc.,
250 F. Supp. 426, 427 (V.D. Va. 1966).
173 But see Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960), rejecting
both nerve-center and operations tests in favor of the state containing the "headquarters
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the action of the ALI in leaving the section untouched. In the first
place the test is complicated; it requires much threshold litigation on
the question of jurisdiction. 7 4 Second, the result of the inquiry leaves
something to be desired. Not only can there be inconsistent holdings by
various courts, since they are given no statutory guidance, but I have
little confidence that in U.S. Steel's case, for example, the chance of
bias is substantially different in Pennsylvania than in New York. The
entire inquiry seems highly fictitious, and it ought to be abandoned-
not extended, as the ALI would provide, to cover unincorporated as-
sociations too.
Finding a suitable replacement for the present test is, as always, a
harder question. If Strawbridge were overruled, as I have advocated,
one could argue for a return to the test of shareholder citizenship: If
any shareholder is diverse to an opposing party, there is jurisdiction.
Such a rule, however would create a substantial risk of fraudulent
transfers that could not confidently be dealt with, even at the cost of
considerable litigation, by prohibitions of improper assignments; and
it would sweep into federal courts a great stream of corporate litigation
that probably contains no significant danger of local prejudice, because
the unknown shareholder even if one disagrees with Strawbridge, is not
likely to be the cause of xenophobic favoritism. The place of incorporat-
tion is often quite arbitrary; the principal place of business is a litiga-
tion-provoking myth; to exclude the corporation from diversity protec-
tion wherever it does business would also promote threshold litigation
(recall the troubles of interpreting the old "doing-business" test of per-
sonal jurisdiction) and would expose the foreign entrepreneur to
dangers of bias as real as any that exist in diversity cases: A newsstand
in Birmingham would not make Alabamians view the New York
Times as a local enterprise. Still more clearly, to hold corporations
never citizens, or to insist on complete diversity with all shareholders,
would exclude from the jurisdiction many cases in which the corpora-
tion or its opponent is in the mainstream of diversity's protective policy.
of day-to-day corporate activity and management .. " See also Moore & Weckstein,
Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited,
77 HA iv. L. REv. 1426, 1441-5 (1964), arguing for a distinction according to the nature of
the business in order to discover "the state on which the corporation most impinges." For
example. "a mining or manufacturing company would probably have its greatest contact
with the public at the site of its largest operating facility, where most of its employees
and equipment are located; a corporation whose primity business is selling would have
its greatest contact with the public in the state in which most sales are made." Such a
standard increases complexity and still fails to provide a tolerable basis for decision in
cases in which the company has nearly equal selling or operating contacts in several states.
174 By 1968 the ansiotations on principal place of business in § 1332(c) already exceeded
nine pages in U.S.C.A.
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The impossibility of defining corporate citizenship is one more
reason why the whole diversity jurisdiction should be repealed. Short
of this unlikely eventuality, I would provide specially for corporations
and similar associations, whatever is done with Strawbridge, because
the organization itself is likely to be a factor diminishing the impact of
the individual member upon state-court prejudice. The best answer I
can suggest is to make a corporation or similar organization a citizen of
any state in which it is chartered, and also of that state in which it
conducts substantially all its activities. 175 This brings me full circle to
an endorsement of the Supreme Court's decision that a labor union is
not a citizen: Since a union has no charter state, it seems better, unless
its activities are substantially confined to a single state, to look to the
citizenship of individual members than to enter the litigious morass
of "principal place of business."'176
b. The Consequence of Multiple Corporate Citizenship. Like the
present statute, the Institute's proposal defines the states of which a
corporation is to be deemed a citizen, but it is less than explicit as to the
consequence of multiple citizenship: "A corporation shall be deemed
a citizen of every State and foreign State by which it has been incor-
porated and of the State or foreign State where it has its principal place
of business."'177 The commentary explains that this provision "destroys
diversity between the corporation and a citizen of any one of the spec-
ified states."' 78 It is unfortunate that the Reporters did not phrase the
statute so as to make this clear to the congressmen who will be expected
to vote on the measure and to the hurried practitioner. For the result
described by the commentary is not what the law has always been, and
in light of the complicated history of multiple corporate citizenship, the
proposal's use of the new word "every" is not without its ambiguity.
The 1958 principal-place-of-business provision did not create the
problem of multiple corporate citizenship; railroads commonly incor-
porated in more than one state in the nineteenth century. To indulge
in understatement, the Supreme Court's attempts to fit these creatures
into the diversity scheme left something to be desired. First, the Court
175 The ambiguity in "substantially all" is no greater than that in "principal"; the
test corresponds better to diversity policy; and, most importantly, the inquiry will only
have to be made in close cases.
176 Nothing is said about federal corporations in the ALl draft. § 1348 now makes
national banks citizens of the state where they are located; and see Feuchtwanger Corp. v.
Lake Hiawatha Federal Credit Union, 272 F.2d 453 (3d Cir. 1959), finding state citizenship
for a federal credit union despite Bouligny and the possibility of a negative inference
from § 1848. If principal place of business is to be the test, the statute should make
dear it applies to federal corporations.
177 OFFcIAL DRArT, pt. I, at 8, § 1301(b)(1).
178 Id. at 57.
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appeared to say a suit by a corporation chartered in two states was to be
regarded as brought by citizens of both, so that under Strawbridge the
corporation was never diverse to citizens of either. 7 9 Next, relying on the
old-fashioned theory that incorporation laws have no extraterritorial
force, the Court held a dual-chartered corporation to be solely a citizen
of the forum state if it was incorporated there' 8 0 Then, in a complete
about-face from its original position, the Court allowed a New Hamp-
shire-Massachusetts corporation to sue Massachusetts defendants in a
Massachusetts federal court; apparently a multi-state corporation was
diverse to everybody."'
Not content to have announced three mutually inconsistent rules
without disowning any of them, the Supreme Court proceeded to sug-
gest that the first incorporation was determinative; 82 that it mattered
whether the second charter had been given to individuals or to a cor-
poration; 88 that the place the cause of action arose was, 8 4 was not, 8 5
and might be'8 6 decisive; and that an incorporation compelled as a
condition of doing business could be ignored.82 Then, quietly proud,
the Supreme Court retired from the field for forty-two years.
Left to their own devices, the lower courts employed the necessary
179 Ohio & Miss. R.R. v. Wheeler, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 286, 297, 298 (1862).
180 Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 283-4 (1872); Muller v. Dows,
94 U.S. 444, 447-8 (1877); Memphis & C.R.R. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 581, 585 (1883).
181 Nashua & L.R.R. v. Boston & L.R.R., 136 U.S. 356, 381-2 (1890).
182 St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 560-5 (1896); Southern Ry. v. Allison,
190 U.S. 326, 332 (1903); Louisville, N.A. 8& C. Ry. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552,
563 (1899). See also St. Joseph & G. Is. R.R. v. Steele, 167 U.S. 659, 663 (1897). The plaintiff
alleged it was a corporation of Kansas and Nebraska, sued a Kansas defendant in Kansas,
and was booted out of federal court. Because neither the "nature" of the corporation nor
the state of its original incorporation was alleged, the court said the case was governed by
the old Wheeler decision, supra note 179, forbidding two related corporations from joining
as plaintiffs against a citizen of either charter state.
An important antecedent of the original-incorporation cases was Pennsylvania R.R. v.
St. Louis, A. & T.H.R.R., 118 U.S. 290, 296 (1886), in which an Illinois corporation was
allowed to sue an Indiana corporation in Indiana federal court, over the defendant's
objection that the plaintiff was incorporated in Indiana as well. The Court held that
Indiana had not incorporated the railroad but had merely given the Illinois corporation
authority to operate in Indiana. "It may not be easy in all such cases to distinguish between
the purpose to create a new corporation which shall owe its existence to the law or statute
under consideration, and the intent to enable the corporation already in existence under
laws of another State to exercise its functions in the State where it is so received." Accord,
Goodlett v. Louisville & N.R.R., 122 U.S. 391, 409-10 (1887); Martin's Adm'r v. Baltimore
& O.R.R., 151 U.S. 673, 684 (1894). But James, Louisville, and Allison went further,
admitting that for some purposes there had been a second corporation.
183 St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 565 (1896).
-184 Memphis & C.R.R. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 381, 383 (1883).
185 Southern Ry. v. Allison, 190 U.S. 326, 335 (1903).
186 Patch v. Wabash R.R., 207 U.S. 277, 283 (1907).
187 Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Castle, 224 U.S. 541, 546 (1912).
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machete, ultimately agreeing that the order or method of incorporation
and where the case arose were immaterial and that compulsory incor-
porations were not to be considered.:"8 The First and Fourth Circuits
thought, in accord with some of the old Supreme Court decisions, that
the corporation was a citizen of the forum state alone if chartered
there; 8 9 the Third, thinking it absurd that a New Jersey plaintiff could
sue a New York-New Jersey corporation in federal court in New York
but not in New Jersey, held the railroad diverse to everybody in any
court.190
It was in this state of affairs that the Supreme Court in 1954 reviewed
the First Circuit decision in Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,191
refusing federal jurisdiction in Massachusetts over an action by a Massa-
chusetts plaintiff against a Massachusetts-Connecticut corporation. The
Court played it close to the vest. Here is its full opinion: "The judg-
ment is affirmed. Patch v. Wabash R. Co., 207 U.S. 277; Memphis &
Charleston R. Co. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 581; Seavey v. Boston & Maine
R. Co., 197 F.2d 485." To some commentators this made everything
clear: Except for compulsory incorporations, which were to be dis-
regarded, "if such a corporation was a party to a lawsuit in one of the
states in which it was incorporated, it would be considered, for diversity
purposes, solely a citizen of that state."' 92
This was indeed what the First Circuit had held in Seavey, but the
citation of Patch and Memphis makes it less than certain that the
Supreme Court was embracing everything said in Seavey, in view of
the suggestions in both of the former cases respecting the place the
cause of action arose-a fact that was also noted in the opinion of the
First Circuit in Jacobson itself. 93 One thing the Supreme Court unmis-
188 See the decisions cited in notes 189-90 infra.
189 Seavey v. Boston & M.R.R., 197 F.2d 485, 487 (Ist Cir. 1952); Town of Bethel v.
Atlantic C.L.R.R., 81 F.2d 60, 68, 69 (4th Cir. 1936) (both refusing jurisdiction in the state
of common citizenship); Boston & M.R.R. v. Breslin, 80 F.2d 749, 750 (Ist Cir. 1985)
(upholding jurisdiction in the charter state where the opposing party was not a citizen).
190 Gavin v. Hudson & M.R.R., 185 F.2d 104, 105-7 (1950), overruled in DiFrischia v.
New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960).
191 206 F.2d 153 (1958), af'd mem., 347 U.S. 909 (1954).
192 C. WiUGr, FEDERAL CouRTs 77 & n.19 (1963); Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and
Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HAv. L. REv.
1426, 1429 (1964). The few cases brought in states in which a multi-state company was not
chartered held the corporation was not diverse to a citizen of any incorporating state.
Waller v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 127 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (applying Straw-
bridge); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Thompson, 8 F.R.D. 96, 98 (E.D. Mo. 1948) ("In this State
the incorporating States all stand on equal footing.'); Dodd v. Louisville Bridge Co., 130
F. 186, 197 (W.D. Ky. 1904) (fuzzy, and probably alternative holding).
193 See the extensive discussion of doubts surviving Jacobson in Friedenthal, New Limi-
tations on Federal Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L. REV. 213, 232-5 (1959), suggesting that the
conflicting decisions may ultimately yield a principle requiring the courts to "weigh such
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takably did was to reject the Third Circuit principle that a dual cor-
poration is always diverse to everybody. Another thing it did was
inexcusably to miss a golden opportunity to eliminate the lingering
debris.
Congress complicated matters further in 1958 by providing that a
corporation should be deemed "a citizen of any state by which it has
been incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of
business.' 194 Legislative history excludes the possibility of holding the
corporation with principal business outside its charter state diverse to
everybody; Congress explicitly wanted to keep controversies between
such a company and citizens of its principal place of business out of
the federal court in that state. 9 5 Beyond this, however, the statute is
opaque. The courts have consistently held that when a corporation has
dual citizenship because of its place of business it is never diverse to a
citizen of its charter state; 96 yet some have concluded that the forum
rule still applies to multiple incorporations.97 This peculiar distinc-
tion is warranted neither by diversity policy nor by the language of the
statute, which seems to equate incorporation and principal business;
its only explanation is that to apply the forum rule to principal-business
cases would create jurisdiction of suits not cognizable before 1958 (i.e.,
suits between a Delaware citizen and a Delaware corporation in the
state of its principal business), contrary to the amendment's policy of
restricting jurisdiction."8 If this distinction is the law, it ought to be
abolished; the ALI, though obscurely, would abolish it by destroying
the forum rule altogether.
Despite the metaphysical origins of the forum rule, it is defensible
in terms of diversity policy. In the state of common citizenship the
Strawbridge assumption works quite well for the multi-chartered cor-
poration, for it is literally impossible to harm the foreign corporation
factors as whether the incorporation in Z was voluntary, whether Z was the first place of
incorporation, and whether the cause of action arose in Z"-as well as whether the
decision will increase or decrease diversity jurisdiction.
194 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964).
195 See S. RFp. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
196 E.g., Diesing v. Vaughn Wood Products, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 460 (W.D). Va. 1959);
Harker v. Kopp, 172 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ill. 1959), both denying jurisdiction in the state
of principal business.
107 E.g., Majewsl~i v. New York Cent. R.R., 227 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mich. 19,64); Hudak
v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 238 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Cotitra, 1
J. MoqRa, FEDERAL PArcE 723.50-.58 (2d ed. 1964); 1 W. BARRON & A. HoLTzoFF, Faoam AL
PRAMEx & PRocEuRE 142 n.93.I (Wright ed. 1960), arguing that the amendment destroys
diversity in any forum.
198 Of course, an ircrease of jurisdiction in some cases, compensated for by reductions
in other areas, is not necessarily incompatible with a statute whose purpose was to
rationalize as well as to limit jurisdictign.
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without hurting the local as well. But, just as in the case of multiple
individual parties, when suit is brought in a state of which only the cor-
portation is a citizen there is nothing to protect the outside opponent
from favoritism for the partly local enterprise. However, so long as
Strawbridge is retained in cases not involving multiple corporate citizen-
ship, there seems no reason to make an exception for corporate cases,
and the ALI's proposal ought to be approved.
If Strawbridge were to be overruled, there would be an argument for
retaining the forum rule so as to deny jurisdiction in multiple cor-
porate-citizenship cases in the state of common citizenship, for the
reason indicated above; but such a rule would create complexity. More-
over, as graphically illustrated by Majewski v. New York Central
R.R.,199 the forum rule despite its basis in diversity policy is irreconcil-
able with the policy of trial in the most appropriate federal forum
reflected by the transfer provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Sued by a
Michigan plaintiff in Illinois federal courts, a railroad incorporated in
both Michigan and Illinois had the action transferred to Michigan for
litigation convenience; the Michigan federal court transferred it right
back because there was diversity only in Illinois.
Simplicity would suggest, if Strawbridge were overruled, that the
multi-state corporation be made diverse to everyone; but this would
destroy Congress's commendable 1958 effort to localize the pseudo-
foreign corporation. It might therefore be best, if minimal diversity is
to suffice, to ignore incorporation entirely if the corporation does sub-
stantially all its business in a single state, and otherwise to allow juris-
diction whenever a corporation is voluntarily chartered by more than
one state. But this proposal again is not without complications; the only
simple way to exclude the pseudo-foreign corporation is, despite the
dent this makes in the overruling of Strawbridge, to accept the ALI
,position that a multi-state corporation is never diverse to a citizen of
any of its home states. If we must put up with diversity jurisdiction, I
would recommend this as the least disruptive course.
c. Direct Actions and Derivative Suits. The ALI, finding "sound"
the 1964 amendment to section 1332(c) that deems a liability insurer
a citizen of the state of which its insured is a citizen, as well as of its own
home states, incorporates this provision in its diversity proposals. 200
There is no merit whatever in the Senate Committee's argument that
cocitizenship between the plaintiff and the insured takes these cases
outside the purpose of the diversity grant;20 1 Strawbridge is unconvinc-
199 227 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mich. 1964).
200 OFFICIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 8-9, § 1301(b)(3).
201 S. REP. No. 1308, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964).
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ing enough in a case like this even when the insured cocitizen is joined
as a party, and the notion that his mere existence protects the insurer
from bias when he is not even sued is quite ridiculous. To the extent
that the direct-action provision resulted from docket pressure on the
Louisiana federal courts, the persuasive answer is to appoint more
judges 02 or to exclude all accident cases; there is nothing special about
direct actions in terms of diversity policy. Even if Strawbridge is re-
tained, this statute should be repealed.
Abolition of Strawbridge would also eliminate the occasionally per-
plexing problem of realigning parties as plaintiffs or as defendants ac-
cording to their real interests. Most commonly this issue arises in
shareholders' derivative suits, in which the corporation, having refused
to sue, is named as a defendant. Yet the corporation will benefit if the
plaintiff wins, for he sues to enforce a corporate claim. Accordingly,
early decisions suggested that the corporation was to be realigned as a
plaintiff unless its management was, as a later dissent put it, in the
hands of those against whom the corporate claim was asserted.20 3 Im-
pressed by the fact that such a test might well require an extensive
investigation of the merits in order to determine jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court not long ago prescribed a simpler test: The corporation
was a defendant if management was "definitely and distinctly opposed
to the institution of this litigation.' 20 4 The result seems to be, as pre-
dicted by the dissent, that the corporation is always a defendant in a
derivative suit; for Rule 23.1, like the familiar law on which it was
based, allows the shareholder to sue only if the corporation will not.
The opportunity for fabricating diversity therefore is enhanced: In
most large corporations it is possible to find some shareholder not a
cocitizen of the corporation or of the ultimate defendants.
The relevance of all this to diversity policy is somewhat remote. The
inquiry ought to be directed toward ascertaining whether the citizen-
ship of the corporation is likely to have an effect upon possible bias for
or against the ultimate parties, but this is not at all easy to assess. That
the corporation will benefit from the plaintiff's victory is perhaps can-
celed out by the refusal of the corporation to sue; maybe the best
answer would be to assume the triers of fact will view the contest as
one entirely between the shareholder and the ultimate defendants,
so that, like the stakeholder in interpleader, the corporation's citizen-
202 See Weckstein, The 1964 Diversity Amendment: Congressional Indirect Action
Against State "Direct Action" Laws, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 268.
203 See, e.g., Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905), as explained in Smith v. Sperling,
354 U.S. 91, 104 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
204 Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114, 116 (1957); Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
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ship should be ignored.20 5 If the corporation participates in the action,
its citizenship will become relevant, but it would not help judicial ad-
ministration to postpone the determination of jurisdiction until after
trial has begun.
Like most rules respecting diversity, the realignment of corporations
in derivative suits is not terribly important. The present law is rather
dear, and that is the main thing. Overruling Strawbridge would dispose
of the remaining alignment problems.206
5. Invoking Diversity at Home
This brings me to the three important new exceptions to diversity
jurisdiction proposed in the ALI's section 1302. The first and most
general is a provision that even when there is diverse citizenship no one
may invoke the jurisdiction in a state of which he is a citizen.207 This
has long been the rule in removal cases: The defendant may remove
only if he is not a citizen of the forum state.2 8 Commentators have
often pointed out the inconsistency of forbidding the resident defen-
dant to remove while permitting the resident plaintiff to sue in the
federal court;209 and the ALl quite correctly observes that, since the
philosophy behind diversity jurisdiction is to protect the outsider, it
does not justify allowing the local party to sue in federal court.210
I have two reservations about this logical proposal. The first is a fear
that it may lead simply to increased procedural litigation instead of
excising a substantial volume of cases from the federal courts; the
second is that in some instances the diversity policy of providing a
forum only for the help of the outsider comes into conflict with the
policy of trying cases in the most convenient forum.
Both objections can be illustrated by the example of a suit by a
Pennsylvania plaintiff against a Delaware defendant. The Institute
would permit suit to be filed in the federal court in Delaware, or in any
available state court, but not in federal court in Pennsylvania. But the
ALI does not say the case cannot be heard in the Pennsylvania federal
court. If suit is filed in a state court in Pennsylvania the defendant may
remove, and it seems not unlikely that he will since he is the party with
reason to avoid the state court. And if suit is filed in the Delaware
205 See text at notes 122-3 supra.
206 See, e.g., Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941); Reed v. Robilio, 376
F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1967).
207 OFFICIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 11.
208 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964).
209 See, e.g., H. HART & H. WaciLaR, TH FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
898 (1953).
210 OFFICIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 68.
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federal court, the defendant may move to transfer it to the Pennsylvania
federal court. It would be unfortunate if the ALI's proposal were read
to preclude the transfer, because Pennsylvania may be by far the better
place to try the case. But if the motion is granted, or if the suit is filed
in Pennsylvania and removed, there has been a wasteful game of musical
chairs. The present rule is assuredly impossible to justify if one looks
only to the policy of providing a forum for the out-of-state litigant, but
it makes a good deal of sense because it simplifies the task of judicial
administration.
The ALI's second suggestion along these lines is that a commuter be
forbidden to invoke diversity jurisdiction in the state where he works.211
This is not to make him a citizen of both states, for the commentary
expressly reserves the right of a citizen of his work state to sue him in
the federal court where the commuter lives.212 The rationale is that the
man who works in New York or Philadelphia is not likely to be the
victim of prejudice in the courts of New York or Pennsylvania just
because he goes back to Jersey to sleep.213
This assessment is hard to quibble with, but I oppose the proposal.
First, it will have a merry-go-round effect like that of the first suggestion
discussed above. It is true that when the commuter sues a New Yorker
in New York there can be no removal; but removal is probable when-
ever the defendant is not a citizen or commuter of the forum state.
Moreover, the New Yorker can go to New Jersey to sue the commuter in
the federal court, and the convenient forum may be New York. The
ALI would forbid transfer to New York because neither party could
have invoked original jurisdiction there;214 this tying of transfer to
original jurisdiction is faithful to the bias rationale but hard to recon-
cile with section 1404(a). Nor is it an answer that transfer is already
limited to courts in which the suit might have been brought. That
limitation can itself be criticized; but the existing limitations are venue
and perhaps also personal jurisdiction, which at least purport to reflect
the same convenience policy as section 1404 itself.215
211 OFFICIAL DRAFr, pt. I, at 12, § 1302(c). To protect the person who "has his principal
place of business or employment in another state for a limited time," see id. at 75, the ALI
requires that the relationship be maintained for "more than two years." And, to assure
"an alien's right of access to a federal court," the provision applies only to United States
citizens. Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 75-76. Here the ALI abandons what it earlier urged, see text at notes 26-40
supra, as a principal justification for diversity jurisdiction: "It may be true that state
justice has shortcomings which the commuter cannot as a practical matter do anything to
correct, but the in-stater who works by his side is not significantly more likely to have
an effective voice in the matter."
214 Id. at 17-18, 19-20, §§ 1305(b), 1306(a).
215 See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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The commuter provision does seem to present fewer construction
problems than many of the ALI proposals, but there may be some
trouble in determining whether a state is the party's "principal" place
of employment. If he is proprietor of a business he will also be covered
by the next exception to be considered, and he may be barred without
deciding whether his principal business is in the forum state. If he is
the ordinary desk or factory employee with only one job the task is
easy. But what if he works eight hours in New York by day and eight
more in New Jersey at night? What if he is a salesman whose territory
is the metropolitan area? A construction worker who spends consider-
able time in two or more states? I oppose the commuter provision as an
unnecessary, litigation-provoking complication that is not worth the
trouble. If we are to have diversity jurisdiction we should make it as
workable as possible by adhering to the simplest test of residence that
we can devise, and without complications.
The third exception in draft section 1302 is to forbid a corporation
or other business to invoke federal jurisdiction in any state where it has
a "local establishment." 2 6 This in my view is the most unfortunate as
well as the most significant of the ALI's proposals. It is in discussing this
section that the Reporters make their statement, quoted at the begin-
ning of this paper, about the desirability of a clear test for jurisdic-
tion;217 it is in drafting this section that the Reporters most singularly
fail to live up to their own exhortation.
They do produce a most gruesome catalogue of specific definitions
of established place of business. A more arbitrary set of rules could
scarcely be devised; the Institute would distinguish, among other things,
between the buying and the selling of goods in a state because only the
latter brings the business into substantial contact with the public. 21 8
But the most striking fact about these horrible specifics is that they
leave enormous gray zones that will plague the courts with additional
problems of construction. There is a provision that one is not to be
held to have a local establishment because of the activities of an "inde-
pendent commission agent, broker, or custodian." Does this adopt the
variable and intensely factual test for distinguishing between servants
and independent contractors? Or does it import a new and equally vague
doctrine whose contours are not yet even suggested? The exception
applies only to "entities organized or operated primarily for the pur-
216 OFFICIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 11-12, § 1302(b). The provision applies only to organizations
incorporated or having their principal business in the United States, and the establishment
must have been maintained for over two years.
217 Id. at 72.
218 Id. at 71. The draft also distinguishes between selling concerns maintaining a stock of
goods within the state and those filling orders of local salesmen from outside, "consistent
with the emphasis on visible competition with local enterprise." Id.
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pose of conducting a trade, investment, or other business enterprise" in
order to permit "charitable, religious, or educational institutions, ...
labor unions and fraternal societies" to invoke jurisdiction where they
have an established place of activity.219 If it were not for this explicit
commentary I would have thought the test of "business" broad enough
to include education unless it is given away free. Is the test to be the
type of activity engaged in, or has "business" to do with the making of
profit only?
Finally, even if the specific and numerous definitions present no
other ambiguities, 220 there is the impossible requirement that the action
be one "arising out of the activities" of the local establishment. The
Reporters helpfully advise us that this test is more restrictive than a
prior formulation that would have excluded actions "related to" the
establishment, 221 but no attempt is made to define either phrase. Nor is
it very clear why there should be any such limitation. None is proposed
for the commuter; the difference is puzzling, since the basis of both
provisions is that the established worker or business needs no protection
against local bias. The explanation is the desire to limit the risks of
litigation that a business takes when establishing a foreign place of
business; 222 but why the Reporters feel the need of this limit is obscure,
since they think the corporation is in no danger of bias.
Further, even if the proposal were not both arbitrarily detailed and
litigation-breeding, it would be questionable in terms of the bias policy.
It is hardly credible that a substantial bias against a foreign business
is destroyed because it sets up a local store; surely the presence of a
wholly-owned newsstand in Birmingham would not help the New York
Times very much in an Alabama court. Indeed one of the original
reasons for diversity jurisdiction, we are told, was the attraction of
capital from other states; 223 not only does this suggest that corporations
should be treated as citizens, since they are a principal means of invest-
ing capital, but it also indicates that the man who invests money in
another state may need protection.
Finally, if I agreed with the Institute that a corporation should not
be allowed to sue in its place of established business, I would suggest
that the statute abolish the second category of principal place of
business. There seems no excuse for two levels of difficult threshold
determination even before we get to venue and service of process. My
219 Id. at 74.
220 See id. at 73, leaving the question of subsidiary corporations to be decided "in light
of the particular facts."
221 Id. at 73.
222 Id. at 72-73.
223 Id. at 49.
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suggestion would be, if I agreed with the ALI on this, that a corporation
be made a citizen of every state where it did business.
This painfully long discussion gives an idea of the enormous infra-
structure that has grown up to support and to define the diversity juris-
diction. In my view the security given out-of-state interests by this
jurisdiction is not worth the burden of defining and administering it.
But the American Law Institute, rather than proposing to simplify the
jurisdictional determination, is intent upon complicating it. I dissent.





I have less to say about federal-question jurisdiction, because the ALI
has done much better with this subject than with diversity. The juris-
diction itself, unlike diversity, is not very controversial, despite the
well-known fact that it did not exist in the trial courts until 1875;224
it seems dear that if we are to have original federal jurisdiction at all
it ought to extend to the enforcement of federal rights. The Institute
accurately marshals the arguments: Federal judges have relative ex-
pertise in dealing with federal law; uniform interpretation is promoted
by federal jurisdiction; state courts may be hostile to federal law. Su-
preme Court review of state courts, limited by narrow review of the
facts, the debilitating possibilities of delay, and the necessity of defer-
ring to adequate state grounds of decision, cannot do the whole job.
The Institute endorses the general federal-question jurisdiction of the
district courts in order "to protect litigants relying on federal law from
the danger that state courts will not properly apply that law, either
through misunderstanding or lack of sympathy. '225 I agree, and I shall
not expand on the argument for the jurisdiction.
One difficulty with federal-question jurisdiction is that nobody knows
how to define it. Its constitutional scope is quite broad. Despite smoke
screens thrown up by dissenting opinions, 22 however, the Supreme
Court has never suggested the jurisdiction includes the vast category
of cases in which there are potential federal issues. The test of the
famous Osborni case is rather that the case must contain some "ingre-
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This is the second installment of a two-
part article. The first part appeared in the Fall i968 Issue, 36 U. CHI. L. kEV. 1-49.
224 See H. M. HART & H. WECHsLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THm FEDERAL SYsTEm 727-
50 (1953).
225 TENT. DRArT No. 6, at 69-74 (1968).
226 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 874-6 (1824) (Johnson,
J.); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 358 U.S. 448, 471 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.).
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dient" of federal law.227 It suffices under the Constitution that a part
of the case is federal, for example the authority of the National Bank
to contract. There is nothing very remarkable about this, or very
mysterious either; Professor Mishkin rightly says the federal govern-
ment must be able to protect its interests against state hostility by
opening its own courts, even when federal law forms only one rather
remote element in the case. The key to the problem is Mr. Mishkin's
insistence that a federal "claim" rather than "question" is the essence
of the jurisdiction: A federal right may need federal-court protection
even if its scope is settled beyond controversy.228 Mr. Justice Frank-
furter to the contrary notwithstanding, the ingredient test remains an
appropriate minimum interpretation of Article III. The controversy
over the permissibility of protective jurisdiction in the absence of such
a federal ingredient has been discussed above. 229
The real difficulty arises because the statutory language, sensibly, has
been more narrowly construed than its constitutional counterpart.
Again Mr. Mishkin supplies the justification: While the power must
exist to protect federal corporations, for example, in all their dealings,
it is unlikely that Congress meant, absent a showing of local hostility,
to burden the federal courts with a great many cases whose resolution
was likely to depend entirely upon state law.230 The case of the federal
corporation has been specifically excluded by statute, except when the
United States is majority stockholder.2 31 But there are other exceptions,
judicially created, that create problems of application.
1. The Well-Pleaded Complaint; Removal
The best-known and perhaps the most-criticized exception to federal-
question jurisdiction is the well-pleaded-complaint rule, which ex-
cludes from the federal trial courts most cases in which the federal
claim is not a part of the plaintiff's original complaint.232 In addition,
the Court's willingness to tie this test to technical pleading rules un-
related to jurisdictional policy233 makes the rule operate capriciously
and adds complexity to the determination of jurisdiction. The Court's
227 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
228 Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 CoLUM. L. REV. 157,
162-3, 168-71 (1953).
229 See text at notes 68-73 supra. [Footnotes 1-223 appear in Part I of this article at 36
U. CH. L. REv. 1-49 (1968).]
230 Mishkin, supra note 228, 53 COLUM. L. Rxv. at 162-3.
231 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1964).
232 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
233 See, e.g., White v. Sparkill Realty Corp., 280 U.S. 500, 512 (1930); and compare
Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486 (1917), with Marshall v. Desert Properties Co,, 103 F.2d
551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 563 (1939).
The University of Chicago Law Review
apparent suggestion that in declaratory-judgment actions the test re-
quires investigation of the rules governing pleading in a hypothetical
coercive action,234 while faithful to the Declaratory Judgments Act's
statement that the statute does not affect jurisdiction,235 increases the
burden of threshold litigation. And the general statutory limitation of
removal to cases that could originally have been brought in federal
court 236 assures that the well-pleaded-complaint rule deprives most liti-
gants of a federal trial court's protection of federal rights asserted in
defense or reply.
The excuse for this rule has been that it spares the courts the uncer-
tainty of guessing whether federal issues will be raised after the com-
plaint and enables the jurisdictional determination to be made at the
outset.23  This policy is deserving; it would be wasteful if federal courts
either proceeded to judgment with the risk of a tardy dismissal for
failure of a federal question to appear or accepted removal of cases
that had been nearly completed before a federal point was raised.
Cutting off access to a federal court before the answer is filed, though,
may be carrying a good thing too far, since the defendant's need for a
federal forum seems quite as great as the plaintiff's. Moreover, such
insistence on an immediate determination of jurisdiction is not com-
patible with the present provision allowing the defendant to remove
when the plaintiff's claim is federal.238 I agree with the present law and
with the ALI that the expenditure of state-court effort between com-
plaint and answer does not justify depriving the defendant of a federal
court to protect against misunderstanding of the plaintiff's federal
right;239 a fortiori, the same wasted effort does not justify depriving the
defendant of federal protection for his own federal right.
The Institute proposes to allow removal on the basis of certain
federal claims raised subsequent to the complaint, but it does not
authorize the plaintiff to obtain original federal jurisdiction by antici-
pating such a claim. 240 This is right enough, though it may lead to a
game of musical chairs like that which forced me to object to barring
the local plaintiff's invoking diversity.241 The difference is that, while
234 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950). Possibly the Court
only held the federal matter was not required to be pleaded by the declaratory plaintiff.
But see H. M. HART & H. WECHSiLE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 774
(1953).
235 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
236 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964).
237 See TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 96-97.
238 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964).
239 TENT. DRArT No. 6, at 98-99.
240 Id. at 5, 6, 94-98, §§ 1311(a), 1312(a).
241 See text at notes 193-7, 207-10 supra.
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the existence of diversity is plain from the complaint, a case does not
arise under federal law until the federal claim is made. This point is
practical as well as technical: The diversity defendant cannot defeat
jurisdiction once attached, as could the defendant with an anticipated
federal claim, by failing to make his defense. Thus, to allow anticipa-
tion by the federal-question plaintiff would not as in the diversity case
assure early final resolution of jurisdiction.
Commendably, for the enlightenment of the attorney, the ALI pro-
poses to codify the well-pleaded-complaint rule, conferring original
jurisdiction of actions "in which the initial pleading sets forth a sub-
stantial claim" arising under federal law.242 Commendably, the draft
disposes of the declaratory-suit problem by applying the same test to
actions "for a declaratory judgment. ' 243 Looking to the actual declara-
tory complaint simplifies the determination and fully meets the reason
for the rule: early assurance that the federal claim is really in the case.
Continued reliance on pleading rules does perpetuate rather arbitrary
decisions and increases complexity, but no simpler or more appropriate
test suggests itself, and the importance of the problem is greatly mini-
mized by the provision for removal and by the sensible provision al-
lowing the federal court to try cases originally but erroneously filed
there if a federal claim has since been made.244 With these amendments
it does not seem worthwile to put much effort into devising a more
perfect test of original federal jurisdiction in this regard.
The provision for federal-defense removal was a source of consider-
able controversy within the Institute. The final product is a com-
promise falling short of the goal and inviting threshold litigation. To
begin with, over the Reporters' mild objection,245 there is a $10,000
jurisdictional amount.2 46 This is odd only because the Institute pro-
poses to eliminate the amount requirement for original federal-question
jurisdiction and for removal based upon the plaintiff's federal claim.2 47
Though "the national government should bear the burden of provid-
ing a forum" to people with federal claims, and though the infre-
quency of removal in federal-question cases, the great majority of which
require no amount, shows that "removal is not now frequently used as
a harassing tactic by defendants," the ALI fears that the new opportu-
nity for federal-defense removal might be used "as a harassing tactic in
242 TENT. DRAar No. 6, at 5, § 1311(a).
243 Id.
244 Id. at 8, § 1312(d).
245 Id. at 101-3.
246 Id. at 6, § 1312(a)(2).
247 Id. at 5, 6, §§ 1311(a), 1812(a)(1).
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small cases in which the claim is grounded on state law."248 Why defen-
dants should be thought more likely than plaintiffs to abuse their right
to a federal forum is not explained, nor why invocation of that right
should be deemed improper. The distinction has no merit; the amount
should be required for both parties or for neither.249
There are other exceptions to the ALI's proposal for federal-defense
removal. First, the federal defense must be "dispositive of the action
or of all counterclaims therein."250 Removal on the basis of such de-
fenses as that the plaintiff's evidence was obtained in violation of federal
law or that damages are limited by the Warsaw Convention is thus
forbidden: "[S]ince the action will ultimately be resolved by state law,
the need for a federal forum is less pressing."251 Moreover, neither
constitutional immunity from state process, constitutional objection
to choice of law, nor the federally guaranteed bar of a sister-state judg-
ment or a bankruptcy decree is to be a ground for removal: 252 "Most
challenges to state 'long arm' statutes are today foreclosed by prior Su-
preme Court decisions, and would not raise a 'substantial defense' ";
even when a substantial issue is presented, "[t]he objection to process
... is a dilatory one, which does not go to the merits," and in every
case there is a preliminary question of the reach of state law. As for the
choice of law and res judicata issues, "[w]hether these are defenses
that 'arise under' federal law and whether they are 'substantial' are
questions that are not dear. It is clear that removal on this ground
should not be allowed." No reasons are given.2 53
Moreover, actions by a state or its officer, agency, or subdivision to
enforce the state or local "constitution, statutes, ordinances, or admin-
istrative regulations' 25 4 are not to be removable on the basis of federal
defenses because "proper respect for the states suggests that they should
be allowed to use their own courts for routine matters of law enforce-
ment," except in special situations such as civil rights or suits against
federal officers. For no apparent reason this exception is deliberately
made inapplicable to claims based on state common law.2 55 Finally,
private eminent-domain cases are made non-removable despite federal
defenses: Removal of most condemnations will be prohibited by the
248 Id. at 78, 79, 101, 103.
249 For general consideration of the jurisdictional amount, see text at notes 367-98
infra.
250 TENT. DRArT No. 6, at 6, § 1312(a)(2).
251 Id. at 105.
252 Id. at 7-8, 110-1, § 1312(b)(7), (8).
253 Id. at 110-1.
254 Or suits against the state to require enforcement. Id. at 7, § 1812(b)(5).
255 Id. at 109.
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clause just discussed, and therefore private condemnation proceedings
should not be removed either.256
Much of this reasoning is unpersuasive. Abuse of the new provision
by the assertion of frivolous defenses seems no more likely with respect
to personal jurisdiction than to other issues, and in any case the prob-
lem is amply resolved by the long-standing requirement that the federal
claim must be substantial,257 a requirement the ALI properly pro-
poses to make explicit in the statute.258 That some of these cases do not
"arise under" federal law in the sense of the well-pleaded-complaint
rule is irrelevant; no federal-defense cases do, and that federal law does
affect both choice of law and respect for judgments is indisputable. 259
State-court hostility or misunderstanding seems no less probable in any
of the excepted cases than in those the Institute would make remov-
able; indeed the likelihood of anti-federal bias must be at its height
when the state sues in its own courts. Federal issues as to personal juris-
diction, choice of law, res judicata, illegal evidence, and compensation
for takings are often intensely factual, so that Supreme Court review
may prove inadequate protection. The ALI's tautological view that
it is less serious to be gypped out of a point of evidence or damages
than out of a whole case does not prove that federal rights to less than
the whole deserve no protection, for they are often far from insignifi-
cant. And the argument respecting private condemnation suits is no
argument at all, since the reasons for excluding comparable state suits
are admittedly inapplicable.
The respectable arguments for the ALI's exceptions from federal-
defense removal are thus reducible to two: the desirability of allowing
states to enforce their laws in their own courts and the undesirability
of burdening the federal courts with numerous questions of state law.
A federal trial seems necessary in all the excepted cases if uniform
vindication of federal rights is to be assured, but the cost of this as-
surance may be too high. When the plaintiff's claim is federal, the
case is likely to be dominated by federal issues, although there may
be threshold questions of state law, as when state action is sought to
be enjoined. Every federal-defense case contains issues of state law;
when the defense is on the merits and dispositive of the action, the mix
of federal and state matters is likely to approximate that of the suit to
enjoin state action. But when the federal issue is collateral, like per-
256 Id. at 7, § 1312(b)(6); id. at 109-10.
257 Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933).
258 TENT. DRAFr No. 6, at 5, § 1311(a); id. at 81-83.
259 See, e.g., Crider V. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Durfee V. Duke, 375 U.S. 106
(1963).
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sonal jurisdiction, there are not only state-law matters related to the
federal issue itself (e.g., the interpretation of a state long-arm statute);
there may also be an entire trial on the merits governed entirely by
state law. Pendent jurisdiction allows the federal court to avoid wasted
effort by adjudicating the entire case, but the expenditure of federal
resources and the invasion of state judicial prerogative are large. The
ALI's proposal to forbid removal based on such relatively peripheral
issues as personal jurisdiction, choice of law, res judicata, illegal evi-
dence, and excessive damages is therefore in complete accord with
Professor William Cohen's recent and valuable insight that original
federal-question jurisdiction should be determined pragmatically in
the light of, among other things, the relative dominance of federal and
state issues. 260 I cannot object to these exceptions; they will probably be
easy to administer, and they will keep a healthy volume of local issues
out of federal courts.
More troublesome is the exception for state enforcement cases, with
its unexplained omission of suits arising under common law. These
cases will often be substantially federal; the reason for excluding them
from federal court is not the dominance of local issues but respect for
the states. This respect seems entirely appropriate in criminal cases,
which Congress has scrupulously left to state courts except in instances
of extreme federal interest or state hostility, such as prosecutions of
federal officers or of persons unable to enforce their civil rights in state
court.261 It may not be so pressing in civil cases, but it is worthy of con-
sideration; I cannot oppose this exception very strongly, as it rests upon
a reasonable balancing of the need for federal protection against the
state's interest in being able to enforce its own laws. But I would delete
the exception for private condemnation suits, which seem to me to pre-
sent no special problems either of deference to state interest or of
dominant state-law issues.
Present law forbids removal of federal counterclaims. The plaintiff
cannot remove because removal is limited to "defendants"; 262 the de-
fendant presumably cannot because the original action was not cogni-
zable in federal court.263 If state practice makes the counterclaim com-
260 Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly"
Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. Rxv. 890, 906-7, 916 (1967).
261 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1443 (1964). In criminal cases, too, the myriad of federal
procedural objections would practically destroy state criminal jurisdiction and burden the
federal courts with state-law issues if removal were allowed.
262 Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 315 U.S. 100 (1941).
263 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964). The notion that the counterclaim itself is the relevant
"civil action" seems contrary to the holding in the Shamrock case, supra note 262, that
the relevant "defendant" is the party against whom the original action was brought.
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pulsory, this law is likely to deprive the defendant of a federal forum.
Consequently the Institute proposes to allow removal by a defendant
asserting a federal claim compulsory under state law and by a party
against whom any federal counterclaim is asserted.264 This accords
with the policy underlying federal-claim and federal-defense removal,
but simplicity would be served without any adverse effect I can see
by eliminating the burdensome inquiry respecting state compulsory-
counterclaim rules and allowing either party to remove whenever a
federal counterclaim is made.
Federal defenses to counterclaims are to provide a basis for re-
moval,2 5 but federal replies to state-law defenses to state-law claims
are not. An earlier draft, loyal to the policy of providing a federal forum
to vindicate federal rights, had authorized federal-reply removal;206
but the late stage at which replies are asserted is one minor argument
in the other direction,26 7 and the probable dominance of state issues in
a reply case is another.26 8 But if the plaintiff attacks the validity of a
state-law defense, the federal question is likely to be of some importance
in the case, and I should prefer to extend removal to federal rights
claimed at any stage of the pleadings, and in any removal petition
filed before trial.
Removal of Jones Act, FELA, and Fair Labor Standards Act actions,
and of suits for lost or damaged freight under the Carmack Amend-
ment, is to be forbidden.2 9 In part this bar is a continuation of present
law;270 the entire package represents a policy decision to respect the
forum choice of a widows-and-orphans type of plaintiff, and I see no
reason to criticize or to extend it. It is an improvement on present law
because it eliminates considerable uncertainty, and I do not feel strongly
about the defendant's access to a federal forum when it is the plaintiff
who would suffer from any state hostility.
264 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 6, § 1312(a)(3). No jurisdictional amount is to be required.
265 Id. at 6, § 1312(a)(2).
266 TENT. DRAFT No. 4, at 6, § 1312(a)(3) (1966).
267 But cf. removal on the basis of an answer to a counterclaim, which cannot be raised
sooner than in a reply.
268 The ALI has used this one. See TENT. DRAFT No. 5, at 98-99 (1967).
269 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 7, § 1312(b)(1)-(4).
270 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1964) (FELA; $3000 minimum for Carmack removal); Pate v. Stan-
dard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 1952) (Jones Act). The FLSA cases con-
flict. Compare Wilkins v. Renault Southwest, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 647, 648 (N.D. Tex. 1964)
(absurdly holding removal "expressly" barred, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964). by a pro-
vision that such actions "may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction'),
with Asher v. William L. Crow Constr. Co., 118 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), allowing
removal.
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The emasculated 27' provision of section 1443(l) for removal by de-
fendants unable to enforce equal federal rights in state courts is to be
preserved without improvemient;272 section 1443(2), which has become
superfluous by interpretation,2 78 is slated for virtual repeal;274 and,
thank goodness, the ALI intends to reverse the pointless court-created
principle that an action within exclusive federal jurisdiction cannot be
removed.27 5
2. Additional Problems of Definition
Not all cases in which the plaintiff's claim contains a federal element
are within the statutory original jurisdiction. In every case involving
a federal corporation or the ownership of a patent or copyright, for
example, the federal existence of the company or of the property may
be implicit in the plaintiff's case; but the improbability of a challenge
on these remote grounds has led to the common-sense exclusion of the
corporation cases by statute2 7 and of the property cases (including
those relating to the ownership of land long ago obtained from the
United States) by court decision. 27 Unfortunately, there is no very
good way to express these exceptions in the statute. The ALI toyed
with the idea of codification but concluded that it was better to say
nothing, because the present rules are fairly well understood although
hard to formulate, and because any change would create uncertainty.278
It is regrettable that the circle cannot be squared, but the Institute
and Professor Cohen 279 are right that we have better things to do than
to keep trying the impossible.
People have tried for years to enunciate a comprehensive definition
of federal-question cases. The Supreme Court from time to time has
said a case arises under federal law when the cause of action is federally
271 See City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 US. 808 (1966).
272 TENT. DAFT No. 6, at 8, § 1312(c).
273 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, supra note 257.
274 TENT. DRAr No. 6, at 9. The narrow provision for removal by a state officer prose-
cuted for compliance with federal law is preserved in the proposed § 1312(c). Federal-
officer removal is considered in text at notes 347-9 and the problem of the civil-rights
defendant in text at notes 569-87 infra.
275 See American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916); TENT.
DRAFr No. 6, at 8, § 1312(d).
276 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1964).
277 See, e.g., Shulthis v. McDotigal, 225 U.S. 561, 569-70 (1912) (land); American Well
Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.§. 257 (1916) (patent); T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu,
339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 881 U.S. 915 (1965) (copyright).
278 TENT. DRAT No. 6, at 83-85. The Reporters also feared the term "direct" might
overrule Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); see note 283 infra.
279 Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly"
Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890, 907 (1967).
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created,2 0 or when federal law must be construed.281 But the former
test is little help in the problem cases in which some elements are
federal and some state; the latter would exclude the clearly cognizable
cases in which the law is clear but a federal right needs federal vindica-
tion 282 and include cases in which a state has adopted federal standards
for its own purposes. The cases are terribly confused on the incorpora-
tion-by-reference problem;283 I see no federal interest in hearing such
controversies, and the statute could profitably and clearly be made to
exclude them by requiring that federal law operate of its own force in
order to support jurisdiction. 28 4
The converse case has occasionally caused trouble. Federally given
rights are often defined by reference to state law, either out of deference
to state interests or because of the convenience of utilizing an existing
standard. People have wondered, for example, why there is federal
jurisdiction to determine who is entitled to renew a copyright, 28 5 since
the statute has been read to adopt state principles of succession; and
the Supreme Court many years back denied federal jurisdiction to de-
280 E.g., American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
281 E.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 879 (1821).
282 See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 157,
170-1 (1953).
283 Supreme Court jurisdiction to review state-court judgments in such cases was denied
in Miller's Executors v. Swann, 150 U.S. 132 (1898), and upheld in Standard Oil Co. v.
Johnson, 816 U.S. 481 (1942). District-court jurisdiction was denied in Moore v. Chesa-
peake & 0. Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934), and upheld in Smith v. Kansas City Title & T. Co.,
255 U.S. 180 (1921). Jurisdiction in habeas corpus was denied in McClain v. Wilson, 870
F.2d 369, 870 (9th Cir. 1966), and in Flores v. Beto, 374 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 887 U.S. 948 (1967). For further confusion see Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 378 U.S. 647
(1963), and Avco Corp. v. Machinists' Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), suggesting opposite
conclusions without adverting to the issue.
284 One commentator would distinguish between cases in which a state has created
additional remedial consequences based upon a pre-existing federal duty and those in
which it has extended the duty to new factual cases. Note, Supreme Court Review of
State Interpretations of Federal Law Incorporated By Reference, 66 HARv. L. Rav. 1498,
1502-3 (1953). The subtlety of this distinction is against it, and in either case the federal
government is indifferent to the outcome. There may be virtue in promoting uniformity
in cooperative state-federal programs based on a common standard (e.g., unemployment
compensation) by providing federal jurisdiction; but it seems better, as in the case of
federal incorporations, not to burden the federal courts with a lot of cases devoid of
federal interest until Congress provides for jurisdiction in the case of a particular program.
In the familiar Standard Oil case, supra note 283, one may be tempted to discern a
federal interest in avoiding taxation of government agencies; but this concern arises from
the proprietary position of the United States, not from the state's use of federal standards
for determining the tax, and it is protected by the truly federal constitutional limits on
intergovernmental taxation.
285 De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956). See the discussion of this case in
T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915
(1965), and in Txrt. DRAFT No. 6, at 84.
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termine which of two claimants was entitled to receive a land patent
from the United States, because the statute provided that "local cus-
toms" were determinative. 2 6 Yet the adoption of state standards does
not demonstrate indifference to the outcome of a case. It is of some
concern to the national government who is entitled to vote for congress-
men, despite the use of state law as a reference.28 7 And when state law
is adopted purely for federal convenience, as in the old Conformity
Act respecting procedure,288 it may be unfair to expect the states to
undertake the whole burden of litigation; the states do not have a burn-
ing interest in how federal courts are run.
Professor Cohen defends the refusal of jurisdiction in the land-
claimant cases on the pragmatic ground that local issues are likely to
predominate,28 9 but I think the difficulty of drawing lines and the
ultimate federal interest in determining who gets federal benefits
justify holding the case within the arising-under jurisdiction. Surely,
for example, the FELA plaintiff is not to be kept out of federal court
because her "widow" status is dependent upon state law.290 To express
this in the statute would not be easy; though the Court has sometimes
been wrong on this matter in the past, I would leave it for the Court
to correct.
Another ambiguity in the present statute is the uncertainty whether
cases arising under federal common law come within the jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's unpersuasive Romero opinion, 291 which held
maritime common law outside federal-question jurisdiction because a
federal forum was already available in admiralty, failed to account for
the corresponding overlaps between admiralty and diversity and in
the case of maritime statutes; but it left open the question of section
1331 jurisdiction over other common-law cases. Rightly concluding that
federal common law requires the same vindication and uniformity
as do statutes, the ALI hopes the courts will uphold jurisdiction, but
288 Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 508 (1900).
287 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
288 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
289 Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly"
Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. Rlv. 890, 906-7 (1967).
290 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
291 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). See the
dispute over Romero's interpretation regarding suits for injunctions based on maritime
common law in Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1959),
rev'd, 362 U.S. 365 (1960), and Khedivial Line v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d
Cir. 1960). Since the premise of Romero was the existence of an adequate remedy in ad-
miralty, the inability of courts sitting in admiralty to give injunctions argues strongly for




it refrains from proposing an amendment to this effect lest it raise
"questions about the continued applicability of existing case law the
authority of which it is intended to preserve." 292
The same objection is raised against making explicit the probable
requirement that the case arise under a law not limited to the District
of Columbia or to federal territories and possessions. 29 3 This limita-
tion is a good one too, for essentially local matters belong in the
District of Columbia or territorial courts. Finally, the Reporters dis-
claim even any opinion on the unfortunate holding that an interstate
compact is not a federal "law" for jurisdictional purposes.294 The
federal interest in uniform interpretation of a compact is strong, es-
pecially since the Court has made clear that federal law governs the
question; 295 the federal courts are ideally placed to arbitrate conflict-
ing state positions respecting compacts; and there is a federal interest
in assuring that the limitations of congressional consent are respected.
I cannot see what deserving case law would be questioned by clarify-
ing any of these ambiguities; the best argument against amending the
statute to reach cases "arising under the Constitution, treaties, statutes,
regulations, executive orders or agreements, and common law of the
United States not limited to the District of Columbia, territories or pos-
sessions, and under interstate compacts" is the esthetically displeasing
lack of simplicity. There is also the danger of excluding by negative
implication some overlooked type of federal law, such as the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.2 6 But since the lawyer needs to know the in-
clusions and exclusions, it might be better to encumber the statute with
those that can be reasonably expressed than to leave him to look for
relevant decisions.
3. Exclusive Jurisdiction
Federal jurisdiction is normally concurrent with that of the states;
if neither party wants a federal forum, it is not forced upon the liti-
gants. It is difficult to justify exceptions to this principle. Allowing
the state courts to protect their dockets by refusing jurisdiction is one
thing;297 depriving willing state courts of power to proceed when both
292 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 86-87.
293 Id. at 85-86.
294 Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 109 (1938).
295 Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 278 (1959).
296 See Cleary v. Bolger, 871 U.S. 392, 414 n.3 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting), raising
the question whether the Rules were "civil rights statutes" within 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
297 See Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 5 (1950) (forum non con-
veniens); but see Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 83, 38-39 (1926), refusing to allow use of a
short state statute of limitation in a Jones Act case.
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parties desire a state adjudication is another. The divorce situation
presents a. strong case for exclusive jurisdiction because of the danger
that both parties and the foreign court may wish to subvert the properly
applicable law.298 But this example is atypical; the cases within federal
jurisdiction do not involve this problem.
Professor Wechsler some years ago argued for continued exclusive
federal jurisdiction over federal crimes on the ground that only in
federal courts could defendants be assured their constitutional rights
against the federal government. 299 But this problem could be cured
by allowing removal by the defendant who wants additional rights,
even if the recent expansion of the rights of state-court defendants
and the added fact that the federal government was prosecutor would
not assure adequate protection in state court. Professor Frankfurter's
long-ago suggestion that much essentially local federal criminal business
be transferred to the state courts30 has never been taken up; perhaps a
revision of the Judicial Code is not the best place to discuss it.
The complexity of antitrust cases is perhaps an indication that state
courts would not be overly anxious to take on the burden of adjudi-
cating them, or at first overly competent to do so. Patent cases may be
similar in this regard, though the present narrow scope of exclusive juris-
diction leaves the state courts considerable scope to deal with patent
law.301 The ALI's notion that in patent and copyright cases there is a
federal interest transcending that of the parties302 is unconvincing;
since nonparties would not be bound by a state decision, it is hard to
see how the monopoly could be undermined or extended by state
litigation. As for uniformity of decision, the desire for federal prece-
dents does not forbid parties to arbitrate or to settle their disputes
without litigation; no more should it bar recourse to a possibly more
convenient and less costly state court.
Suits against the United States and for review of its administrative
agencies are authorized only in federal courts, and this is reasonable:
Since the United States could be expected to remove most suits brought
against it in the state courts, exclusive federal jurisdiction spares the
parties and the courts an extra round of filing and of court costs. In
298 See D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict Of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and
Borax, 34 U. CH. L. REv. 26, 49-53 (1966).
299 Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 219 (1948).
800 F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BusiNEss oF THE SuPREMwE COURT 293 (1928).
301 See Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897); Luckett v. Del-
park, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 510-1 (1926).
802 TENT. DA r No. 6, at 89.
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bankruptcy cases the presence of multiple parties makes the danger of
state-court error both unusually likely and unusually serious.
I would limit the exclusive jurisdiction to criminal, bankruptcy, and
antitrust cases; to suits against the United States or for review of fed-
eral administrative agencies; and to certain maritime proceedings dis-
cussed below.308
4. Pendent Jurisdiction
State-law issues are commonly adjudicated in federal courts, regard-
less of diverse citizenship, if they are part of a case arising under federal
law. The strength of the policy justifying this intrusion on state con-
cerns varies according to the case, as Hart and Wechsler and the recent
article by Mr. Shakman have shown.304 When, as in the National Bank's
contract case,305 only a part of the federal claim itself is based on
federal law, or when a federal defense is interposed to a state-created
cause of action, a federal trial court could not function at all if it could
not pass upon local issues. In interpleader cases the court could func-
tion if it left out of consideration claims created by state law, but the
risk of exposing a stakeholder to multiple liability argues strongly for
pendent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's decisions permitting a
plaintiff with a federal claim to join state-law claims arising out of the
same transaction 0 6 go a big step further, based entirely upon the sav-
ings in time and money of avoiding multiple trials on overlapping
evidence.
As I indicated in discussing the complete-diversity rule and its ex-
ceptions,80 7 I have no difficulty in subordinating the claim of states'
rights in this sort of situation to what I consider a substantial economy
of resources, and I endorse the ALI's intention to codify the pendent-
jurisdiction doctrine in the broad form in which the Supreme Court
has recently defined it. 808 The old test of Hum v. Oursler,809 which
803 See text at notes 337-41 infra. The ALI commendably proposes to do away with
exclusive jurisdiction in a number of obscure situations, as well as under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964). See TENT. DR. r No. 6, at 5, 89-94,
§ 1311(b).
304 H. M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 804
(1953); Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REv.
262 (1968).
305 Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
806 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238
(1933).
807 See text at note 156 supra.
808 TENr. DRArr No. 6, at 10, § 1313(a).
309 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
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required a distinction between separate "claims" and separate "causes
of action," was not easy to administer, and it forced the splitting of a
number of cases that might better have been consolidated from the
point of view of judicial economy.310 The 1948 attempt at codifica-
tion3 11 was a failure; no one knew whether the reviser's test of a
"related" claim was meant to broaden or to preserve the Hum test,
312
and the apparent limitation of the doctrine to copyright, patent, and
trademark litigation made little sense in policy and less in precedent.
The statute has been largely ignored.
The Gibbs case gives the proper breadth to the doctrine, allowing
pendent jurisdiction whenever considerations of judicial economy jus-
tify consolidation. 313 The ALI captures the essence of this principle,
making it easily available to the harried practitioner in familiar lan-
guage that lends itself to construction in light of the policy of avoiding
duplication of proof: State-law claims may be entertained if they "arise
out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or
occurrences as the federal claim, defense, or counterclaim." The inter-
pretive difficulties of this test, already utilized in the closely related
provision defining compulsory counterclaims in Rule 13(a), seem justi-
fied by the enormous burden of duplicate litigation that can be avoided
by pendent jurisdiction.
I would end the definition right there. The ALI feels the need to
add a complicating qualification: "if such a determination is necessary
in order to give effective relief on the federal claim or counterclaim
or if a substantial question of fact is common to the claims arising under
State law and to the federal claim, defense, or counterclaim." 314 In the
great mass of cases one or both of these conditions will be met by the
requirement that the federal and state claims arise from the same
transaction; the gain in specificity of tailoring jurisdiction to policy
by adding the ALI's qualification seems to me outweighed by its diffi-
culties of application.
The ALI sensibly provides that when a case is removed to a state
court all claims unrelated to the federal claim are to be remanded. 31 5
310 E.g., in Hum itself, where the federal claim was for copyright infringement, a state-
law claim for theft of an uncopyrighted version of the same play was dismissed. See also
Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964).
311 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1964).
312 Compare River Brand Rice Mills v. General Foods Corp., 334 F.2d 770 (5th Cir.
1964), with Powder Power Tool Corp. v. Powder Actuated Tool Co., 230 F.2d 409, 413
(7th Cir. 1956).
313 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
314 TENT. DRAFr No. 6, at 10, § 1513(a).
315 Id. at 10, § 1313(b).
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This is a logical corollary of the basic pendent-jurisdiction provision:
Judicial economy does not sanction depriving state courts of authority
over nondiverse claims not factually related to those in federal court.
The proposal for remand is related to that old bugaboo, the separate-
claim-removal statute (section 1441(c)). The problem is what to do
about removal when a plaintiff joins claims under federal and state law
in a state court. The answer is easy enough: If the claims are related,
the whole case should be removable in order to assure correct interpre-
tation of the federal right and to promote judicial economy; if the
claims are unrelated, the federal claim alone should be removable. Be-
fore the broadening of pendent jurisdiction in Gibbs it was not clear
that either of these goals could be reached under the general removal
statute, because removal was tied to original jurisdiction, and the
federal court might not have had original jurisdiction over the entire
action.3 18
Gibbs takes care of the related-claim case: If there is need for con-
solidation, there is pendent jurisdiction and the entire case is within
original federal cognizance. The ALI's remand proposal indirectly
solves the case of the unrelated claims, for it unmistakably implies that
removal is contemplated although the state-court case contains some ele-
ments outside original federal jurisdiction; and the ALI's revised fed-
eral-question provision makes clear that federal jurisdiction exists
whenever the complaint sets forth a substantial federal claim, without
regard to the presence of state claims.317 Section 1441(c), which says so
much more than this, which was designed before the effective pendent-
jurisdiction doctrine of Gibbs, and which plays hob with the diversity
jurisdiction, is not needed.
The Institute resolves the dispute over whether extraterritorial fed-
eral process is effective on pendent state claims318 by saying it is.319 This
answer is fully consistent with the policy underlying nationwide fed-
eral service in those situations in which it is authorized; if the plaintiff
is to be allowed to sue the defendant far from home, he should not be
discouraged from doing so, or forced to wage two lawsuits respecting
318 See Lewin, The Federal Courts' Hospitable Back Door-Removal of "Separate and
Independent" Non-Federal Causes of Action, 66 HARv. L. REV. 428, 426 (1958).
317 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 5, § 1311(a). See also the removal provision, § 1312(a)(1), id.
at 6, which reinforces the conclusion by allowing removal of a "civil action" whenever
there is a "claim" within original federal cognizance.
318 Compare, e.g., Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 980-2 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), with Wilensky v. Standard Beryllium Corp., 228 F. Supp. 708, 705-6 (D. Mass. 1964).
See Ferguson, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 11 Vim. L. Rxv. 56
(1965).
319 TENT. DR.AFT No. 6, at 10, 119-20, § 1313(a).
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a single transaction, by being denied the right to make that process
effective as to related state claims. Moreover, since the defendant is
required to defend the federal claim in a distant forum, it is not likely
to be appreciably more inconvenient for him to face related state-law
claims there too,
My first caveat is based on the fact that state and constitutional limits
on personal jurisdiction express important choice-of-law considerations
as well as policies of convenience;3 20 care must be taken not to allow
pendent personal jurisdiction to cause a change in the applicable law
to the detriment of some interested state. Mechanical application of the
Klaxon rule 321-following the choice-of-law rules of the forum state-
would do just that, without the justification of avoiding intrastate
forum-shopping, since only in the federal court is there nationwide ser-
vice of process. If defendants are brought in who are beyond state
reach, the analogy of Van Dusen v. Barrack32 2 teaches that they should
be treated as if the suit had been brought in a state in which they could
have been sued. Unfortunately, in contrast to the transfer case, it is not
always clear where the suit would have been brought if there had been
no nationwide federal service; often there may be two or more available
forums. The best compromise between Erie policy and judicial economy
therefore seems to be, as the ALI suggests in interpleader, 323 to allow
the federal court to depart from state choice-of-law doctrine when that
is necessary to avoid injustice to a defendant not normally subject to
suit in the forum state. The Reporters' commentary so proposes.
324
My second reservation respecting the relaxation of venue and per-
sonal-jurisdiction requirements for claims pendent to those subject to
nationwide process is that the relaxation should be confined to claims
among the original parties. Limitations on the place of trial reflect im-
portant policies of fairness and convenience in litigation; I do not think
the desirability of avoiding multiple trials justifies dragging to an
otherwise inappropriate forum parties not subject to nationwide pro-
cess on the original claim.3
25
The ALI would make explicit the judicial rule that if the federal
claim is disposed of, the federal court may in its discretion dismiss
820 See D. Currie, The Growth of the Long Armh: Eight Yeqrs of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533.
321 Klaxon Co. y. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
322 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
323 See text at note 127 supra.
324 TENT. DRArr No. 6, at 120.




pendent state claims without adjudication.826 It is obvious that litigants
should not be allowed to impose upon the federal courts by appending
substantial state claims to frivolous federal ones, and that judicial
economy will not be served by pendent jurisdiction in such a case
because there is not going to be a federal trial at all. In part this prob-
lem is taken care of by the ALI's codification of the jurisdictional sub-
stantiality requirement;327 claims dearly lacking merit will not even get
in the federal door, and there is nothing to which state claims can be
appended. The federal courts have also wisely refused, however, to hold
a separate tri al simply for state claims even when the pretrial dismissal
of the federal claim is on the merits instead of for lack of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court in Gibbs suggested this rule might be an abso-
lute one by saying "certainly" the state claims should be dismissed in
such a case;3 28 but the force of this statement, which was not necessary
to the result, is weakened by the Court's describing the entire decision
respecting pendent jurisdiction as discretionary. I suppose discretion,
despite its uncertainty, is best in such a matter. The extent of the pre-
dismissal investment of federal resources in discovery and other pretrial
maneuvers will vary from case to case, as will the additional effort re-
quired to adjudicate the state claims; it would be wasteful, for example,
to throw them out without prejudice if they could be disposed of on
the merits before trial along with the federal claims. There may also be
problems with state limitation periods that expired while the federal
claim was pending.
The ALI's provision for discretionary refusal to adjudicate state
claims in removed cases necessitates a special section allowing im-
mediate appellate review of the dismissed federal claim, with a stay of
the order remanding state claims pending appeal.329 This is complicated
but sensible, because it avoids wasted efforts. The principle is clear and
its application will be easy; the frightening bulk of the provision is
deceptive.
In general, I heartily endorse the ALI's proposals regarding federal-
question jurisdiction. In particular, the suggested limitation of ex-
clusive jurisdiction, the codification of pendent jurisdiction, and the
provisions for removal on the basis of federal defenses deserve prompt
congressional approval. My objections to the details of these sections
826 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 10, § i313(c).
827 Id. at 5, § 1311(a).
S28 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
329 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 10-11, § 1313(d).
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are minor; I would gladly sacrifice them in order to see the general
improvements enacted.
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
The Institute's modest emendations of the barnacled provisions for
maritime cases are among the very best of their proposals. First, the
ALI steps squarely into a controversy that Congress has unfortunately
left unsettled since 1789, providing expressly that "the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction does not include a claim merely because it arose
on navigable waters."330 This means that jurisdiction and choice of law
respecting plane crashes, for example, can no longer be held to depend
upon the irrelevant question whether the wreckage is upon the earth or
the water;331 the admiralty jurisdiction and its attendant federal com-
mon law332 will henceforth be tailored to the needs of the shipping
business that are their universally acknowledged justification.333 The
more ambitious extension of admiralty jurisdiction to cover the entire
aviation business-an extension clearly warranted by the precise
analogy between air and water commerce in terms of the policies un-
derlying the jurisdiction 334-is not considered by the Reporters.
Apart from its partial renunciation of the blind locality test for torts,
the ALI does not enter the morass of irrational distinctions created by
judicial attempts to delineate which cases are "maritime," and for this
it is perhaps to be forgiven. An ideal statute would see to it that the lo-
cality test is no more a necessary than a sufficient condition in tort
cases; the belated Extension Act,335 which includes within the jurisdic-
830 Id. at 19, § 1316(a).
331 See Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963). Better decisions, re-
jecting jurisdiction in cases of swimmers and divers injured by striking submerged
objects or the bottom, are Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962, 965-6
(6th Cir. 1967), and McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
332 See generally D. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess,"
1960 Sup. CT. REv. 158. I agree the statute should not try to exempt pleasure boating, be-
cause of the difficulty in drafting to take account of such matters as collisions between
pleasure and commercial vessels. The issue seems better dealt with as a matter of choice
of law than as one of jurisdiction. See TENT. DRArT No. 6, at 137-8.
333 See, e.g., Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 CoLu a. L. REv.
259, 262 (1950); Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALI. L. Rav. 661,
665 (1963).
334 See D. CutouE, FEDERAL COURTS 405-9 (1968).
335 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1964). Perhaps it was the inappropriate stowage of this provision
outside the Judicial Code that led the Reporters to overlook it. The incompleteness of
the Extension Act and the interpretive problems it creates (see D. CuRIa, FEDERAL
CouRTS 399-403), suggest that the Reporters' fear that such a revision might cause as
many problems as it would solve is not well founded. The statute should provide, in
words the Reporters reject, jurisdiction over "all ciaims arising out of any maritime
transaction or occurrence irrespective of where the claim arose or the damage or injury
occurred." TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 140-1.
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tion suits for shore damage caused by a vessel, ought itself to be ex-
tended. The well-known exclusions of contracts to build and to sell
ships3 86 ought to be explicitly eliminated. The statute ought to make
clear that the "admiralty court" has full power to give equitable, quasi-
contractual, or any other kind of relief necessary to do full justice be-
tween the parties; it is high time that Professor Morrison's unanswer-
able repudiation of the ancient and lingering limits on remedial powers
in section 1333 cases were enacted into law.337
A second highly commendable proposal of the ALI is to restate the
confusing saving-to-suitors clause of section 1333, which gives the mis-
leading impression that the admiralty jurisdiction is largely exclusive.
State courts, says the ALI in essentially codifying the existing decisional
law, shall have concurrent jurisdiction of maritime cases except for
limitation proceedings and actions in rem.338 The commentary makes
clear that the state courts will be permitted to entertain suits under the
Death on the High Seas Act,339 although courts have frequently and
unjustifiably held federal jurisdiction exclusive.3 40 The change is a
good one, in line with the general policy that suitors not desiring a
federal forum should be permitted to forgo it. Limitations and in rem
proceedings present the only justifiable cases for exclusive jurisdiction
in maritime matters, apart from suits against the United States; both
336 See, e.g., The Francis McDonald, 254 U.S. 242 (1920) (construction); The Ada, 250
F. 194 (2d Cir. 1918) (sale). The Reporters admit the exclusion of shipbuilding is an
"anomaly" but find it "of little practical significance" since it is well known; those affected
"are able to safeguard their interests." TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 188. This is to say there
is no point in making the division of jurisdiction rational, and it comes close to saying
admiralty jurisdiction might just as well be dispensed with altogether. Amendment
would not require emulation of the British attempt to enumerate all maritime cases,
Administration of Justice Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 46, § 1 (1956). I agree this would
invite trouble. All that is needed is to deal with the two most flagrant exceptions, with
perhaps a commentary suggesting the new inclusions are to be taken as a guide for
avoiding unnatural limitation of the general term "maritime." Jurisdiction should
reach "all claims arising from maritime transactions, including contracts for construction
or sale of vessels."
337 See Morrison, The Remedial Powers of the Admiralty, 48 YAL.E LJ. 1 (1933). The
Reporters complacently assert that the problem has "apparently been cured" by the 1966
unification of civil and admiralty procedure. See TENT. DRAr No. 6, at 136-7, relying on
FEn. R. Crv. P. 1, 18, defining maritime actions to be "civil" and allowing joinder of
"legal, equitable," and "maritime" claims. Even if the courts are willing to buy this
persuasive argument (but see Fiddler, The Admiralty Practice in Montana and All That,
17 MAINE L. REv. 15, 25-26, 28, 88 (1965)), it provides only for relief ancillary to a request
for a remedy traditionally maritime; the problem remains whether the admiralty juris-
diction includes an action for injunction alone. See Khedivial Line v. Seafarers' Intl
Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960).
338 TENT. DRAFr No. 6, at 19, § 1316(b).
389 46 U.S.C. §§ 761 et seq. (1964); TrNT. DRArr No. 6, at 147-8.
840 E.g., Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 98-98 (NJ). Cal. 1954). Contra,
Ledet v. United Aircraft Corp., 24 Misc. 2d 1010, 204 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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typically include numerous claimants, so that the case is both unusually,
difficult and nuisually impqrtant.
Less understandable is the In~titute's a~ceptance p9 4 e a law that
maritime cases brought in state court are not removable simply because
they are originally cognizable in admiralty.3 41 The present statute was
plainly designed without regard to the remoyal of maritime cases,342
but the federal interest in providing a forum for the defendant seems
just as great as in any other cases w~thin the original federal jurisdic-
tion. Only in the commentary, and Nwithout giving any reasons, does
the ALI reveal that it means to perpetuate the Romer holding that
cases under the general maritime law are not federal-question cases.343
*Thus, the Institute means to preserve the absurd rule that removal of
maritime cases is allowed only if the parties are diverse or the case is
based on a federal statute. I would not give the plaintiff in a m4ritime
case a final power to choose a state forum except in the unusual case,
such as those under the Jones At, in which there is reason to assert a
special concern, for the convenienpe of an especially needy clas of
plaintiffs. 344
The best argument I have seen against allowing remqyal into 1d-
miralty is that removal woul4 cIfeat the plaintiff's option to secure a
trial by jury, which was the central purppse of the dause saving cpm-
mon-law remedies.3 4u Removal on the basis of diversity or a federal
statute, presently allowed, is consistent with this policy (but not with
the asserted policy of allowing choice of a state forum), diversity
and federal-question cases are tried "at law." And it is in regard to trial
by jury that the Institute makes its most singular and forward-lopking
contribution to maritime law, authorizing jury trial on request of
341 TENT. DRArr No. 6, at 20, 154, § 1317(a). See Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 35, 371-2 (1959) (dictum). A few courts have allowed removal.
See, e.g., Davis v. Matson Nay. Co., 143 F. Supp. 5a7 (N.D. Cal. 1956), and the modified
positiqn of the same judge in the Crawford case, infra note 342.
342 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964), construed in Crawford v. East Asiatic Co., 156 F.
Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1957), to forbid removal on the basis of admiralty alone if any
defendant resided in the forum state.
343 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). See
DRA  No. 6, at 154.
344 The Institute's § 1312(b)(3), T N;r. DRAFT No. 6, at 7, would preserye the Jnnes
Act's prohibition of removal because of the "deliberately considered choice of Congress,"
id. at 109. The policies underlying this choice, the Reporters note, "seem equally ap-
plicable" to other maritime personal-injiry actions, see id. at 154-5, yet the @aft does pot
forbid their removal on diversity grounds. This oversight should be corrected, at least
as to seamen's actions, which may be special. See the confusion engendered by joinder of
Jones Act and other seamen's claims in state court in Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp.,
193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1952), discussed in D. CuRa, FEDERAL CouRTs 364-5 (1968).
345 See Note, Removal o 4dmiralty, 69 YAri L.J. 442, 451 (1960).
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any party, even though the basis of jurisdiction is admiralty, of all
claims for damages from personal injury or death.3 46
This provision is brilliant. It may be the first attempt in the history
of American law to base the right to a jury upon considerations of its
appropriateness instead of on hollow historical accident. It builds upon
the excellent suggestion made some years ago by Professor Charles
Black that juries are out of their depth in complex commercial cases
but vitally useful in accident litigation where the "estimation of the
intangible but real elements of damage ... is very much a matter of
lay feeling."3 47 It provides a solution for the argument that removal
into admiralty would deprive the plaintiff of his jury: Removal would
do this only when the case would be better tried without one.
It would be good if the ALI's functional approach could be extended
to the troublesome jury problems on the "law side" of the court, which
now require a tedious and irrelevant investigation into the division of
responsibility between law and equity in eighteenth-century England; 348
but the Seventh Amendment would get in the way unless rationaliza-
tion took the form of extension rather than contraction of jury trial
in every instance. Meanwhile the Institute is very much to be applauded
for its advanced contribution to rationality in the mode of trying mari-
time cases. Indeed I think it would be wise to go further and to provide
that the admiralty jurisdiction is the sole basis of federal power over
maritime cases. This would allow refusal of a jury in maritime cases not
involving personal injury regardless of the plaintiff's designation of his
claim. Surely the existence of diverse citizenship has nothing to do
with whether there ought to be a trial by jury.
Three cheers for the Institute's maritime proposals. The provisions
respecting jury trial, the locality rule in torts, and the jurisdiction of
state courts should be enacted at once, and additional corrections
should follow.
UNITED STATES AS PARTY
Sovereign immunity is the most interesting and controversial ques-
tion in federal-government litigation, but the ALI is probably wise not
to deal with it in a general overhaul of the law of jurisdiction. The
bulk of the jurisdiction study is concerned with the issue of where a
lawsuit should be tried; immunity, while often considered "jurisdic-
346 TmT. DRAFr No. 6, at 22, § 1319. The exception for limitation proceedings is un-
fortunately to be preserved, see id. at 162-3.
847 Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 CoLum. L. REv. 259, 278
(1950).
348 See Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1961).
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tional" in many of its aspects, determines the quite distinct issue of
whether the government can be made to respond at all. Some day Con-
gress should eliminate the irrational, inequitable exceptions to govern-
mental tort liability; 49 consolidate the ragged and inconsistent statutes
consenting to suit;350 abolish the untrusting and inconvenient require-
ment that government-contract actions for more than $10,000 must be
brought in the Court of Claims3 51 and the provision for direct Supreme
Court review of that court, 52 which burdens the Supreme Court with
insignificant cases or deprives the litigant of all review; and make a
more rational and more liberal reconciliation of individual protection
and government elbow-room in suits to enjoin federal officers than
that established by the benighted Larson decision and its sequels. 35 3
But all these matters are somewhat tangential to the central task of
deciding which cases belong in federal rather than in state court, and
the ALI is justified in not holding up one important job while pur-
suing another.
The Institute does essay two minor alterations in this field, raising
the maximum amount in district-court Tucker Act cases from $10,000
to $50,000354 (a small step in the right direction) and making an ex-
plicit provision regarding the none-too-clear right of a defendant to
counterclaim when sued by the United States. The proposal is a con-
servative one; it would allow any counterclaim that could have been
brought in a district court to begin with, or any related counterclaim
that could have been brought in any court of the United States, relax-
ing slightly the monopoly of the Court of Claims. But immunity itself
is not to be relaxed beyond the already established ability to set off
549 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
350 See e.g., Amell v. United States, 384 U.S. 158 (1966), and the discussion in D. CuR-
RiE, FEDmEAL CouRs 458-67 (1968).
351 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (1964).
352 28 U.S.C. § 1255 (1964).
S53 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701-2 (1949); Malone
v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). As stated in Mr.
Justice Douglas's concurrence in Larson, 337 U.S. at 705, there may be something to be
said for protection against suits to obtain Government property; but the majority opinion
and both the Malone and Dugan decisions rested on the unjustifiable and unworkable
distinction between official acts in violation of statute and those merely illegal. See the
admirable proposal of Professor Wechsler to abolish immunity except when the judg-
ment runs against the United States as such-making clear, of course, that courts may not
order an officer to cough up property owned by the United States. Wechsler, Federal
Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 222-3
(1948).
354 TENT. DsArr No. 6, at 25, § 1322(a)(1).
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related claims against the government's recovery: "[N]o affirmative
judgment may be given against the plaintiff on such a claim."3 55
This compromise should appease nobody; it relies on the econom-
ically exaggerated distinction between out-of-pocket losses and lost re-
ceipts, a distinction that can scarcely be of significance to the opera-
tions of the securely solvent government of the United States. There
may be wrongs that the government should be permitted to perpetuate
with impunity; if so, it should be irrelevant that the United States has
a claim against the victim for an equal or larger amount. On the other
hand, if it appears unfair for the government to play both sides of the
street by suing and refusing to be sued, counterclaims should be al-
lowed without regard to whether they reduce the government's win-
nings or result in a judgment against the United States.
The Institute preserves the present statutes pertaining to mandamus
against federal officers,3 56 jurisdiction over federal corporations,357 and
removal of state-court actions against federal officers, 358 providing spe-
cially for venue and change of venue in government litigation3 59 and
leaving untouched the provision for district-court review of ICC or-
ders.360 There is no excuse for retaining this obsolete departure from
court-of-appeals review in administrative cases, and especially no justifi-
cation for the burdens of convening a special three-judge court and of
mandatory direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The ALI excuses its
inattention to this problem by noting that the Commission and the
Judicial Conference are presently working on it.361 Okay.
The provision for removal by federal officers, while slightly changed
355 Id. at 24, § 1321(b). See United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940), and the am-
biguities discussed in H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, TiE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
Syvsm 1154-8 (1953).
356 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 26, § 1323(b). See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964), finally enacted in
1962 to remedy a shocking gap erroneously based upon M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 504 (1813), which had relied on the absence of a grant of federal-question juris-
diction. This statute removes neither sovereign immunity nor the limitation of mandamus
to actions not "discretionary," see Smith v. United States, 333 F.2d 70, 72 (10th Cir. 1964);
clarity and simplicity might be served, as well as the case for mandamus against state
or local officials improved, by substituting a reference to mandamus in the general federal-
question provision for the separate section proposed by the ALL.
357 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 27, § 1324(a); see 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1964).
358 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 27, § 1323(c). See 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1964).
359 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 29-32, §§ 1326-27. The commentary explains, id. at 31, 33,
that these provisions are generally similar to those for federal-questions or diversity cases,
see text at notes 407-66 infra, except that in government cases venue is proper in the state
where all plaintiffs, other than the United States, reside.
360 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 28, § 1325; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 1336, 2325 (1964).
361 See TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 186, 247.
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in ivbrding, i' not described aIs changing the law, althoigh a recent
court-of-appeals decision casts doubt on the protective sufficiency 6f the
existing statute by tonstruifig it more narrowly than the substantive
federal law restricting damage's against federal officers.362 The applro-
priateriess of this juriisdiction to assure the ffective functioning of the
federal government itself is evident,s63 and the scope of removal should
encompass every substantial claim of federal privilege. The ALI's pro-
posed removl iii federal-defense cases fails to meet this need, because
it is limited by the inadvisable jurisdicti6nal amount; 3 4 and further
study should be given to the question whether state hostility to federal
programs is such as to justify removal of claims against federal officers
even when fed'eral defenses are not at stake.
The Institute has nothifig to say about the neither settled nor satis-
factory state of the law respctirig the jurisdiction of state courts over
federal officers. Without rhyme or reason the Supreme Court has al-
lowed state courts to entertain criiiihal, replevin, and damage suits
against federal officers, but not mandaius or habeas corpus;36 5 the pos-
sibility of ain injunction is cloudy.366 Obviously such limitations as
sovereign immunity bar state as well as federal proceedings, but whether
the integrity of federal operations requires additional restrictions on
state power over federal officers is less clear. The subject ought to be
considered.
I am left with the feeling that since the ALI was not prepared to
undertake a thorough consideration of the law respecting federal-gov-
ernment litigation it would have been better advised to leave the sub-
ject alone. Its half-baked efforts in this regard make little significant
contribution and are likely to deflect attention in the future from the
many and serious issues that are not effectively resolved by the draft.
THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
Ever since the 1789 judiciary Act, which imposed a $500 minimum
iii diversitr tases,367 access to the federal courts in certain cases has been
limited to cases involving a more or less substantial money value. Both
362 Morgan v. Willingham, 883 F.2d 139, 141-2 (10th Cir..1967).
363 See Bradford v. Harding, 284 F.2d 307, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1960).
364 TENT. DRAFr No. 6, at,6, § 1312(a)(2).
365 United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S: 1 (1906) (criminal); Tarble's Cqse,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.), 97 (1872) (habeas); Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284, 292 (1852)
(damages); M'Clung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 604-5 (1821) (mandamus); Slocum
v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 12 (1817) (replevin).
366 See Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin F'ederal Officers, 73 YALE LJ.
1385 (1964).
367 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
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the general diversity and the general federal-question provisions today
require more than $10,000 in controversy,368 in order, according to the
Senate Report on the 1958 bill that raised the amount from $3,000,
not to "fritter away" the resources of the federal courts "in the trial of
petty controversies."36 9
Discrimination against litigants with "only" $10,000 at stake is not
without its unsavory connotations: The amount is high enough to
realize the Senate Committee's fears of turning the federal courts into
tribunals "of big business," except for accident cases, and to suggest an
indifference to protecting the rights of the common man. On the other
hand, if the federal courts are too busy to handle all diversity and fed-
eral-question cases, it makes sense to exclude those in which state-court
error or prejudice will do the least damage, and money may be as good
a gauge of damage as we can practicably apply.370 Alternative ways to
deal with the problem of congestion include the appointment of addi-
tional federal judges371 and the exclusion of particular classes of cases,
regardless of amount, in which there is relatively little need for a fed-
eral forum, an unusually high burden of litigation, or an especially
potent state interest.372
The ALI does in part embrace the last alternative; in addition to
approving and extending federal doctrines requiring refusal to inter-
fere without special warrant with state taxation or regulation, it pro-
poses to exclude federal courts from original as well as removal jurisdic-
tion in workmen's-compensation cases arising under state law. These
exceptions will be discussed below.373 But the Institute proposes to
retain the $10,000 minimum in diversity cases while abolishing it in
cases arising under federal law.374
The justification for the difference is in part the fact that existing
statutes make numerous exceptions to the amount requirement in fed-
eral-question cases now, leaving the amount required, according to the
Senate Committee in 1958, only in suits challenging the validity of
state statutes and in personal-injury suits brought by seamen under the
Jones Act.3 75 But many attacks upon state statutes come within section
368 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1964).
369 S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958).
870 See TENr. DRAFT No. 6, at 79.
371 See the vehement objection to such a notion in Frankfurter, Distribution of Judi-
cial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 515-6 (1928).
872 See Meador, A New Approach to Limiting Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.AJ. 383,
384 (1960), making particular reference to personal-injury diversity cases.
073 See text at notes 505-10 infra.
374 See OrricuL DaRA-r, pt. I, at 8, § 1301(a) (diversity); TrEr. DRAFT No. 6, at 5,
J 1311(a) (federal question).
875 S. R a'. No. 1830, 85th Cong., ga Sm., 6 (1958).
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1343(3), which dispenses with the minimum amount in suits against
state officers for deprivation of "any right, privilege or immunity se-
cured by the Constitution" or by any federal law providing for equal
rights; 376 and the Jones Act, even if it does not itself confer jurisdiction
without regard to amount,3 77 will very likely be held a law "regulating
commerce" within section 1337,378 which also dispenses with the re-
quirement. In any event, the Jones Act plaintiff can get into federal
court with a small case simply by labeling his papers "Admiralty," for
there has never been a jurisdictional-amount requirement in section
1333 or its predecessors.
The lack of reason behind the patchwork pattern of exceptions, the
fact that the present requirement is "largely illusory,"379 and the dif-
ficulty of determining which cases require the amount and which do
not, amply support the Institute's decision to unify the law in all
federal-question cases. The further decision to accomplish unification
by abolishing rather than by extending the amount requirement ac-
cords very well with the principle that the federal courts ought to be
the principal enforcers of federal rights; to force small claims into
state courts, the Reporters say, "would smack too much of regarding
the state courts as inferior tribunals 3.... 30 And this solution elimi-
nates the often very difficult process of determining how much is in
fact in controversy in the case at bar.
The diversity draft does not attempt to defend its retention of the
jurisdictional amount. The federal-question draft, observing the ap-
parent contradiction, comes to the rescue without committing itself on
the other draft: "[W]here parties are relying entirely on state law, it is
not inappropriate to require the states to provide a forum for cases
involving a small amount."381 The difference apparently comes not in
differential need for a federal forum but in the degree of undesirability
of requiring state courts to exercise small-claim jurisdiction, and in
376 For the undeservedly narrow construction given this statute and the Fifth Circuit's
recently abandoned efforts at correction, see Bussie v. Long, 383 F.2d 766 (1967); D. CUtR-
RnE, FEDRmAL CouRTs 426-30 (1968).
377 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
378 See Imm v. Union R.R., 289 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1961) (FELA within § 1337); Swan-
son v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 5 (1946) (Jones Act supported by commerce power);
Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1952) (FELA removal bar in-
corporated by Jones Act).
379 TFiNT. DRAFT No. 4, at 202. However, the occasional omissions may cause unjustified
hardship. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), where in the excitement over stand-
ing the Court overlooked the problem of amount in a suit to enjoin a federal officer from
disbursing money in alleged violation of the Establishment Clause.




these terms the source of the governing law is indeed relevant. Whether
this difference justifies the distinction, however, is another matter.
Ascertaining the amount in controversy is no mean trick. In damage
actions the requirement is virtually ineffective to keep out small claims;
the amount at stake is whatever the plaintiff claims, if there is a pos-
sibility the jury will award it, and the courts are understandably re-
luctant to investigate the merits deeply enough to determine whether
there is a "legal certainty" that the amount claimed cannot be recovered
or whether it was claimed in bad faith.382 Provisions for denying and
imposing costs when recovery falls short of the claim, the ALI tells us,
have not proved very effective to deter inflated claims;383 to enforce
the provisions rigidly, moreover, would hardly be fair to the honest
plaintiff whose case has been compromised by the jury.
When relief other than damages is sought the plaintiff's allegation is
not so conclusive, for the amount depends upon objective facts; un-
fortunately they do not always lend themselves to valuation. The im-
possibility of putting a money value on free speech, for example, may
have had much to do with the statutory dispensation of the minimum
in many constitutional cases;384 constitutional rights against the United
States, however, and nonconstitutional rights such as adoption, custody,
and divorce, are equally immeasurable, and no special provision is made
for such cases.3 8
Short of impossibility there are difficult valuation problems when,
for example, an injunction is sought. It is pretty well and sensibly
settled that the amount involved is the minimum cost to a party of los-
ing his case; one cannot contend, for instance, that his entire $1,000,000
business is at stake when he could preserve it by buying a contested $50
license.38 6 But it is not always easy to determine the actual cost of com-
plying, say, with a regulatory statute;38 7 and for some unknown reason
382 See, e.g., Bell v. Preferred Life Assur. Society, 820 U.S. 238 (1943), holding the
then $3000 requirement met in an action asking $200,000 for fraud relating to the plain-
tiff's investment of $200 in a policy worth no more than $1000, although punitive damages
were required to "bear proportion" to the injury. Some courts are willing to dismiss when
on the facts a verdict exceeding the minimum would have to be set aside. E.g., Anthony
v. United Ins. Co., 240 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.S.C. 1965). Contra, e.g., Deutsch v. Hewes Street
Realty Corp., 359 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1966).
383 OFFICIAL DRarT, pt. I, at 64-65, discussing the present 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(b), 1332(b)
(1964). The provision is to be retained, however, "because its presence may have had some
benefit and because its repeal might convey an unfortunate impression." See id. at 9,
§ 1301(d).
384 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 529 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring).
385 See Note, Determination of Federal Jurisdictional Amount in Suits on Unliquidated
Claims, 64 MICH. L. Rlv. 930, 932 n.10 (1966).
386 See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 269 (1934).
387 See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936).
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it has remained unclear to this day whether the value to the plaintiff
or to th defendant is the critical fact. 8 It hatters little in terms of
jurisdictional policy which of these ast 'two positions is adopted, but
the uncertainty fuither complicates the jurisdictional questioi. When
installment payments are hi issue, the question is likely to depend upon
state law as to the immediate recoverability of contingent future
sums,3 8 9 a matter likely to be 'neither very clear nor very relevant to
whether the case belongs in federal court.
Aggregation of claims presents further problems. The general rule
is often said to be that a single plaintiff may aggregate any claims he
has against a single defendant, 3 0 fegardless of whether the claims are
related-:-an issue relevant to judicial convenience-or whether any
single claim meets the requirement. Ignorihg these differences is prob-
ably a good idea, since it simplifies the determination without any
very serious impaiiment of jurisdictional policy. The worst that can
happen by all6wing such aggregation is that a federal court may be
required to litigate a few small clainis that are after all diverse or fed-
eral. Counterclaims pose special problems all their own.3bi
The law respecting aggregation in multi-party cases, however, is both
less liberal ahd less kimple; the difference is probably explicable in
terms 0f the far greater risk of imposition of small and unrelated
claims upon the federal courts when multiple parties are involved. It
is said that claims by more than one plaintiff or against more than one
defendant may be aggregated only it the parties have a "common undi-
vided ihiterest" arid a "single titlt or right" is involved.392 There is a
388 See Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U.S.
121, 125 (1915), upholding jurisdiction although the defendant could havd removed his
offending poles and wires for $500 because the alleged damage to the plaintiff exceeded
$3000; Mississippi '& lo. R.R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485, 492 (1863), upholding
jurisdiction to remove a bridge without regard to the extent of harm to the plaintiff;
Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W. Ry. Co., 116 F.2d 604, 606 (M10th o. 1940); "mhe test . is
the pecumary result to either party which the judgmeit would direcily produce." The
possibility that the apparent discrepancy between value to plaintiffs and to defendants
is illusory', se'e Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw 9- ECoN. 1 (1960), has not
k66inid its way to the ourts.
389 See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. . Flowers, 330 U.S. 464, 467-8 (1947) (workmen's
compensation). Cf. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270-1 (1934), disallowing capitalization of
an annual tax sought to be enjoined and making rather lne distinctions.
390 See, e.g., H.M. HART & H. WEcasEAa, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE Ms. SYSTaM
997 (1953). A suggestive case is Pearson v. National Soc. of Public Accountants,'200 F.2d
897 (5th Cir. 1953).
391 Counterclaims apparently may be anticipated, as federal defenses may not, by
piaintiffs sekiig federal access without sufficient grounds of their own. Horton v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961). For additional counterclaim problems, see
D. CutRm, FEDERAL COURTS 439-40 (1968).




dispute between circuits as to the effect of recent amendments to the
Civil Rules upon the doctrine that claims may be aggregated in class
actions only if the class is a "true" one;3 6 3 there even are decisions re-
fusing pendent jurisdiction over small related claims in multiple-party
cases when the principal claim exceeds the jurisdictional amount,394
despite the analogy to state-law claims in federal-question cases395 and
despite the policy of avoiding multiple litigation of a single controversy.
The ALI proposes to do nothing about this tangle except to make it
more impenetrable by allowing pendent jurisdiction over claims arising
from the same transaction as an action already in federal court and
brought by or on behalf of "any member of ... [the plaintiff's] family
living in the same household" against the same defendant.39 The nar-
rowness of this provision has nothing to recommend it; the same ju-
dicial economy can be had regardless of family ties or place of abode.
The Reporters' lame excuse is that relatives living together may have
the same lawyer; 397 so, however, may others, and the provision is not
well tailored to this not very material coincidence. The difficulties of
construction are patent and horrid: Does "family" include third cous-
ins? Illegitimate, adopted; or step-children? In-laws? Does "living in
the same household" include Grandma, who has spent the past three
years in the laundry room while voting back home in Appalachia?
Junior, who is in Vietnam or in Leavenworth? A married son in the
coach house?398 And why, oh why, does it matter whether he has bought
the house next door instead?
Although a cataloguing of the problem areas may exaggerate their
numerical importance, it seems clear that the amount requirement,
designed to keep litigation out of federal courts, has imposed a con-
siderable burden of litigation to determine its contours, litigation that
contributes nothing to the ultimate decision of the lawsuit and that
drains away resources in a very unproductive manner. I should prefer
to see the minimum amount abolished across the board because it is
893 Jurisdiction was upheld in Gas Service Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968),
and denied in Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968).
394 E.g., Diana v. Canada Dry Corp., 189 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Pa. 1960). Contra, Wilson
v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558, 564 (3d Cir. 1966).
395 See text at notes 303-29 supra.
396 OFFicAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 9-10, § 1301(e).
397 Id. at 65.
398 "It is believed that drawing the line at this point furnishes a standard that will
be simple to apply .... similar terminology has commonly been used in insurance
policies and has frequently been construed by the courts." Id. at 66 n.12.
Moreover, what is the relevant time ,for determining whether the plaintiffs are members
of the same family, living together? What is the effect of a marriage, a divorce, or a
shipping out between the time of the transaction and the day suit is filed? Judging from
the decisions determining citizenship under past diversity statutes, see text at notes 87-93
supra, the test is the time of suit, but this invites manufactured residence.
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burdensome, inequitable, and in large part ineffective. Retention of
the amount, moreover, adds still another straw to the mistreated camel;
it makes administration of the debatable diversity jurisdiction, which
is on shaky enough ground to begin with, that much more complicated
and offensive.
RAiSING OBJECTIONS TO JURISDIcrION
Since the beginning, federal courts have indulged in the expensive
habit of investigating the existence of jurisdiction on their own and at
any stage of the proceedings, even overlooking garden-variety estoppel
to permit objections to be raised by the disappointed suitor who invoked
the jurisdiction and lost at trial.399 Recent scholarship has raised doubts
that the practice of the courts was ever quite so atrocious as their lan-
guage would suggest,400 but the books contain ample evidence of cases
that reached the Supreme Court before anybody ever noticed the defect
that caused dismissal. The excuse for this sort of thing is apparently
the truism that limitations on federal jurisdiction often serve to protect
state rights and not the interests of the litigants; for this reason, and
in order to protect the federal courts from the burden of litigating
cases that do not belong there, the parties cannot be allowed to confer
jurisdiction by failure to object to its absence.
Adequate protection against imposition on the federal courts of cases
that should have been brought in the state, however, requires in gen-
eral only that the federal judge be able to notice a lack of jurisdiction
on his own initiative at the pleading stage. The marginal gain in terms
of jurisdictional purity from leaving the issue open even on appeal
cannot justify the waste of time and money caused by throwing a case
out after it has been tried. A most glaring abuse of the principle that
jurisdiction can always be examined is the familiar decision in Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, in which the Supreme Court threw
out for want of federal-question jurisdiction a case in which two federal
questions had been argued and decided below-because there was no
federal issue properly in the case when the complaint was filed.401
The ALI wisely proposes to eliminate this "fetish . . . inconsistent
with sound judicial administration": 40 2 After trial begins, federal juris-
399 E.g., Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804).
400 Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter jurisdiction
Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. Rav. 491, 507-21 (1967). And see the refreshing in-
vocation of estoppel, defended even on precedential grounds by Professor Dobbs, in Di
Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960).
401 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
402 OFFcIAxL DRAFT, pt. I, at 106.
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diction is not to be questioned for the first time unless there is new
evidence or a change in law, "collusion or connivance," or the Consti-
tution requires that the defect be noticed.40 3 Professor Dobbs considers
this provision at once too narrow and too broad. It allows wasteful
consideration of jurisdictional issues long after commencement of the
suit, so long as trial has not begun, and it precludes later considera-
tion of jurisdictional issues that may be truly important.4 4 I know of
no limits on federal civil jurisdiction so important that they must be
allowed to disrupt a trial already begun, if there was an opportunity
to consider them before; nor do I think there is any constitutional
compulsion, as the ALI overcautiously fears, to ignore the ordinary
principles of judicial efficiency that foreclose issues not timely raised.40 5
Recent decisions commendably relaxing finality in habeas corpus
cases40 6 rest on the high value of enforcing such important safeguards
as the prohibition of involuntary confessions; no such overpowering
policy requires assurance that no cases are tried in federal courts in
the absence of complete diversity.
There is merit to Professor Dobbs's suggestion that the inquiry into
jurisdiction be cut off earlier than the ALI proposes, perhaps thirty
days after the answer is filed; and I have reservations about the ALI's
permitting indefinite attack on the basis of "collusion or connivance."
Which court the case is tried in, as I have been saying throughout this
paper, is just not terribly important in most cases. But I heartily en-
dorse the ALI's proposal respecting the foreclosure of jurisdictional
issues, because it is a bold stroke that will eliminate a great deal of
inefficiency and waste, and because it draws the necessary lines at quite
acceptable places.
VENUE AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
As in the case of the jurisdictional amount, the Reporters for the
diversity draft and those for the federal-question draft have taken op-
posite positions regarding the place of trial in federal courts. Once
again the compliant membership of the Institute has gone along with
both proposals. Janus would have been proud.
For many long and unthinking years the federal courts have been
403 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 57-58, § 1386.
404 Dobbs, supra note 400, 51 MINN. L. REv. at 527.
405 Cf. M'Cormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192 (1825); Durfee v. Duke, 375
U.S. 106 (1963), refusing to permit collateral attack on a judgment for lack of jurisdic-
tion. See OFF Ic L DRAFr, pt. I, at 108-10.
405 E.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Brown
v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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encumbered by two distinct requirements for locating the appropriate
place for trying federal-court cases: p~esonaj jurisdition and veue.
Both, as the Supreme Ppurt has noted, are based in some part on
litigational convenience.497 In state cpurts the two concepts servo 4if-
ferent purposes: Personal jurisdiction determines whether it is appro-
priate to try the. case in tlie state at all, while venue determines the
best place within the state. But there is no such justifc tion for the
dual requirement in fe.deral court§ except in the relatively rare, cases
with international complications, an4 the ual stapdard is a burden to
administer. Moreover, the Federal Rules leave personal jurisdiction al-
most entirely to state law,408 and this disuniform, often inadequate
practice is toaly withput justification when federal rights are at stake.
Like a breath of fresh air, the ALI proposes a single test for the place
of trial in fedeal-questiq cases; Natiqnwide serice is to be allowed,
but suit may usually be brought only where "a substantial part" of the
events or property in suit occurred or is situated, or in the state where
all defendants reside.409
In essence this propqsal adopts for, federal-question cases the principle
behind the modern crqp of long-arm statutes, 410 modifying the cqm-
Tnq-lalv preference for making plaintiffs trayel by permitting suit
where te case arose. The "substantial part" language will doubtless
give rise to somq litigation, but its eyident intention is to avoid the
litigation-breeding apd tgc4nicality-inviting test§ of where a tort was
committed or a contract made;41 the 4LI's more general form is
preferable.412
However, the unexplained clause permitting suit where '"a substan-
tial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated" con-
407 See Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340 (1953) (venue); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-7 (1945) (personal jurisdiction).
'408 FE. R. Civ. P. 4. There are a few narrow provisions for nationwide service, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1964) (interpleader); 15 U.S.C. § §0a-43 (Investment Co. Act).
400 TE Trr. DRAFr No. 6, at 12-13, § 1314.
410 See D. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL.L.F. 533.
411 See id., 1963 U. ILL. L.F. at 544-5, s54-5, 572-3, 577-9.
412 The Institute overlooks (except in interpleader and dispersed-party cases, see
OFFICIAL DRAFT, "t. I, at 38-39, 45, §§ 2344(a), 2361(a)) "the desirability-of providing long-
arm service upon parties outside the United States in cases arising here. This principle,
accepted by every state in its nonresident-motorist statute, recently generalized by most
states into a general long-arm statute, and approved by the Supreme Court, serves to
assure the effectuation of substantive forum policies and to remove the burden of litiga-
tion travel from the plaintiff injured in his own home town by a peripatetic outsider.
See R. CRAMTON & D. CuRmRE, CoNFLicr oF LAvs 477-9 (1968), and authorities cited;





tains the potential for considerable unfairness. If the proposal embodies
the outmoded and unclear distinction between actions in rem and in
personam, it will be difficult to administer and out of step with modern
jurisdictional thought. 13 If it means the mere presence of property in
the district authorizes suit there on any claim arising out of the owner-
ship or use of that property anywhere, it bears little relation to the
policies relevant to choosing the appropriate forum. If it preserves the
unfair practice of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over claims unrelated to
the forum district on attachment of property situated there, it ought to
be replaced by its opposite at once.41 4
When all defendants reside in one state, the ALI allows the plaintiff
a choice of forum.415 But it rejects the suggestion that suit should be
permitted wherever one defendant resides if others live outside the
state, because "what is convenient for one defendant will be incon-
venient for the other defendant. 416 This is true enough, and hardship
to the plaintiff in such cases is avoided by allowing suit wherever a
substantial part of the events occurred.
When the events all took place outside the country, however, the
ALI subordinates the defendant's convenience to the desirability of
providing some forum: "No federal question case should be denied a
federal forum because of restrictive rules of venue or process," so suit
may be brought wherever "any defendant may be found." 417 This pro-
vision embodies the vice of the discredited rule allowing mere service
within the jurisdiction to create authority to try causes of action un-
related to the place of forum;418 it even extends the unfairness of this
rule by allowing several defendants found anywhere in the country to
be dragged to a district in which only one of them has been served.
Moreover, when the facts have all occurred outside the United States
the choice of forum may very well affect the choice of law; to allow suit
418 See Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 241,
277.
414 See FED. R. Cav. P. 4(e), allowing use of state foreign-attachment laws; R. CRAxxroN
& D. CUmRE, CoNFUC'r OF LAWS 528-33 (1968), criticizing the practice.
415 The preservation of the existing test of residence rather than of citizenship (see
28 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. II, 1967)) perpetrates the likelihood of separate tests for de-
termining diversity and for determining venue, see Townsend v. Bucyrus-Erie Corp., 144
F.2d 106, 108-9 (10th Cir. 1944). Contra, Koons v. Kaiser, 91 F. Supp. 511, 517 (S.D.N.Y.
1950); 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrICE 1483-4 (2d ed. 1964), but the disparity corresponds
to the different policies that underlie the two decisions: Venue is based upon litigation
convenience, while diversity seeks to protect against prejudice. Domicile (see text at notes
53-61 supra) is an obviously inappropriate test of the former; if symmetry demands a
change, both inquiries should turn on residence.
416 TENT. DRAFT" No. 6, at 127.
417 Id. at 12, 126, § 1314(a)(3).
418 See D. Currie, supra note 410, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. at 58 -4.
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in the United States because of physical presence in the jurisdiction
unrelated to the facts in suit may subject the defendant not only to
the costs of litigating in an inconvenient forum but also to the applica-
tion of American law in a case he had reason to believe would be
governed by foreign law. If the facts did not happen in this country,
and if one or more defendants reside abroad, the plaintiff should be
left to sue elsewhere. 419
Corporations and associations, now regarded for venue purposes as
residents of every district in which they do business, 420 are to be con-
sidered residents under the ALI proposal only of the district of their
principal place of business and, in the case of a corporation, of each
district in every state of incorporation. 421 The purpose of this restric-
tion is to avoid suits against organizations in inconvenient districts
unrelated to the cause of action; as the commentary points out, suit
may be brought where the facts occurred without regard to residence.422
Unfortunately, this commendable goal is to be attained only at the
price of a tedious inquiry into principal places of business.423 Since the
plaintiff is free to sue where the acts occurred and in the corporation's
charter state, I don't think the advantages of allowing one additional
forum are sufficient to warrant imposing the burden of threshold liti-
gation on the courts to determine an organization's principal place of
business. Suit should be allowed only in the charter state of any associa-
tion, incorporated or not, and where a substantial part of the events
occurred.
One magnificent contribution of the ALI's venue proposal is that it
discards at long last the troublesome and pointless special venue pro-
visions for patent and copyright cases.424 Unfortunately the commen-
419 If all defendants reside in this country, however, I would allow suit where any
one of them resides if the facts are foreign; the federal interest in seeing to it that
policies embodied in federal law are not defeated argues that reliance on foreign law
should be considered in making the choice of law, see People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria,
48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957), rather than made a barrier to jurisdiction, and it
will seldom be persuasive when all parties reside in the United States to argue that
overall litigation convenience would be served by requiring a trial abroad.
420 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (Supp. II, 1967) (corporations); Denver & R.G.W. Ry. Co. v.
Brotherhood of Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 562 (1967) (unions). It is not clear whether
§ 1391(c) applies to corporate plaintiffs as well as to defendants. Compare Southern
Paperboard Corp. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 649, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (yes), with
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Davenport, 94 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D. Iowa 1950) (no).
421 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 12-13, § 1314(b).
422 Id. at 131.
423 See text at notes 167-73 supra.
424 28 U.S.C. §§ 1400(a), (b) (1964). See the interpretive difficulties raised in Stonite
Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942); Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra
Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957); and the discussion in TE.NT. DRAFT No. 6, at 128-30.
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tary is silent as to the equally troublesome special venue sections of
the Jones Act and of the FELA; the Jones Act, which allows suit
where the employer "resides" or has his "principal office," 425 has been
held to incorporate the present general definition of corporate resi-
dence in section 1391, so that the employer may be sued wherever it
does business.426 Presumably the ALI's proposed repeal of this general
definition of corporate citizenship will modify the venue in Jones Act
cases, but if the plaintiff is not to retain the advantage of choosing
among nearly limitless forums I see no reason to preserve the special
venue section at all. Indeed the propensity of accident plaintiffs to
choose inappropriate forums has already received the disapprobation of
Congress, for a distaste for such shenanigans was partly behind the
enactment of the transfer-of-venue provision in 1948.427 I would sub-
ject all federal-question cases to the ALI's general statute.
The federal-question draft makes one venue proposal that I find
wholly unacceptable. That is the codification of the existing rule that
suits in admiralty may be brought wherever any defendant, or any prop-
erty subject to a maritime lien, may be found.428 The Reporters make
no effort to show why the substantial policies of litigation convenience
that limit their proposal for venue in federal-question cases evaporate
at the water's edge; it seems likely that they have simply been bam-
boozled by the antiquarian crustaceans of the admiralty bar, who main-
tain a monopoly of aqueous litigation by promulgating the myth that
their subject is arcane. I should have thought that such nonsense had
been laid to rest by the long-delayed merger of the civil and the ad-
miralty rules. It is time the lawmakers recognized that the presence of
the defendant or of his property in the forum district no more makes
that place a convenient or fair one for trial of an unrelated action
when the suit is labeled "admiralty" than when it is labeled "law."
When the plaintiff invokes diversity, his maritime case is subject to the
ordinary venue provisions; suits "in admiralty" should be too.
429
It is noteworthy that the ALI has made its single test of the place
of trial in federal-question cases one of venue rather than of personal
jurisdiction. The difference lies in the judicially developed rule that
425 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). Cf. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1964) (FELA) ("doing business').
426 Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 207 (1966).
427 See Reviser's Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1964).
428 See 7A J. Moo.E, FEDERAL PRAcIcE 449 (2d ed. 1968); TNT. DRAFT No. 6, at 20-21,
§ 1318(a)(2).
429 The ALI points to one important qualification, namely the accepted practice of
allowing process to extend throughout a harbor area regardless of state lines. TENT.
DRAFT No. 6, at 158-60. If in rem process is to continue permitting suit in inappropriate
forums this qualification is a good one.
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a defendant may challenge a default judginent for lack of personal
jurisdiction but not for improper venue; 430 the Institute apparently
takes the p0 ition that the advantages of putting a case to final rest
as early as possible outweigh the inconvenience of requiring the defen-
dant to appear in an inappropiate forum in order to establish his right
not to be sued there. I disagree, becaiuse of the possibility of harassment
opened up to plaintiffs with small and disputed claims, especially since
the plaintiff will frequently have to sue on his defatult judgni-ent in
another state in order to enforce it.
For diversity caes the Institute ptoposes to retain the double test
of venue and peisongl jurisdiction, defining venue much as in federal-
question cases except that when the facts are foreign, venue is laid
where a defendant resides, not where he may be found .431 This last is
an improvement. Personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, is left to
Civil Rule 4; which in turn leaves the matter largely to state law. The
Reporters believe the issue is "one appropriately to be left to the rule-
makifig ;iuthority." 4312 They do not say why, and I do not see why. In
part, personal jurisdiction reflects the convenient place of trial, as does
venue; the Reporters grant that venue is an appropriate subject for
legislation. Moreover, variations in state choice-of-law principles433 are
such that the choice of forum in a diversity case may very strongly
affect the ultimate decision; this consequence of the place of trial sug-
gests that the stbject is hot mbst appropriately dealt with by a body
forbidden to meddle iith "any substantive iight."434
Whether there ought to be a uniform federal 8tandard to determine
the place of tril in diversity cases is a more difficult question. The
lower courts have consistehtly held that diversity jurisdiction may not
be exercised, absent a federal statute or Civil Rule, unless personal
jurisdiction is conferred by state law.4 36 If the principle of the Erie
430 See, e.g., Conn. v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959) (jurisdiction).
The venue question seems to have escaped litigation; my conclusion stems in part from
the comiuin statement that lack of "jurisdiction" is virtually the sole groulhd for col-
lateral attack, e.g., Willians v. North Carolind, 325 U.S. 226, 228, 229 (1945), And from
the Court's sharp insistence, in waiver cases, that venue is not a,matter of "jurisdiction."
E.g., Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-8 (1939); THE REsTATE-
MENT OF JUDGMENTs, § 7, comment b (1942), makes the statement as baldly as I do, and also
without citation, that a federal judgment "is not void merely because the action was
brought in the wrong federal district."
431 OrFIcIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 13-14, § 1803.
433 Made applicable in diversity cases by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941).
43i 28 U.S.X. 6 272 (1964). Contrast the authorization of Congresi in Article IV 6f
the' Cd6xiUtutini to preitilbe the affect to be given 'conflicting state laws.
435 E.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 820 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
[Vol. 36:268
Federal Jurisdiction
case is simply that the diversity court should reach the same result as
would a court of the forum state,436 or that forum-shopping should be
avoided,437 deference to state law is clearly correct. But I agree with
Mr. Justice Harlan that Erie's aim is not uniformity for its own sake,
but respect for state policies in the absence of countervailing federal
concern. 438 As Judge Clark has pointed out, limitations on state service
of process are in all probability prompted more by constitutional doubts
-or, I should add, by inertia-than by any conscious policy of solici-
tousness toward nonresidents who enter the state.439 I therefore think
it quite unlikely that a federal long-arm statute for diversity cases would
infringe the policy of the state where the federal court sits.
More serious, perhaps, is the risk of conflict with policy of a state
other than that of the forum. Insofar, however, as such policy relates
to the legitimate litigation convenience of the defendant, it should be
protected adequately by a federal standard based on the long-arm prin-
ciple. So long as Klaxon remains the law care must be taken, as it ha
been in transfer cases,440 not to allow a federal long arm to affect the
choice of law; overruling Klaxon obviously would help to assure that
a federal law of personal jurisdiction would not frustrate state interests.
Arguably, even if state policy would not be offended by a federal
standard, the federal forum should be available only if the local state
court is open, for only then is there a danger of prejudice. But if the
local plaintiff traveled to the defendant's home to sue, the case could
be brought in federal court; I think, as illustrated by the transfer
provision of section 1404(a), that since the case could properly be made
federal there is a federal interest in determining which district is the
most appropriate place of trial. In order to promote this federal in-
terest and to do away with the unfortunate double standard of venue
and service of process, and in recognition of the fact that state interests
would not be significantly offended by enlarging personal jurisdiction
in diversity cases, Congress ought to abolish venue limitations and to
adopt a federal long-arm statute to govern diversity as well as federal-
question and admiralty cases. So far as I can see the terms of the statute
should be the same regardless of the basis for jurisdiction. 441
436 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
437 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-8 (1965), also referring to the problem of
"equal protection" for citizens of the forum state.
438 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-5 (1965) (concurring opinion). See also Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Friendly, In Praise of Erie--And oJ
the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 394-5 (1964).
439 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 241 (2d Cir. 1963) (dissent).
440 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
441 Similarly, there is no need for the Reporters to avoid overruling decisions requiring
dismissal in accord with state laws limiting "local" actions respecting land to the state
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Multi-party litigation, the Institute recognizes, presents special prob-
lems of venue and personal jurisdiction, regardless of the basis of fed-
eral jurisdiction. In interpleader cases the ALI means to retain the
present statute allowing venue "in the judicial district in which one
or more of the claimants reside" and to expand the present provision
for nationwide process to anywhere outside the country "that process
of the United States may reach. '442 These provisions, like the relaxation
of the Strawbridge requirement, are necessary if the interpleader statute
is to accomplish its goal, and the policy of avoiding risks of multiple
liability is strong enough to justify subjecting some claimants to an
otherwise inappropriate forum. The same policy supports the similar
provision in dispersed-party cases for extended process and for venue
where a "substantial part" of events or property occurred or is located,
and where any party resides if the facts are all foreign.443 The Reporters
avoid extending to interpleader the dispersed-party venue section, which
is more in line both with the ALI's general venue proposals and with
the long-arm principle than is the current statute, lest the reference to
"property" be held to allow suit where the stakeholder resides.444
"Property" should be dropped from the formulation and the long-arm
principle of suit where the events occurred should be employed in
interpleader cases.
The problem of venue and process respecting additional parties im-
pleaded under Rule 14 or brought in to answer a counterclaim under
Rule 13 is somewhat different, and the ALI does not consider it. Un-
der present law, it has been said, the "majority" of courts dispense with
venue limitations in impleader, but Rule 14's direction to "serve a
summons and complaint" upon the third party requires respect for
Rule 4's limits on personal jurisdiction.445 The argument for relaxing
the protection against suit in an inappropriate forum is not as com-
pelling in impleader as in interpleader, for there is no chance of multi-
ple liability. Yet, in addition to the desirability of avoiding two trials
where the land is located. E.g., Still v. Rossville Crushed Stone Co., 370 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.
1966). See OFFICIAL DRArT, pt. I, at 81. According to 1 J. Moom, FEDmRAL PRACtiCE 1454-5
(2d ed. 1964), the present venue provision in § 1391 applies only to transitory actions; cf.
Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66 (1880) (national-bank venue statute). To the extent that the
situs of the land is an appropriate place of trial a federal long-arm statute would permit
suit there, but there is no excuse for adopting either federal or state rules prohibiting
suit in other convenient or interested states.
442 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1397, 2361 (1964); OFFICiAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 45, 161-2, § 2361 (italics
omitted).
443 OFFICIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 34, 39, §§ 2342, 2344(a).
444 Id. at 161-2.
445 See Note, Ancillary Process and Venue in the Federal Courts, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1164,
1167 (1960).
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respecting a single transaction, it is relevant that inconsistent decisions
might leave a single wrongdoer bearing alone a burden that others
should share. The ALI's refusal to allow suit against two defendants
in the district where either resides446 suggests the Reporters would
agree with me that this risk does not justify overriding the interest
of the absent third party. The ALI's general provision for venue where
the transaction occurred will minimize this problem, for in many cases
the third-party claim will be sufficiently connected to the forum dis-
trict that an original suit against the third party could be brought
there. But the situation should be clarified by statute, since the Insti-
tute leaves process in diversity cases to state law and permits suit where
all defendants reside.
In short, the ALI's treatment of place of trial in federal-question
cases is an original and brilliant advance; in diversity and admiralty,
it is plodding and myopic.
CHANGE OF VENUE
The theory is good, but it is practically unworkable. It would be
mellow to try every action in the most convenient forum. But decid-
ing where that forum is costs altogether too much time and money.
Professor Kitch has effectively penetrated the complacency surround-
ing section 1404(a) and has exposed its complexity. 447 Ignoring his ad-
vice, the ALI proposes to retain the transfer provision, to permit still
more transfers, and to enact four separate sections to govern transfer.
Transfer at present is hampered, if one thinks transfer a good thing,
by the statutory requirement that the receiving district be one in which
the action "might have been brought." The Supreme Court has made
clear that such limitations on the availability of a forum as state rules
against suits by foreign personal representatives are not to interfere
with the policy of finding the convenient federal forum,448 but it has
held that federal venue statutes limit transfer: A defendant may not
obtain transfer to a district in which the plaintiff could not have sued
him, even though he is willing to waive the venue objection. 449 Since
the transfer statute requires that the receiving district be a convenient
one, this additional requirement seems unnecessary even if one views
venue statutes as affording protection to the plaintiff.
The ALI would remove this undesirable limitation in some but not
446 See text at notes 415-6 supra.
447 See Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or In-
justice?, 40 IND. L.J. 99 (1965).
448 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
449 Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
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in all cases. Both drafts distinguish between transfer from proper and
from improper forums: If prignal yenue is laid in the ?wrong district,"
transfer still can be made only to a district in which the action "might
have been brought."4 50 I see no reason for this distinction; an ad hoc
determination of the best place of trial seems no less appropriate when
the initial forum is improper than when it is proper. The authors of
the diversity draft, apparently in fear lest plaintiffs use transfer to
secure trial in an otherwise inaccessible district, makes a further dis-
tinction among cases brought in a proper forum: When the defendant
seeks transfer, the case may be moved to "any district"; when the
plaintiff seeks transfer, the case may be transferred only to a'district
in which venue and process could be had.451 As usual the federal-ques-
tion draft is better, relying on the requirement of convenience and
the interest of justice to avoid the risk of imposition in all transfers
from a proper forum. 452 The Institute also ought to make clear, as
several lower courts have held, that transfer is permissible when original
venue is proper but personal jurisdiction lacking; 453 the inability of
the courts to agree whether such cases fall within section 1404 or sec-
tion 1406 acquires significance in light of the ALI's different defini-
tions of the transferee forum in the two types of cases.
The divrsity draft unwisely introduces a new limitation: No trans-
fer is to be permitted to a district in which "both one or more plain-
tiffs and all moving defendants would be barred" from invoking di-
versity jurisdiction because of citizenship or established business in
that state.454 Here quite viidly the ALI's policy of confining diversity
to cases in which there is reason to fear bias conflicts with its policy of
trial in the most convenient forum; the effort to conserve federal re-
sources will often result in trial in a federal court inconvenient for all
concerned.4 55 Finally, nothing but complication is gained by splitting
the present general transfer provisions into separate sections for di-
versity, federal-question, and federal-government cases.455 Simplifica-
450 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 14, § 1315(b); OFFIcIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 20, § 1306(b) (district
where venue and service proper).
451 OrriciAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 17, 19-20, §§ 1305(a), 1306(a).
452 TIr_. DRAFT No. 6, at 14, § 1315(a). The federal-question transfer provisions apply
to maritime cases, see id. at 21, § 1318(c).
453 See United States v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1964) (§ 1404); Dubin
v. United Statei, 380 F.2d 813, 815-6 (5th Cir. 1967) (§ 1406).
454 O icAuL D.Arr, pt. I, at 17-18, § 1305(b).
455 An escape hatch adds further to the burden of determining where a case will be
tried: If the only appropriate federal court is closed, the action may be stayed on condi-
tion of a waiver of objections to suit in an appropriate state court. Id.
456 Trr. DRAFT No. 6, at 32, § 1327, repeating almost verbatim the federal-question
proposal, this time for government litigation. § 1327(c) preserves and enlarges the pro-
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don counsels a single unified provision, especially since there are no
significant policies justifying differences based upon the ground of
jurisdiction.
Best of all, however, the transfer prbvisiong should be eliminated.
The only excuse for transfer or for its harsh predecessor, forum non
conveniens, 457 was the inexcusable overbreadth of the venue and per-
sonal-jurisdiction laws, which permitted suit against a corporation in
virtually any inconvenient district in which it did business. With the
Institute's laudable proposal to limit venue in order to assure that suit
is commenced in an appropriate forum, this excuse disappears. The
added convenience of assuring that trial is held at the more convenient
of two perfectly acceptable places-the defendant's home or the place
of the events-cannot be worth the extensive proof required to make
the determination. The present section 1406(a), which provides for
transfer as an alternative to dismissal when the suit is brought in an
improper forum, should be replaced by a provision suspending the
statute of limitations pending filing in an appropriate district within a
reasonable period such as thirty days, in order to spare the courts the
burden of passing upon which is the best place to have the trial.
One of the big factors causing delay in the determination of transfer
motions has been the uncertainty surrounding reviewability of deci-
sions to transfer or not to transfer. The ALI deals inadequately with
this problem, forbidding all appellate review of the "exercise of dis-
cretion" on such a motion in some federal-question cases458 but mak-
ing no mention of review in diversity cases. The federal-question re-
view provision is right and should be extended across the board; there
is a need for uniformity in determining the meaning of the transfer
provision, but appellate courts should not be burdened, nor cases
delayed, by additional inquiry into the relative convenience of two or
more forums. 459 Yet even the federal-question provision fails to make
clear whether decisions respecting the interpretation of the transfer
section are immediately reviewable-as they must be if an entire trial
is not to be wasted-and, if so, whether in the transferor or in the trans-
feree court. By no means should the situation in Hoffman v. Blacki be
permitted to recur: There a transfer, upheld by the transferor court
visions now in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(c), 1506 (1964) for transfer when a suit within the
exclusive jurisdiction of one federal court is filed in another. These provisions avoid
unnecessary hardship, but suspending the statute of limitations might reach the same
result with less judicial effort. Cf. text at notes 457-8 infra.
457 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
458 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 14, § 1315(a). This provision applies only when the original
forum is proper.
459 See Kitch, supra note 447, 40 IND. L.J. at 117-26.
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of appeals, was struck down by the transferee court of appeals, the Su-
preme Court unbelievably holding that the former decision was not
binding on the transferee courts.460 Interlocutory appeal adds greatly
to the time and expense of litigation; even the ideal review section,
limiting review to questions of law in the transferor court of appeals,
would be an additional argument for abolishing the entire transfer
statute.
The diversity draft proposes to codify the decision in Van Dusen v.
Barrack, that a defendant does not get a change of law by moving for
transfer from a proper forum: The transferee court is to decide the
case as if it had remained where originally filed.46' This is calcification
as well as codification, for the decision left open the question of choice
of law in cases in which the transferor state would have dismissed on
grounds of forum non conveniens. 4612 The philosophy of Barrack was
to assure that the accident of diversity did not affect the outcome; if
the transferor state would not have heard the case, to apply its choice-
of-law rules departs from this goal. The difficulty of investigating the
law and practice respecting forum non conveniens in the transferor
state4 63 is a strong point in favor of the ALI's simplified version.
However, in the other two cases distinguished and reserved in
Barrack, those of transfer from an improper forum or on the plaintiff's
motion,464 the Institute is able to refine the relevant policy without re-'
quiring a burdensome investigation: In both these cases the trans-
feree court is to apply "the same law which it would have applied
had the action been commenced in that court. '465 This is sound, for
it keeps the transfer section from giving the plaintiff, who can shop
interstate for the favorable law, the added and peculiarly federal ad-
vantage of doing so without sacrificing a convenient forum. Tying the
choice of law to the federal venue statute, however, does not seem quite
appropriate; Klaxon policy466 tells us that the critical question should
be whether the case could have been brought in the courts of the
transferor state.
Once again the awkwardness of attempting to reconcile deference to
state choice-of-law doctrines with federal policies respecting the ap-
propriate place of trial argues for the overruling of Klaxon; my only
460 363 U.S. 335, 340 n.9 (1960).
461 376 U.S. 612 (1964); OFFICIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 18, § 1305(c).
462 376 U.S. at 640.
463 See B. Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 405,
447-9 (1955).
464 376 U.S. 634, 640 n.29.
465 OFFIciAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 20, § 1806(c).
466 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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reservation is the uncertainty that a satisfactory federal body of doctrine
could be created to resolve cases of true conflict. And until Klaxon is
overruled this awkwardness is an additional argument against trans-
fer.
ABSTENTION AND RELATED DOCTRINES
From time to time, in deference to state interests, Congress has
created exceptions to the general grants of diversity and federal-ques-
tion jurisdiction. Thus federal courts are forbidden to enjoin the en-
forcement of state or local taxes or utility-rate orders if there is an
effective state-law remedy;467 federal actions to enjoin enforcement of
state statutes or orders are to be stayed if a state court has suspended
enforcement pending an enforcement action; 468 federal injunctions
against pending state-court proceedings are limited by statute; 469 federal
habeas corpus for state convicts is available only after exhaustion of
state-court remedies.470 The Supreme Court, however, in the face of
statutory commands that jurisdiction extend to "all" federal-question
and diversity cases as defined,471 has created several additional excep-
tions.
First of all, as the result of an ancient dictum472 only recently chal-
lenged by a district court,473 the federal courts have refused jurisdiction
to grant a divorce or to award alimony. The Supreme Court has said
there is no federal jurisdiction to administer an estate or to probate a
will.4 7 4 Proceedings such as workmen's compensation that state law
has committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative agency
will not be entertained by federal courts.4 75 Moreover, the Supreme
Court in the Burford and Alabama cases refused to interfere, despite
the presence of diversity or a federal question, with the enforcement of
state administrative orders regarding permission to drill for oil or to
467 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 (1964). The rate provision, § 1342, is somewhat more quali-
fied.
468 28 U.S.C. § 2284(5) (1964).
469 28 US.C. § 2283 (1964).
470 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (Supp. II, 1967).
471 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1964).
472 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859). Arguments for and against ex-
clusive divorce jurisdiction are considered in D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict
of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 26, 49-53 (1966).
473 Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
474 Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946) (dictum).
475 Cf. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., "348 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1000 (1966), holding in deference to Alabama law that an Alabama court would not
entertain a claim for compensation under Georgia law that Georgia committed exclusively
to its own commission; Zeidner v. Wulforst, 197 F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), respecting
a statute confining suits against a government agency to the New York Court of Claims.
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discontinue a train: The oil case was touchy and complex and the
rail case "local," and in both, the states had provided an adeqtiate,
centralized avenue for review of administrative determinations. 47 6 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, paraphrasing Marshall's admonition that courts
have "no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdictiqn which is
is given, than to usurp that which is not given," 477 and stressing that it
was the very premise of federal jurisdiction that state-court remedies
were not adequate to protect federal interests, dissented in both cases.
Finally, relying in part on the traditional notion (not found in the
statu-te unless by use of tie word "may") that declaratory relief is "dis-
cretionary," the Supreme Court has held that federal courts should
not issue declaratory judgments as to state taxes;4 78 and it has invoked
the equitable reluctance-to enjoin criminal proceedings in order to
refuse interference, absent compelling circumstances, with threatened
state criminal prosecutions alleged to contravene federal law.479
In addition to these court-made principles requiring dismissal of
cases not explicitly excepted by Congress from the general jurisdiction
grants are the Supreme Court's familiar doctrines of abstention and
certification, both championed, inconsistently enough, by Mr. justice
Frankfurter, 480 and both resulting, in theory, in referring not the
entire case but particular state-law issues to state courts for decision.48 1
Apparently Mr. Justice Frankfurter's sense of duty was satisfied so
long as th6 federal court decided part of the case: "Abstention," as the
Court several times said meaninglessly, involves not "the abdication of
jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise. '482
As originally conceived in the Pullman case, abstention meant send-
ing the parties to a state court for an interpretation of unclear state
law in suits to enjoin the enforcement of state law on constitutional
grounds. In this type of case abstention served to avoid three mis-
fortunes: premature decision of constitutional questions, the misinter-
476 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (oil); Alabama Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951) (railroad).
477 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
478 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 29 (1948).
479 See text at notes 549-59 infra. See also Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., gl U.S.
.1o, 228 (19bs), refifig to-entertain a challenge to state rail rates beause the "1egislative"
process of 'rate-making included a review in the ^state's highes t court that had not been
utilized: "Litigation cannot arise until the moment of legislation is past." Cf. also the
decisions, infra text at notes 574-5, staying federal actions pending the outcome of related
state proceedings to avoid multiple litigation.
480 Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 US. 496 (1941) (abstention); Clay v. Sun
In. Office, 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (certification).
481 See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 875 U.S. 411 (1964).
482 E.g., id. a; 416.
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pretation of state law, and friction between the federal courts and the
states. Consequently, abstention was not proper if the constitutional
question was insubstantial or the state law clear. Mr. Justice Brennan's
separate opinions, though he was not an especial champion of the
doctrine, recognized a second category of cases in which abstention was
proper: Those in which state law was unclear and a federal decision
might seriously disrupt state activities or unsettle a "delicate balance in
the area of federal-state relationships. '4 8 3
Two additional Frankfurter opinions, however, carried abstention
to perhaps greater lengths. In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodau, 4 4 over three dissents, the Court upheld abstention in an
expropriation case based on diversity, because state law was unclear and
eminent domain was of special concern to the state. There was no sub-
stantial constitutional question to avoid, and the Suit was not of a type
formerly equitable. In the light of a decision rendered the same
day refusing to recognize eminent domain as a subject excluded from
the diversity jurisdiction,4 85 Mr. Justice Brennan objected in dissent
that abstention in Thibodaux could be based only on a distaste for
the diversity jurisdiction or on the ambiguity of the state law; neither
of these, he thought, should suffice. In Clay v. Sun Insurance Office,
again over dissents, the Court ordered a lower court to take advantage
of a Florida statute authorizing replies by the state supreme court to
questions of Florida law certified to them by other appellate courts.486
There was a substantial constitutional issue in Clay, and the state law
was unclear; but the danger of friction was reduced because the action
was for damages and between private parties, involving neither the in-
terdictory effect of an injunction nor the abrasive of a decision against
a state official.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals took advantage of the Thibodaux
and Clay decisions to invoke both abstention and certification in run-of-
the-mill diversity cases on the single ground that state law was un-
clear.487 As David Liebenthal has observed, 488 this procedure was a
natural outgrowth of the necessity to follow state decisional law after
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins; but it was very much a negation of the poli-
483 See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 32 (1959)
(dissent); Martin v. Creasy, Bo0 U.S. 219, 225, 226 (1959) (concurrence).
484 80 U.S. 25 (1959).
485 County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
486 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
487 United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (1964) (abstention); Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (1963) (certification).
488 Liebenthal, A Dialogue on England: The England Case, Its Effect on the Abstention
Doctrine, and Some Suggested Solutions, 18 W. Ras. L. RFY. 157, 158 n.2 (1966).
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cies behind the diversity jurisdiction, for the obscurity of state law
furnishes a unique opportunity for undetectable implementation of
bias. Moreover, there is often very little left for the federal court to
decide after the state courts have settled the only disputed legal issue
in the case.4 s9
Even the Fifth Circuit has now receded from its extreme position,490
and the Supreme Court's decisions by no means justify abstention on
the basis of unclear state law alone. Not only did Thibodaux attempt,
if weakly, to distinguish the earlier Meredith decision holding unclear
state law insufficient ground for abstention,491 but the opinion is
based in large part upon the allegedly special nature of eminent do-
main. Moreover, the case can be easily fitted into Mr. Justice Bren-
nan's second category of permissible abstention cases, for an adverse
federal decision based upon an error of state law would have prevented
the local government from carrying out its large-scale plan to provide
utility service to its constituents. 492 Clay, which involved the less drastic
device of certification, was after all a case containing a substantial con-
stitutional question to be avoided.
In the past few years the Supreme Court has shown an increasing
reluctance to invoke the doctrine of abstention in the traditional con-
stitutional cases. The Court manages always to discover that there has
been too much delay already493 or that because of the nature of the issue
(overbreadth or vagueness) state-court clarification would not obviate
the constitutional question.494 In addition, in one recent case the Su-
preme Court added to the elapsed delay two new factors that could se-
verely limit abstention: Neither party had requested abstention, and a
federal injunction would not impair "an entire legislative scheme of
regulation" because the statute was attacked only as applied to foreign
commerce.
495
489 In Thibodaux, however, the federal court ultimately settled the amount of com-
pensation after the state court established the right of expropriation. 373 F.2d 870 (5th
Cir. 1967).
490 See Howell v. Union Iroducing Co., 392 F.2d 95, 98 (5th Cir. 1968).
491 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), discussed, 360 U.S. at 27 n.2.
492 See Record, at 5-6.
493 Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 219 (1964); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964).
494 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 575-8 (1964); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
490-2 (1965), also noting that the good faith of the state officials was challenged; Zwickler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
495 Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964). See also
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963), declaring it immaterial in an action to
correct school segregation that the conduct might violate state law; Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S.
678, 690-1 (1964), stressing the absence of pending state proceedings; Harman v. Fors-
senius, 380 U.S. 528, 537 (1965), emphasizing the "fundamental" nature of the right to
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Despite the disfavor in which the present Supreme Court seems to
hold its own doctrine, the Institute proposes to give both abstention
and certification an honest statutory pedigree.496 The proposed cate-
gories of abstention are the accepted ones laid out by Mr. Justice Bren-
nan: There must in any case be an unresolved state-law issue, and in
addition either a substantial constitutional question to avoid, "serious
danger of embarrassing the effectuation of State policies" by an er-
roneous decision of state law, or "other circumstances of like character,"
whatever that means. Certification on the other hand, despite the Re-
porters' initial inclination to disregard it,49 is to be allowed whenever,
absent "undue delay" or prejudice to the parties, a controlling state-
law question "cannot be satisfactorily determined in the light of the
State authorities. '" But abstention and certification are both to be bar-
red in suits by the United States or its officers, and in suits to redress
the denial, on racial grounds, of the right to vote, or of equal protec-
tion.498
It is a logical corollary of the policies behind abstention that after
decision of the disputed state-law issue the case can be brought back to
federal court for further disposition. In this way, the Court has said,
both state and federal courts do what is most within their competence:
Each decides issues of its own law.499 But this procedure creates prob-
lems of its own. The Reporters' summary of the relevant considerations
is brilliant:
To litigate these cases entirely through the federal courts
strains state-federal relations, may require the premature de-
cision of federal constitutional questions, and requires the
federal court to pass on questions of state law in circumstances
under which an erroneous decision may seriously interfere
with state substantive policies. To litigate such cases entirely
vote and the "immediacy" of the need for decision because an election was impending.
But cf. Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965), surprisingly requiring a federal court to
stay implementation of a reapportionment order because the state supreme court, in an
action filed after the federal, had also held the old law invalid.
496 TNT. DRAr" No. 6, at 38-40, § 1371(c)-(g).
497 Id. at 214.
498 Present law allows abstention in federal-government cases. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 220, 228-30 (1957). But cf. Department of Employment v. United
States, 385 U.S. 355, 558 (1966), holding the stay provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964) in-
applicable to suits by the United States; and the like decision respecting the limitation
on enjoining state-court actions (§ 2283) in Leiter itself, 352 U.S. at 224-6.
499 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-6 (1964).
Under England the litigant must walk a tight rope: He is required to make the state
court aware of his constitutional claim, so the state law can be construed to avoid it; but
if he argues his constitutional claim to the state court he loses his right to return to the
federal. 375 U.S. at 419-20.
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through the state fourt9, with reVieiw in the United States Su-
preme Court; deprives plaintiff of federal fact-findii-g, and
of fedekal protection during the pendency of the state action.
To shuttle the cases back and forth from state to federal court,
as preseht doctrines permit, "operates to require piecemeal
adjudication in many courts . . . theieby delaying ultimate
adjudication on the merits for an undue length of time." 50 0
The A.I's so 1ution, coricededly not a perfect 0ne, is to forbid absten-
tion altogether uhiless the fedral clai, "including any issues of fact
material thereto," can be adequately prtected by Supreme Court re-
view of the gtate -curt decision; if the federal couri does abstain, the
entire case is to be tried in state court, with f~deral jurisdiction retained
only to asiurie interim p-r6t'ction and to aliow' recapture of the litiga-
tion in case the state proceeding proves ineffective to reach a prompt
final disposition.r °i
I disagree. If we must have abstention, I think we should preserve
the p6wek of the iederai coUrit to decide all i ssues except unclear mat-
ters of state laie, gince this arifigement sacrifices as little as possible of
the 'important policy of providing i federal f6rhm. The ALI's com-
promise unfortunately would require the federal court tio make still
another threshold investigation in order tb decide wtiether to decide
the case, and it may n6t always be easy to decide whether Supreme
Court review would be adequate protection. Surely the ALI does not
propose that the federal court try to assess the likelihood that a partic-
ular state Court would see'k to cheat the plaintiff out of his federal
right; 50 2 prestimably, the test would be the extent to which the federal
right depends iipoh the facts to be found and whether or not the
right would be defeated by an adverse rtiliiig on state law. I think
the test for abstenti6n, if we must have it at all, ought to be simpler
than this: Abstention on the disputed state question alone, when-
ever resolutibn of that question may avoid a serious issue of constitu-
tional law. The ALI's s'oxia category of Tbstention cases is too vagae
to be easily administrable, and many cases involving the risk of "em-
barrassing the effectuation of State policies" will be encbmpassed in
the provision regarding cbnstitutional cases. If there musi be a second
category, it should be made more understandable and more concrete:
Cases in which a state official is sought to be enjoined from enforcing
unclear state law.
5bo TENT. DRArT No. 6, at 206.
ol id. it 38-39; §4 1371(c), (d).
502 Cf. City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 827-8 (l966J.
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But I would dispense with abstention altogether. I do not share the
view that the federal courts, whose job is in significant part to enforce
the Constitution, ought to carry their understandable desire to post-
pone ultimate confrontations so far as to refuse to decide the case.
Finding narrow grounds of decision in order to avoid constitutional
questions is no disservice to the litigant; forcing him to split his law-
suit in two or denying him a federal forum is. In ordinary diversity
cases, moreover, abstention is likely to deprive the plaintiff of a federal
hearing as to the only question of importance; in constitutional cases,
even if the federal question and its attendant facts are to be decided
by the federal court and if a state-created right is not a requisite of the
federal, the delays and added cost of abstention, which have been chron-
icled in hideous detail503 give the practice a Bleak House aspect that
in my mind is too high a price to pay for the gains in avoiding error,
friction, and constitutional questions. Last of all, if the question were
a close one, I think the balance would be swung by the time saved if
federal courts did not have to go through the troubles of deciding
whether or not to abstain-an issue whose difficulty is attested to by the
substantial number of Supreme Court decisions attempting with only
limited success to define the limits of the doctrine.
Certification the Institute would authorize in order to clarify any
foggy state-law issue.50 4 Certification has the decided advantages of
allowing somewhat greater protection of the rights of litigants by having
the facts stipulated or stated by the federal court and by assuring federal
disposition of all but the certified issues, and of mitigating cost and
delays by sending the disputed question directly to the state's highest
court, dispensing with the necessity for a state-court trial. Unfortu-
nately it presents the questions to the state court in rather abstract
form, which may not be conducive to an accurate answer. Whether or
not the unavoidable costs and delays are merited by the avoidance of
error is arguable; at least the Institute's certification proposal is dear
and easy to administer, except for the requirement that certification not
cause undue delay or prejudice. I think I should prefer to let the federal
courts muddle through murky state law on their own, in the interest
of judicial economy, but I do not object strongly to the certification
proposal.
The Institute also intends to preserve the existing statutory limita-
tions on federal jurisdiction to enjoin state taxes or rate orders, to ex-
tend the limitation to embrace declaratory judgments, and to include
503 See Note, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1358
(1960).
504 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 39, § 1371(e).
1969]
The University of Chicago Law Review
in the limitation suits attacking state orders respecting the use or con-
servation of natural resources, 05 There are exceptions to the rate
limitation that the ALI means to restate and make applicable to re-
source cases: The order must have been made after reasonable notice
and hearing and, according to the new formulation, must not have
been "superseded by any Act of Congress or administrative regula-
tion thereunder." The reason for these exceptions, presumably, is
the importance of assuring the supremacy of preemptive federal
laws toward which state courts may lack sympathy and of protecting
the due-process rights of litigants. Other claims of federal right, such
as the ho-hum assertion of confiscation, are less likely to require federal
protection; and the protection of out-of-state litigants in diversity
cases is to be sacrificed in order not to risk erroneous interference with
substantial state policies in matters likely to be scientifically or eco-
nomically complicated and outside the normal purview of federal
judges. The balance struck by the ALI is a reasonable one, especially
if one does not take too seriously the dangers of bias that underlie
diversity jurisdiction. I have less sympathy for the long-standing limita-
tion on enjoining state taxes; constitutional issues in such cases may
often be substantial and state law lacking in specialized complexity.
But I doubt that repeal could be pushed through Congress.
In 1958 Congress forbade removal of cases arising under state work-
men's-compensation laws.506 The diversity draft proposes to exclude
these cases from the original jurisdiction as well.507 This move goes
beyond the principle of allowing the states to concentrate proceedings
before an expert tribunal, for it bars federal review of the initial
agency decision. It also goes behond the 1958 policy of protecting
the needy litigant's choice of a convenient state forum, as in FELA
and Jones Act cases,508 for the ALI would forbid the injured employee
to sue in a federal court. The rationale given is to relieve the federal
courts of a substantial burden of litigation and to prevent the race to
the courthouse door. Moreover, say the Reporters, these cases "are
more appropriate for state determination."509 That was not what Con-
gress said in 1958, and it is not clear why compensation cases are any
less deserving than other accident litigation of a federal forum. Perhaps
the proposal is a first step toward Dean Meador's goal of excluding
all accident cases because of their large litigation cost and their re-
505 Id. at 38, §§ 1371(a), (b).
506 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1964).
507 OFFIcuL DRAFT, pt. I, at 10, § 1301().
508 See text at notes 269-70 supra; S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
509 OFFICIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 66-67.
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moteness from the commercial context that arguably presents the
greatest threat of prejudice.5 10
The Sixth Tentative Draft contained a proposed section intended to
codify the existing judicial exclusion of domestic-relations and estate-
administration cases from federal jurisdiction. 511 The idea of codifica-
tion was a good one, but the Institute's members were unable to agree
on the definition of the excluded subjects-not surprisingly, in view
of the amorphous state of the law-and the section was removed from
the draft by a unanimous vote. 512 If these exclusions are justified, it is
because of the danger of error in administering laws that depend more
upon the judge's sensitive discretion than upon what can be found in
the books.513 The question should be further studied.
THREE-JUDGE DisTuc-r COURTS
It is not surprising that I am enthusiastic over the ALI's proposals
respecting three-judge district courts in constitutional cases, since they
are largely derived from my own. 514 I shall not repeat here what I
have spelled out in detail elsewhere, except to note that the ALI draft
would eliminate the difficulty posed by the Phillips and Bransford
cases515 of determining whether the complaint really attacks the valid-
ity of a statute or of an executive or administrative decision; would
extend the requirement to the declaratory-judgment case, which is
indistinguishable in principle from the suit for injunction;51 would
tailor the cure to the disease by dispensing with the three-judge court
unless the state requests it; and would make clear that the courts of
appeals may review the refusal of the trial judge to call for a three-judge
court.51 7 The change regarding declaratory judgments rationalizes the
law without adding complexity; the other changes will substantially
510 See Meador, A New Approach to Limiting Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A.J. 383,
384 (1960).
511 TNT. DRAFT No. 6, at 36, § 1330.
512 See 36 U.S.L.W. 2740-1 (1968).
513 See D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and
Borax, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 26, 49-53 (1966). The existing limits are discussed in Vestal
& Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41 MINN.
L. RFv. 1 (1956).
514 D. Currie, The Three-judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. Cmi.
L. REv. 1 (1964); TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 240-1.
515 Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941); Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354,
360-1 (1940).
516 Three judges were held not required in declaratory-judgment actions in Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 152-5 (1963).
517 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 43-46, §§ 1374-6. For confusion regarding appeals, see
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 870 U.S. 713 (1962), and later cases noted
in D. CuRam, FEDmmL CouRTs 553-4 (1968).
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reduce the burden of administering the three-judge provisions, which
has been considerable. The Institute also feels on sufficiently firm
ground to propose abolition of the three-judge requirement in actions
attacking federal as opposed to state statutes because of the absence
in such cases of an irritant to federal-state relations and because federal
trial judges today are not engaged in any substantial degree in the
practice of sabotaging federal statutes. 518
I hope the Congress will buy these amendments, and I should be
happier still if the three-judge requirement could be abolished across
the board; the special court when required decreases the efficiency
of federal judges by a factor of three, and the Supreme Court is bur-
dened with the sole responsibility of reviewing three-judge cases re-
gardless of their importance. 519 I have said elsewhere that I can under-
stand the desire for the safeguard of numbers against error or prejudice
when important state programs are at stake and the value of the extra
prestige of three judges in cushioning the friction of striking down
state laws, and I recognize that the number of three-judge cases has not
been intolerable. 520 The special court, in short, is a means of making
the necessary medicine of federal review of state laws less irritating and
less subject to abuse than it might otherwise be. Nevertheless, if I had
my druthers I would eliminate the three-judge court altogether and
spare the federal courts not only the inefficiences of its actual operation
but also the considerable burden, only partly relieved by the proposed
amendments, of deciding when three judges are required and what
can be done by the single judge.
INJUNCIONs AGAINST SUIT
"The use of injunctions to stay actions at law," says Pomeroy, "was
almost coeval with the establishment of the chancery jurisdiction." 521
The Supreme Court has held it proper for one federal court to restrain
a litigant from proceeding in another federal court,522 and for a court
of one state to enjoin a litigant from suing in another state.523 But in
most cases judicial economy would be better served by defending an
existing action than by bringing a second action to enjoin the first;
and, especially when the two courts are of different sovereignties, an
injunction forbidding suit can be a ready cause of irritation. In ex-
518 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 248-9.
519 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964).
520 D. Currie, supra note 514, 82 U. Cm. L. REV. at 3-12.
521 5 J. PomERoy, EQUITy JURISVRUDENCE § 2058 (4th ed. 1919).
522 Steelman v. All Continent Corp., 801 U.S. 278 (1937).
523 Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 121 (1890).
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treme cases courts in which a litigant has been enjoined from proceed-
ing have responded by enjoining enforcement of the injunction: "This
court need not, and will not, countenance having its right to try cases,
of which it has proper jurisdiction, determined by the courts of other
States, through their injunctive process." 524 "The place to stop this
unseemly kind of judicial disorder," wrote Illinois Justice Schaefer
in protest against such a disposition, "is where it begins. '5 25
Congress in 1793 emphatically shared Mr. Justice Schaefer's opinion,
enacting an apparently absolute prohibition against federal courts' en-
joining state-court proceedings. 526 Various possible justifications for this
ban were discussed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Court opinion in
Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.: antifederal sentiments engen-
dered by the assertion of jurisdiction over a state in Chisholm v. Geor-
gia;5 2 7 the policy against splitting one litigation between two court sys-
tems; and the 1793 prejudice against equity jurisdiction. The opinion
concluded that Congress desired to "avoid friction between the federal
government and the states resulting from the intrusion of federal
authority into the orderly functioning of a state's judicial process. 52 8
Unfortunately the prohibition did not long remain absolute. Con-
gress modified the anti-injunction statute itself in 1872 to allow in-
junctions against state suits when authorized by the bankruptcy laws; 529
other statutes expressly or impliedly authorizing anti-suit injunctions
were held to qualify the earlier prohibition;53 0 and frequent dicta
established, in the teeth of the statute, that an injunction was permis-
sible against state proceedings "seeking to interfere with property in the
custody of the [federal] court"53' because, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said, "contest between the representatives of two distinct judicial sys-
tems over the same physical property would give rise to actual physical
friction," an extreme example of the very kind of mischief the statute
was designed to prevent.53 2 Finally, when the Supreme Court in Toucey
itself repudiated earlier decisions thought to establish an additional ex-
524 E.g., James v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 14 Il1. 2d 356, 372, 152 N.E2d 858, 867 (1958).
525 Id., 14 IMI. 2d at 375, 152 N.E.2d at 868.
526 Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335.
527 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
528 314 U.S. 118, 130-1, 135 (1941).
529 Rev. Stat. § 720.
530 The Interpleader Act, ch. 273, § 2, 44 Stat. 416 (1926), expressly allowed an injunc-
tion against "any suit or proceeding in any State court." See also Providence & N.Y.S.S.
Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 599-600 (1883) (Limitation of Liability Act); Dietzsch
v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 494 (1881) (removal statutes, which dated from 1789 but had
been recodified).
531 See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235 (1922).
532 Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 135 (1941).
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ception allowing an injunction against harassing relitigation of matters
concluded by a federal judgment, 53 3 Congress amended the statute
completely in 1948.
The result was the present section 2283, which allows a federal court
to enjoin state proceedings in three situations: "as expressly autho-
rized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgments." The purpose of the revision,
according to the Reviser's Notes, was to "restore the basic law as
generally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision."
The "expressly authorized" provision is a substitute for the earlier
bankruptcy exception, broadened "to cover all exceptions"; "in aid
of its jurisdiction" provides symmetry, for unexplained reasons, with
the All Writs section 34 and preserves the power to enjoin after removal
from state courts; "to protect or effectuate its judgments" overrules
Toucey.
This detailed commentary is not sufficient to dispel the dense clouds
of ambiguity enveloping this most obscure of all jurisdictional statutes.
Since the Reviser meant to preserve existing statutory exceptions to
the injunctions ban, the term "expressly authorized" is poorly chosen:
Several statutes held to have qualified the original prohibition were
anything but express. 535 Consequently "expressly" has consistently been
read to mean "impliedly"; the latest craze is to hold "express" the
authorization of the Civil Rights Act of 187 1,5 6 which says nothing
about proceedings in other courts or injunctions against them: Every
person who under color of state law deprives another of constitutional
rights "shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." It is still unclear
whether a statute giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction is
sufficiently "express." Apparently the Reviser hoped to emphasize
533 E.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). See also Simon
v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915), allowing an injunction against the dnforcement of
judgments obtained from state courts by fraud. This exception too was disapproved in
Toucey, 314 U.S. at 136.
534 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964).
535 E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 29(a) (1964) (Bankruptcy Act: A "suit" against the bankrupt "shall
be stayed'); 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1964) (Limitation Act: All proceedings "shall cease").
536 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). The power to enjoin was upheld in Cooper v. Hutchinson,
184 F.2d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 1950), and asserted in dissent in Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F.
Supp. 873, 885 (S.D. Miss. 1966), aff'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 611 (1968). Contra, in
addition to Cameron, is Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964). See also
Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226, 230-2 (5th Cir. 1965), distinguishing Baines in order
to hold an injunction against state proceedings "expressly authorized" by the public-
accommodations sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: "no person shall . . . attempt
to punish" for exercising -protected rights,
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that authorization for an injunction against suit was not to be lightly
inferred, but the result has been nothing but confusion.
Injunctions "necessary in aid of" federal jurisdiction, the Reviser
said, were meant to include those in removed cases. This statement
creates still further doubt as to the meaning of the "expressly autho-
rized" clause, since the removal statute's direction that "the State court
shall proceed no further"5 37 is no less "express" than others that ap-
parently come within the first exception. Lower courts have held, in
addition, that "in aid of ... jurisdiction" includes the old in rem ex-
ception,5 38 probably because there is no other likely place to insert it
and because the Revisers meant to leave the law unchanged except for
Toucey. The Supreme Court too has found additional meaning in
"aid of . . . jurisdiction," allowing the National Labor Relations
Board to obtain an injunction against a state-court suit to restrain a
secondary boycott within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board: "If
the state court decree were to stand, the Federal District Court would
be limited in the action it might take .... To exercise its jurisdiction
freely and fully it must first remove the state decree."' i59
In a very similar case, however, the Court held no injunction could
issue when requested by the union: Only the Board was authorized by
statute to resort to the court's equity powers; the union's injunction
plea was not ancillary to any jurisdiction of the district court over the
underlying labor dispute, and "such non-existent jurisdiction therefore
cannot be aided. ' 540 This holding was entirely in accord with the statu-
tory language, but the argument for an injunction was as compelling in
the one case as in the other. The requirement that the injunction be
ancillary to pre-existing federal jurisdiction is without basis, and it sug-
gests the possibility that the prohibition can be avoided by simply
adding to the complaint a request for declaratory judgment, so long as
the amorphous requirement of "necessary" is met.5 4'
Lower courts, relying on the Reviser's disclaimer of an intention to
alter the law apart from Toucey, have indicated that, in accord with
decisions under the earlier prohibition, the pendency of multiple in
personam actions respecting the same transaction is not a ground for
enjoining state proceedings. 42 Again the statutory language is mis-
537 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1964).
538 E.g., Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 388 F.2d 501, 508 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 905 (1968).
539 Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501, 505-6 (1954).
540 Amalgamated Clothing Wkrs. v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 519 (1955).
541 But see Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 583, 587 (4th Cir. 1964), where
the court was unimpressed by the addition of a declaratory plea.
542 E.g., Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 388 F.2d 501, 508 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 905 (1968), cting Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922).
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leading, for the necessity of an injunction seems more pressing in such
a case than in most of those in which the writ is allowed. The defense
of res judicata, which the overruling of Toucey allows to be the sub-
ject of an injunction, can always be raised in the state court and re-
viewed by the highest federal court if necessary, and a state court that
proceeds despite removal can be reversed on appeal. But the state court
need not relinquish jurisdiction just because the same controversy is
pending in a federal court; an injunction is literally the only way to
prevent the federal court's jurisdiction from being effectively destroyed
by a prior state judgment. The difficulty with this argument is that
there has never been a federal right, except in cases of removal or ex-
clusive jurisdiction, to be free from multiple actions arising from a
single transaction. The Reviser's Notes do not suggest an intention to
create one. Thus the second category of cases in which state suits may
be enjoined, like the first, is framed in language so vague as to defy
construction except by reference to the pre-existing law that it was in-
tended to codify; and it conforms but poorly to the policies that ought
to determine the availability of such injunctions.
The exception permitting injunctions to "protect or effectuate"
federal judgments probably means only that the binding effect of a
federal judgment can be asserted by enjoining state proceedings on
the same cause of action. This is the purpose made explicit by the
Reviser. It seems unlikely that injunctions against concurrent state
actions, forbidden before the amendment and not referred to in the
commentary, were meant to be allowed in order to protect future
federal judgments; the judgments referred to, the Fourth Circuit has
properly held, are those already entered.543 But a recent Supreme Court
decision suggests a way around the ban: Section 2283 forbids only in-
junctions, not declaratory judgments; 44 if the plaintiff obtains a decla-
ration of his rights from a federal court, an injunction against further
state proceedings may be necessary to effectuate the declaratory judg-
ment.
As if this were not enough, the Supreme Court, notwithstanding its
declaration that the prohibition is "qualified only by specifically de-
fined exceptions" and "not to be whittled away by judicial improvisa-
tions," 545 has held the prohibition inapplicable to suits brought by the
United States, because statutes divesting pre-existing rights or privileges
"will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that
543 Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 587 (1964).
544 Cf. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967) (nonstatutory policy against enjoining
state criminal proceedings).
545 Amalgamated Clothing Wkrs. v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 514, 516 (1955).
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effect" and because denying an injunction would so frustrate "superior
federal interests... that we cannot reasonably impute such a purpose
to Congress from the general language of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 alone."' 48
What these interests were the Court did not say; Congress, I think,
had made it dear that it was willing to risk the occasional denial of
relief in a deserving case in order to make certain that injunctions
against state suits would not be granted on the basis of ordinary equi-
table considerations. But this questionable decision may well have in-
fluenced the Fourth Circuit in making the following statement, which
is the epitome of judicial nihilism: "The statute ... is inapplicable in
extraordinary cases in which an injunction against state court proceed-
ings is the only means of avoiding grave and irreparable injury. In our
view, the congressional command ought to be ignored only in the face
of the most compelling reasons .... ,,547 Congress cannot be blamed
for this sort of thing; perhaps these opinions suggest it is futile for
Congress to try to define limits in this field, for the courts may not
heed them. One hopes we have not reached that point.
The present statute, like its predecessor, has been held not to forbid
injunctions against state-court proceedings that have not yet been in-
stituted, 4 1 although no hint of this distinction has ever intruded into
the statutory language and although the degree of offense to the states
may not be very different in the two classes of cases. This ruling has
led the Court into some rather strained maneuvering of the determina-
tive date,549 and it makes the result depend upon a race to the court-
house. Moreover, freedom from the strictures of section 2283 does not
assure the plaintiff's success, for the Supreme Court has embraced the
equitable reluctance to interfere with criminal proceedings as an ad-
ditional means of avoiding unnecessary friction with the states even
when the prosecution has not been begun.
The exact contours of this second limitation on suit injunctions are
not much dearer than those of the statute itself. Douglas v. City of
Jeannette550 forbade enjoining prosecution under an ordinance held
unconstitutional on the same day; the want of equity was dear, since
there was no reason to think the state would continue prosecution
in the face of the invalidating decision. Stefanelli v. Minard carried the
principle further by refusing to enjoin state-court use of illegally seized
evidence even though at the time there was no Supreme Court review
546 Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 224, 226 (1957).
547 Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 593 (1964).
548 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965).
549 See id.
o50 319 US. 157 (1943).
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of fourth amendment claims. There was no threat of irreparable in-
jury, the Court amazingly said; and piecemeal intervention to try col-
lateral issues was worse than enjoining the whole trial because it would
"invite a flanking movement against the system of State courts" on the
myriad questions of procedural due process.551 Later decisions respect-
ing injunctions against the use of various kinds of illegal evidence have
left nothing but uncertainty;5 5 2 of particular interest is the statement
by three Justices favoring such injunctions that section 2283 was inap-
plicable even after the state prosecution had begun because "the thrust
of the relief is only to enjoin the use of wire-tap evidence, not to en-
join the action itself." 553
In the important case of Dombrowski v. Pfister 54 the Court found
circumstances justifying an injunction against a state prosecution held
not to have been pending at the decisive moment: an attack on over-
breadth grounds upon a state law impinging upon freedom of expres-
sion. The "chilling effect" of such a law upon constitutional rights
would not, the Court said, be removed by a series of prosecutions.
Moreover, the Court added in refusing to sanction abstention, the
prosecution had been brought in bad faith for purposes of harassment.
Probably either bad faith or overbreadth affecting expression would
suffice after Dombrowski;555 but most recently, in Cameron v. John-
son, the Court over dissent found against rather convincing allegations
of bad faith, declared a Mississippi demonstration statute neither too
vague nor too broad, and held that allegations that the conduct in issue
was protected by the first amendment were insufficient to permit an
injunction, apparently even against merely threatened proceedings. 5 6
On the other hand, shortly before Cameron, the Court held in Zwickler
v. Koota that the limitations on injunctions against threatened state
prosecutions are inapplicable to suits for declaratory judgment: The
federal courts are the primary forums for vindicating federal rights,
and a suitor's choice of forum should be respected. 5 7
Where all this leaves us is far from plain. Douglas v. City of Jeannette
551 342 U.s. 117, 122-3 (1951).
552 Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961);
Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
553 Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 406 (1963) (dissent); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S.
458, 462 (1961) (dissent).
554 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
555 See United Steelworkers v. Bagwell, 383 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1967), and Carmichael
v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1967), both allowing injunctions without finding
harassment; Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), denying an injunction on the
ground that neither overbreadth nor bad faith was established.
556 390 U.S. 611 (1968). See also Zwickler v. Boll, 391 U.S. 353 (1968).
557 389 US. 241 (1967).
[Vol. 36:268
Federal Jurisdiction
had sensibly said that an injunction was proper "in those exceptional
cases which call for the interposition of a court of equity to prevent ir-
reparable injury which is clear and imminent." 5 s Dombrowski and
Cameron seem to particularize this standard into categories with little
regard for the basic policy: Overbreadth and bad faith seem decisive,
and the likelihood of adequate state-court relief is ignored. Thus the
decisions leave something to be desired in terms both of policy and of
clarity, and the statute remains wholly silent on the subject.
The ALI proposes a thorough revision of section 2283.r-9 Making
clear that the prohibition extends to injunctions against the enforce-
ment of state-court judgments as well as against state-court proceed-
ings,5 60 the proposal would rightly assure that injunctions within the
enumerated exceptions issue not automatically but only if "otherwise
warranted." The present three exceptions become seven. The vague ex-
ceptions for injunctions in aid of jurisdiction and to protect federal
judgments are narrowed and clarified: "to protect the jurisdiction of
the court over property in its custody or subject to its control," and
"to protect or effectuate an existing judgment of the court." Judicially
created exceptions allowing injunctions sought by the federal govern-
ment, and temporary injunctions "pending determination of whether
this section permits grant of a permanent injunction," are codified.
The troublesome "expressly authorized" language is replaced: An in-
junction is proper if "an Act of Congress authorizes such relief or
provides that other proceedings shall cease." This exception is meant
to include bankruptcy, limitation, and removal cases as well as those
under more specific statutes; it would be enough if the statute said
that a federal court might "stay any proceeding" or that a state court
"shall proceed no further."561 Although statutory interpleader would
be embraced within this exception, a separate provision is made for
injunction "in aid of a claim for interpleader" in order to take care
of "equitable interpleader" under Rule 22.562 The commentary ex-
pressly disapproves injunctions against the enforcement of state-court
judgments obtained by fraud, in order to prevent "fragmentation" of
the controversy, and because the state court is better able "to determine
what it has passed upon."563 No injunction is to be allowed merely
558 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
559 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 41-42, § 1372.
560 Nothing, however, is said about enjoining the use of evidence in state courts,
though the problem has several times reached the Supreme Court. See text at notes 551-3
supra.
561 TENT. Darr No. 6, at 223-4.
562 Id. at 226-27.
563 Id. at 233-34.
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because federal jurisdiction is exclusive, but the Institute's proposal to
allow removal in such cases would make this academic. 564 Injunctions
are not to issue merely to avoid multiple in personam litigation. The
most important and probably most controversial of the new exceptions
is designed to protect civil rights: "to restrain a criminal prosecution
that should not be permitted to continue either because the statute or
other law that is the basis of the prosecution plainly cannot constitu-
tionally be applied to the party seeking the injunction or because the
prosecution is so plainly discriminatory as to amount to a denial of the
equal protection of the laws."5' 6 5
If we must have a list of cases in which anti-suit injunctions are to
be allowable, the Institute's list is not a bad one; it certainly'is better
than the list we have. The in rem, interpleader, government-litigation,
temporary-injunction, and res judicata exceptions are without obvious
ambiguities and should be easy enough to administer.516 The same can-
not be said with assurance of the civil-rights and statutory-authoriza-
tion exceptions. The latter makes it necessary to construe each proffered
federal statute to determine whether or not it authorizes suit injunc-
tions; this inquiry has not proved easy in the past. The civil-rights pro-
vision is important and desirable enough to outweigh any objection to
its difficulty of administration, but of course it should be made as
simple as is consistent with the basic policy it embodies.
Whether the ALI's exceptions exhaust the cases in which an injunc-
tion is desirable may be debated; so may whether the exceptions are
themselves all warranted. It seems especially unfortunate that nothing
is said about injunctions against prosecutions not yet instituted; the
case for statutory specification seems equally strong whether or not the
state suit has begun. But my objection is more fundamental. The at-
tempt to specify exceptions is an understandable attempt to make sure
the courts do not err by granting either too few or too many injunc-
tions. But specificity necessarily creates problems of statutory construc-
tion and runs the serious risk of excluding unforeseen cases of urgent
need.
Anti-suit injunctions, whether litigation is pending or threatened,
are undesirable because of the friction they cause. But sometimes they
are the only effective means of protecting federal rights, as in labor
disputes in which a state-court injunction might effectively destroy an
564 Id. at 232-33.
565 Id. at 226.




organizational campaign despite the state court's lack of jurisdiction,5 7
and in cases in which state courts are unwilling to prevent prosecutions
for the exercise of constitutional rights. Both these cases have been
held outside the permissive terms of the present statute; while the
ALI proposal would partly correct these omissions, additional cases
requiring an injunction may appear at any time. I think the courts
should be free to deal with them according to the demands of policy. I
would suggest a simple statute underlining that the test for an injunc-
tion against suit is more strict than the ordinary equitable require-
ments. The Fourth Circuit's formulation, impermissible as a statutory-
construction device, seems appropriate as a new statute: The federal
courts shall not enjoin pending or threatened proceedings in state
courts unless there is no other effective means of avoiding grave and
irreparable harm. 68
Civil-rights litigation, however, is a very special case. Perhaps the
greatest single flaw in the present Judicial Code is the absence of an
effective remedy to protect civil-rights workers against improper prose-
cutions. Habeas corpus has never caught on as a pre-trial remedy,
though the statutory exhaustion requirement applies only to persons
already convicted by a state court, and though the judicially created
exhaustion requirement could and should be held satisfied if the state
fails to provide a means of protecting the litigants against the burdens
of the trial itself.56 9 Removal, which the Supreme Court effectively
destroyed in the nineteenth century by reading into the predecessor
of section 1443 the requirement that the petitioner attack a state
statute on its face,570 enjoyed a brief flurry of popularity a few years
back until the Supreme Court killed it again by adhering, except in
public-accommodation cases, to the earlier test.571 The possibility of
567 See Amalgamated Clothing Wkrs. v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 526 (1955)
(dissent). The need for an injunction has been somewhat alleviated by the relaxation of
finality for appealing state-court labor injunctions, see Construction Laborers v. Curry,
371 U.S. 542 (1963), and by the holding that a contempt citation cannot stand in such
cases if the state-court injunction is ultimately set aside, In re Green, 369 U.S. 689
(1962).
568 See Baines v. City of Danville, 37 F.2d 579, 593 (4th Cir. 1964).
569 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. II, 1967); Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting
Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to
Abort State Trial, 113 U. PA. L. Rtv. 798, 882-908 (1965).
570 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906).
571 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780
(1966) (public accommodations). The distinction is not satisfactory. Moreover, Peacock
limited the companion provision for removal of one prosecuted for acts "under color of
authority" of certain federal laws to federal officers and others aiding enforcement, while
Rachel held free-speech claims outside the removal provisions.
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an injunction, brightened by Dombrowski v. Pfister572 and by asser-
tions in the lower courts that the 1871 Civil Rights Act "expressly
authorized" anti-suit injunctions, 78 was dimmed considerably when
the Court held in Cameron v. Johnson, even without considering sec-
tion 2283, that the protected nature of a state-court defendant's activi-
ties did not justify an injunction against prosecution. 574
Something ought to be done about this situation. Some state courts
have shown themselves unable or unwilling to prevent the prosecution
of civil-rights workers who have done no wrong. Anyone doubting the
accuracy of this statement need only read Professor Amsterdam's
graphic description of Mississippi justice575 to be convinced and horri-
fied. But drafting the most appropriate response is no mean task.
Bills have been introduced in Congress from time to time to broaden
removal in these cases. The 1966 Civil Rights Bill, for example, would
have allowed removal by any defendant being prosecuted for exercis-
ing his rights of racial equality or for exercising his constitutional
freedoms in advocating racial equality, and also by any Negro or civil-
rights worker prosecuted on any ground in a state in which Negroes
were systematically discriminated against in the courts. 575 The ALI
proposal, directed toward the same two abuses-prosecution for pro-
tected activity and harassment by groundless prosecution for acts not
directly related to protected activity-is considerably more conserva-
tive: The activity must be "plainly" protected, and the unrelated prose-
cution must be shown in the individual case to be "so plainly discrimi-
natory as to amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws." 577
I think the ALI is too grudging with respect to the protection of
constitutionally protected activities; because the factual context of a
civil-rights demonstration is so critical in determining whether or not
the activity is protected, and because of the extreme unwillingness
shown by some state courts to enforce federal rights, what is needed is
a federal trial of the facts relevant to the constitutional claim. In all
probability, if a policeman testified that a demonstrator struck him
with a sign, the federal court could not find the prosecution "plainly"
forbidden; yet, it is precisely in cases of conflicting testimony that an
impartial trier of fact is most indispensable and Supreme Court re-
572 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
573 See note 536 supra.
574 890 U.S. 611 (1968).
575 Amsterdam, supra note 569, 118 U. PA. L. REv. at 794-9.
576 S. 2923, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), Title IV.
577 TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 42, § 1372(7).
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view least effective. 78 I am not perturbed by allegations that providing
for a federal trial of the facts would deprive the states of the power of
enforcing their criminal laws; when the states learn to enforce their
laws fairly, they may be permitted to enforce them. In the meantime
the protection of constitutional rights of expression and of racial
equality are far more important than the preservation of the sensibil-
ities of state officials. As in the congressional proposal noted above, the
remedial statute should be limited to racial-equality cases since it is
in the battle for racial equality that state courts have most flagrantly
displayed an incapacity to do justice.
Much more troublesome to me is what to do about prosecutions not
directly related to protected activity but designed to harass those with
the temerity to challenge existing patterns of racial discrimination. The
recent prosecution of Aaron Henry579 strongly suggests such harassment
and demonstrates as well the ineffectual attempts of the Supreme
Court to deal with the problem on direct review. Federal habeas corpus
after conviction allows re-examination of the facts,580 but it comes too
late to avoid the hardships of long and costly state-court proceedings,
excessive bail or incarceration pending final decision, and the lingering
cloud of criminal charges as an encumbrance on the ability to hold a
job or to live a normal life. Yet the sweeping proposal of the 1966
Civil Rights Bill is not a pleasant prospect. It is one thing to ask the
federal courts to examine prosecutions arising directly out of civil-
rights demonstrations, since the frequency of such prosecutions is man-
ageably small and the likelihood of overreaching by state officials great.
It is quite another thing to allow every Negro prosecuted in Mississippi
to remove his trial to the federal court. The impairment of the state's
legitimate interests in a law enforcement is much greater under such
a proposal, as is the burden imposed on the federal courts; and while
it may be that Negroes are never treated with proper respect or fair-
ness in Mississippi courts, it is surely not true that every prosecution of
a Mississippi Negro is likely to be on a false charge. Moreover, when
the petitioner has no federal defense to the prosecution it is not entirely
578 The proposal is further weakened by the commentary's explanation that the
state law in question, or one just like it, must have been "authoritatively determined"
to be invalid on its face or as applied to such a case. TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 230. The
absence of precedent is irrelevant to the need for an injunction, and the requirement
as defined leaves litigants defenseless against newly enacted laws. Without the definition
the term "plainly" would invite litigation over the imponderable boundary between
unconstitutional and very unconstitutional laws.
579 Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
580 See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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clear that the case is one constitutionally arising under federal law
and thus properly within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Accordingly, I think the provision for federal protection against
harassment of civil-rights workers for conduct not directly related to
their protected activities should be narrower than that proposed in the
1966 bill. The ALI's proposal, on the other hand, is likely to have very
little effect. It requires not only a showing that the prosecution is
!'plainly discriminatory" but also that it amounts to a denial of equal
protection. "Discriminatory" by itself requires something more than
proof that no crime was in fact committed; the test should not be
further qualified by the impossible standard of "plainly," which is likely
to deprive the defendant of a federal trial of the crucial issue of bad
faith. Moreover, the requirement that the prosecution deny equal pro-
tection is at best confusing. Perhaps the phrase is tautological: Discrim-
inatory enforcement of laws is by definition a denial of equal protec-
tion. Prosecution with no evidence is also a deprivation of liberty or
property without due process; 581 completeness suggests due process
should also be mentioned if "discriminatory" is not sufficient, In addi-
tion, "discriminatory" does not fully capture the essence of the prob-
lem. Prosecution under a statute seldom used is, of course, one way to
harass unpopular people; prosecution for common offenses on trumped-
up charges is another. I think bad faith, the term used by the Supreme
Court in discussing anti-suit injunctions,5 2 should be added to "dis-
criminatory" and the confusing, possibly redundant reference to equal
protection removed.
My proposal would require the federal court to dismiss unless it
found the unrelated prosecution baseless or discriminatory; it could
not proceed to try the facts and determine whether an offense had in
fact been committed. Thus the courts would be unable to protect fully
against harassment, but full protection could be assured only at the
enormous cost of allowing all suits against civil-rights workers to be
tried in federal court. This would be better than the proposal to in-
clude all suits against Negroes, since by no means all Negroes are active
fighters for equal rights and since the greatest danger of harassment
is to those who are. I think the broader proposal would be constitu-
tional: If it is demonstrated that Negroes are excluded from electing
judges, or from sitting on juries, or if they systematically are given
higher sentences or subjected to higher bail than other people similarly
situated, the likelihood that the state courts will treat Negroes or their
advocates unfairly is substantial enough to make a federal trial forum
an appropriate means of assuring that the state does not deny them
5sl Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
582 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965).
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the equal protection of the laws. Such cases, even without a specific
federal defense except the probability of unfair treatment by state
courts, would arise under federal law-the statutory grant of jurisdic-
tion as a reasonable exercise of the power given by the fifth section of
the fourteenth amendment.583
Whether therefore the statute ought to provide a federal forum
whenever a civil-rights worker is prosecuted in a state whose courts
are unfair to Negroes, or only to allow a federal court to abort charges
that are baseless or discriminatory, depends upon the gravity and ex-
tent of state-court impropriety in this sort of case. In the absence of
more detailed evidence I favor the more limited version, especially be-
cause requiring proof that the claim is without basis would permit the
statute to be drafted without the necessity of defining the class within
its protection. To protect the civil-rights worker alone would be in-
complete, for he can be harassed by prosecution of his family and
friends; even to define the civil-rights worker, outside the context of a
prosecution for civil-rights activity directly, would be difficult,584 and
defining his friends and relations adequately would be impossible. The
problem, in other words, is not one that can be wholly solved without
doing away with state criminal jurisdiction altogether, and perhaps
with state civil jurisdiction too.
It remains to discuss whether injunction, removal, or habeas corpus
is the best avenue for providing federal relief against improper state
prosecutions. The ALI favors injunction, because removal has the
disadvantage of automatically stopping the state proceeding before it
has been determined to be illegal.585 Removal need not have this con-
sequence, and it can be argued that the everyday process of removal is
less irritating than the extraordinary, peremptory command of the in-
junction. But the injunction has the advantage of making clear that
the federal court is expected only to determine the single issue of federal
right, while removal suggests, though again it could be made other-
wise, that the entire trial is to be federal. More serious are the tech-
nical limitations of removal and of habeas corpus as they have been
defined. A case can be removed only after it has been fied in state
court, and habeas lies, so far, only if there is some form of custody or
restraint of the state-court defendant.58 6 It does not work if the de-
583 See the discussion of protective jurisdiction, text at notes 68-73 supra.
584 Would a single letter to the mayor suffice? Participation in a march ten years
before?
585 TENT. D AFr No. 6, at 114.
586 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964). For relaxation of this requirement see Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236 (1963) (parole); Peyton vi Rowe, 890 US. 978 (1968) (sentence not yet being
served).
1969]
The University of Chicago Law Review
fendant is only to be fined or to be subjected to civil liability, or if he
is free on bail. A statute, of course, could remove these limitations at
the expense of the English language; although terminology ought to
be the least of our worries, I agree with the ALI that injunction lends
itself best to covering the diverse situations in which federal protection
should be provided.
Finally, I think it clear that a special provision must be made to
assure that such injunctions will in fact be issued. In all but civil-
rights cases I think it sufficient to provide that injunctions against suit
may be granted only when necessary to prevent grave and irreparable
harm. But under just such a formulation, developed by the courts
themselves without statutory compulsion, the Supreme Court has re-
cently held that an injunction will not issue to forbid prosecution for
civil-rights activities protected by the Constitution in Mississippi.587
Congress should make clear its disagreement.
A serious question is whether there ought to be a requirement of ex-
haustion of state remedies before seeking the federal injunction. In
cases not involving civil rights such a requirement makes sense; if there
is a reasonably efficient pre-trial state procedure for protecting the fed-
eral right, it should be first explored in order to minimize friction. But
to require Mississippi picketers to ask the state courts to enjoin prosecu-
tion seems rather futile. The likelihood of a state's acting improperly,
of course, will be relevant to the plaintiff's case for proving irreparable
injury, but the statute should make clear that the necessity for federal
protection of civil rights is so great and the likelihood of state im-
propriety so high that the delays and costs of applying for state pre-trial
relief need not always be incurred.
The ALI also proposes to relax the Supreme Court's virtually abso-
lute ban on state-court injunctions against federal proceedings. 588 The
amendment is a good thing; there may be occasions when, as in the
filing of multiple actions on a cause of action already concluded by
judgment, the state court is in the best position to prevent irreparable
harm. But the danger that state-court injunctions might interfere with
the legitimate operations of the federal courts, and the frequent in-
sufficiency of Supreme Court review to correct the excesses of state
courts in injunction cases, suggest that the ALI is right in defining the
occasions for such injunctions very strictly. The two categories are easy
to understand: "to protect the jurisdiction of the court over property in
its custody or subject to its control" and "to protect against vexatious
587 Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
588 Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 US. 408, 412 (1964), admitted in dictum the
possibility of state-court injunctions to protect in rem jurisdiction.
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and harassing relitigation of matters determined by an existing judg-
ment of the State court in a civil action. '9 8 9
The problem of multiple litigation deserves special mention. Two
suits over a single controversy are almost never tolerable. The policy
against the resultant waste of time and money is reflected in federal
rules respecting res judicata and pendent jurisdiction. Yet the notion
persists that a party is free to sue the same defendant twice at the same
time, though not consecutively, or that a defendant may sue the plaintiff
in another court at the same time. A race to the courthouse is arbitrary
and unseemly, but it is no more so than the present race to judgment
in two suits filed one after the other, and it involves a good deal less
waste. The Judicial Code should be amended to provide that a state
or federal court must stay any action filed, whether in rem or in per-
sonam, concerning substantially the same parties and subject matter
already in issue in another court. If, however, because of joinder of
parties or causes the second court can more fully decide the controversy
than can the first, the first suit should be stayed.590
MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
The ALI proposals do not deal with the entire Judicial Code, nor
even with all its jurisdictional provisions. The sections dealing with
court organization are obviously outside the scope of the inquiry. Less
clear, however, is the exclusion of appellate jurisdiction and habeas
corpus from general consideration. The latter omission can be ex-
plained by the desire not to jeopardize the new Code by controversial
provisions and the former simply by saying that the district courts are
a big enough problem to tackle at one time. I hope the Institute will
soon give its attention to these other matters too; the passage of the
new Code, if that is to be, should not obscure the real problems that
exist outside it.
The major problem affecting appellate jurisdiction is to free the
Supreme Court from the lingering burden of appeals that it has no
power to decline . 91 The Court can serve its principal function of clari-
fying important questions of law only if it is free from the obligation
of deciding insignifidant cases; recognizing the conflicting demands on
589 TErN. DRAFr No. 6, at 42-43, § 1373.
590 Present law apparently gives the trial judge considerable discretion in this regard.
See, e.g., Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952) (two federal
actions); Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965) (requiring stay by federal court pending
resolution of a later-filed state reapportionment suit); Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103,
106-7 (4th Cir. 1967).
591 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964); 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1253, 1254(2),
1257(l) (1964).
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its time, the Court has resorted to less than legitimate practices to spare
it undesired appeals. 592 Congress ought to make the certiorari practice
applicable throughout the Court's jurisdiction; since the Supreme
Court is entrusted with the substantive protection of federal rights, it
can be trusted to determine which cases are most in need of review. 3
Especially onerous and without cause are the provisions for direct re-
view of district-court decisions in routine ICC and government anti-
trust cases; either the Court is required to probe the facts extensively,
with great waste of its time, or the case receives no effective review at
all.594 Government antitrust cases should be reviewed in the courts of
appeals; ICC orders, like those of the NLRB and many other federal
agencies, should be tested in the courts of appeals as well. I also would
repeal the provisions for direct Supreme Court review of orders dis-
missing criminal indictments5 95 and holding federal statutes unconsti-
tutional in government litigation.590 Surely not all decisions frustrating
criminal prosecutions demand the attention of the Supreme Court, 97
and the ALI's willingness to abolish three-judge courts for testing fed-
eral statutes598 suggests that the companion provision for direct appeal
of constitutional cases is no longer warranted either. Finally, the pro-
vision for direct review of three-judge courts in cases attacking state
statutes is a natural response to the fact that three judges hear the case
to begin with; but the speed of direct Supreme Court review is not
called for unless the state law has been held unconstitutional, and in
any event I should prefer to see the three-judge requirement done away
with.
The law of post-conviction review is in quite a mess, thanks in part
to the Supreme Court's commendable expansions of habeas corpus and
to the lack of congressional sympathy. Perhaps in this state of affairs the
reformer is best advised not to stir up the legislative hornets. But
desirable changes would include broadening habeas for military
592 See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956); Wiener, The Supreme Court's New
Rules, 68 HAv. L. REv. 20, 51 (1954). Cf. the certification practice, discussed in D.
CumuE, FDERAL, CouRTs 223-4 (1968).
593 See Moore & Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appellate
Procedure, 35 VA. L. Rxv. 1, 45 (1949).
594 See the Court's protest against the antitrust provision in United States v. Singer
Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 n.1 (1963). An ALI proposal to modify this statute, see TENT.
DRAFr No. 5, at 37-38, 209-13, was omitted in the later version because the matter is
under consideration by Congress. TENT. DRAFT No. 6, at 247.
595 18 U.S.C. § 3721 (1964).
596 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1964).
597 See generally the critical article by Professor Kurland, The Mersky Case and the
Criminal Appeals Act: A Suggestion for Amendment of the Statute, 28 U. Cm. L. Rxv.
419 (1961).
598 See text at notes 517-8 supra.
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prisoners from its present confused state to the fall relief now afforded
state prisoners; 99 unifying the ragbag of remedies available to the fed-
eral civil prisoner;600 and eliminating altogether the weakening custody
requirement. 10  Short of constitutional mootness, every claim of an
unconstitutional conviction or sentence should be given one full hear-
ing in a federal civil court.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps I shall be accused of attempting to put the law of federal
jurisdiction into a strait jacket like that forged by Joseph Beale in the
conflict of laws.602 As one who has fought for several years to eradicate
the last traces of Beale's legacy603 I am somewhat sensitive to such a
charge, but I think there is a difference. In the first place, Beale's
system never attained the virtues of simplicity for which it was created.
In the second, he picked the wrong field to stress simplicity: While the
choice between federal and state courts will seldom predictably affect
the outcome of a case, the choice between competing substantive laws
is often a matter of critical importance. I would not sacrifice much for
simplicity; my proposals for eliminating jurisdictional complexity are
based upon the belief that in many cases it is not very important
whether a case is tried in federal or in state court. I should like to
summarize my position, in the words of Judge Charles E. Clark, as
a protest against "the waste, if not frustration, of a trial to decide if
there shall be a trial."
599 See D. CuRuE, FEDERAL. CovaRs 189-98 (1968).
600 See id. at 209-11.
601 See note 586 supra.
602 See J. BEATE, CONFUiCr OF LAWS (1935), passim.
603 See R. CRA&ITON & D. CuRIuE, CONFLIcr OF LAWs (1968), passim.
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